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We are pleased to be joined by Law Review members Joshua Harms, 
Natalie Reid, Edna Enriquez, Evanie Parr, Michael Parrott, and Gregory 
Swanson, and the rest of the Seattle University Law Review, who 
performed the research required to update this Survey. Many sections of 
this Survey were improved through editing and revisions, clarifying the 
discussions and analysis of cases. This marks the sixth publication of the 
Survey that was originally authored by Justice Robert F. Utter, 
Washington State Supreme Court (retired) in 1985, with updates published 
in 1988, 1998, 2005, and 2013. 
This Survey is intended to serve as a resource which Washington 
lawyers, judges, law enforcement officers, and others can turn to as an 
authoritative starting point for researching Washington search and seizure 
law. In order to be useful as a research tool, this Survey requires periodic 
updates to address new cases interpreting the Washington constitution and 
the U.S. Constitution and to reflect the current state of the law. Many of 
these cases involve the Washington State Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the Washington constitution. Also, as the U.S. Supreme Court has 
continued to examine Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
jurisprudence, its decisions and reflections on Washington law are 
discussed. 
Often the rules and approaches in interpreting the Washington 
constitution differ in certain areas from the analysis used by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Where that 
occurs, this Survey has identified the independent approach adopted by the 
Washington State Supreme Court. 
Article I, section 7 of the Washington constitution is a counterpart to 
the Fourth Amendment. That section provides that “no person shall be 
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of 
law.” The Washington State Supreme Court historically applied the 
analytical framework outlined in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 61–62, 
720 P.2d 808 (1986), in its case-by-case determination of the scope of 
protection afforded under article I, section 7, and in situations where 
greater individual protection exists under the Washington constitution than 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
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Gunwall adopted the following six neutral interpretive factors: (1) 
the textual language of the state constitution; (2) the significant differences 
in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions; (3) 
the state constitutional and common law history; (4) the preexisting state 
law; (5) the differences in structure between the federal and state 
constitutions; and (6) matters of particular state interest or local 
concern. Id. 
This analytical framework adopted in Gunwall provides the structure 
and foundation from which Washington courts continue to define the 
scope of article I, section 7. Recognizing the structural approach to state 
constitutional interpretation, however, continues to provide a reasoned 
method for resolving issues of state constitutional law. 
This Survey contains updated case comments and statutory 
references that are current through December 2018, and focuses primarily 
on search and seizure law in the criminal context; it omits discussion of 
many procedural issues, including those arising under court rules that 
implement constitutional protections. In addition, all references to Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 




Triggering Article I, Section 7 and the Fourth Amendment: 
Defining Searches and Seizures 
This chapter addresses three questions: (1) what is a search; (2) 
what is a seizure; and (3) who has standing to challenge a search or 
seizure? These questions represent the threshold inquiry in any search or 
seizure problem. Unless a search or seizure has occurred within the 
meaning of the federal or state constitution, constitutional protections are 
not triggered. This chapter first discusses when a search has occurred, 
from entries into the home to the taking of blood samples. The chapter 
then discusses when a seizure has occurred, be it an arrest, an 
investigatory stop, or the detainment of property. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of who may raise claims concerning article I, section 7 
or the Fourth Amendment. 
1.0 DEFINING “SEARCH” PRE-KATZ:  
“CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AREAS” 
Prior to 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court found Fourth Amendment 
protections in “constitutionally protected areas.” Berger v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41, 59, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967); Lopez v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–39, 83 S. Ct. 1381, 10 L. Ed. 2d 462 
(1963). The Fourth Amendment’s guarantees applied only to those 
searches that intruded into one of the “protected areas” enumerated 
within the Fourth Amendment: “persons” (including the bodies and 
clothing of individuals); “houses” (including apartments, hotel rooms, 
garages, business offices, stores, and warehouses); “papers” (such as 
letters); and “effects” (such as automobiles). See generally 1 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.1, at 562–76 (5th ed. 2012). 
This conception of the Fourth Amendment changed in 1967 when 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 88 
S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). In Katz, the Court found that the 
Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places.” Id. at 350–52, 88 S. 
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Ct. 507. That is, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. . . . [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Id. at 351, 
88 S. Ct. 507. The Court thus defined a search as that which invades an 
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 360, 88 S. Ct. 
507 (Harlan, J., concurring). The following sections examine the 
application of this “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis as well 
as the continued vitality of the “constitutionally protected area.” See 1 
LaFave, supra, § 2.1, at 562–96. 
1.1 DEFINING “SEARCH” POST-KATZ: THE “REASONABLE EXPECTATION 
OF PRIVACY” 
The concurring opinion in Katz, which has since been accepted as 
the Katz test, explained that the Fourth Amendment extends search and 
seizure protections to all situations in which a defendant has a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
360, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see 
1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.1, at 562–96 (5th ed. 2012). 
A reasonable expectation of privacy is measured by a twofold analysis. 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring). First, a 
person must have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy.” Id. For example, a person has no expectation of privacy where 
illegal business is openly conducted. State v. Clark, 129 Wn.2d 211, 226, 
916 P.2d 384 (1996); State v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d 229, 232, 830 P.2d 
658 (1992). Second, the individual’s expectation must be “one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 
88 S. Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001); State v. Carter, 
151 Wn.2d 118, 127, 85 P.3d 887 (2004); State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 
173, 189, 867 P.2d 593 (1994). This “legitimate” expectation of privacy 
“must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by 
reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to 
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 
(1978). 
Similarly, article I, section 7 extends search and seizure protections 
to one’s “private affairs” and home. Const. art I, § 7. The focus is on 
“those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should 
be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.” State 
v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 695, 92 P.3d 202 (2004) (quoting State v. 
Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151 (1984)). In the remainder of 
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this section, we discuss the protection of a person’s “private affairs” 
under article I, section 7 and the reasonable expectation of privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment, as both have been applied to the use of sensory-
enhancing devices and techniques such as canine sniffs, aerial 
surveillance, GPS trackers, and recording devices. 
 
1.1(a) Article I, Section 7 Analysis of Sensory-Enhancing Devices 
 and Techniques 
In applying article I, section 7, courts engage in a case-by-case 
analysis concerning the use of sensory-enhancing techniques in the 
course of police investigations. For example, whether a canine sniff 
constitutes a search remains an unanswered question in Washington. 
State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 181, 196 P.3d 658 (2008). Specifically, 
Washington courts have rejected a blanket rule that canine sniffs are not 
searches, focusing instead on the intrusiveness of the sniff and the 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Boyce, 44 Wn. 
App. 724, 730, 723 P.2d 28 (1986); see also State v. Hartzell, 156 Wn. 
App. 918, 929–30, 237 P.3d 928 (2010) (dog sniff of exterior of car door 
is not a search); State v. Stanphill, 53 Wn. App. 623, 631, 769 P.2d 861 
(1989) (dog sniff of package at post office is not a search). 
Furthermore, under article I, section 7, “[a]erial surveillance is not 
a search where the contraband is identifiable with the unaided eye, from 
a lawful vantage point, and from a nonintrusive altitude.” State v. Wilson, 
97 Wn. App. 578, 581, 988 P.2d 463 (1999); State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 
361, 365, 693 P.2d 81 (1985) (aerial surveillance of defendant’s property 
at an altitude of 3,400 feet without the aid of visual enhancement devices 
does not constitute a search); Myrick, 102 Wn.2d at 514, 688 P.2d 151 
(observation of defendant’s marijuana plants at an altitude of 1,500 feet 
with the unaided eye is not a search); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 2.3, at 724–803 (5th ed. 2012). Regarding GPS devices, a 
search occurs when the device is installed on an individual’s vehicle. 
State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 264, 76 P.3d 217 (2003). 
It is not a violation of article I, section 7 to record a conversation 
when a party consents. Clark, 129 Wn.2d at 221; State v. Pulido, 68 Wn. 
App. 59, 63, 841 P.2d 1251 (1992). However, it is unlawful to record 
any “[p]rivate communication transmitted by telephone, telegraph, radio, 
or other device between two or more individuals . . . without first 
obtaining the consent of all the participants in the communication.” 
RCW 9.73.030(1)(a) (emphasis added). An individual has “consented” 
to the recording of electronic communications, however, if the individual 
has knowledge that the communications will be recorded. State v. 
Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666, 676, 57 P.3d 255 (2002) (defendant was 
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deemed to have consented to the recording of the communications 
because he constructively knew that his attempts to arrange sexual 
encounters with a minor over an Internet instant messaging service were 
automatically recorded by the receiving computer); see also State v. 
Smith, 189 Wn.2d 655, 666, 405 P.3d 997 (2017) (defendant, as the user 
of his own cell phone and who is thereby considered generally familiar 
with its functions, is deemed to have consented to voice mail recordings 
that he inadvertently and unknowingly makes); In re Marriage of Farr, 
87 Wn. App. 177, 184, 940 P.2d 679 (1997) (because an answering 
machine’s only purpose is to record messages, a defendant who 
knowingly left messages on the answering machine has implicitly 
consented to the recording and has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
as to the recording). But see State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d 862, 876, 319 
P.3d 9 (2014) (defendant retained a privacy interest in text messages sent 
to and received by a third party’s phone when he was unaware that the 
recipient reading and responding to the messages was someone other 
than the intended recipient). Lastly, although an individual does not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation with a police 
officer recorded on a dashboard camera during a traffic stop, RCW 
9.73.090 nevertheless requires that the officer inform the individual, on 
camera, that the conversation is being recorded. Lewis v. State, Dep’t of 
Licensing, 157 Wn.2d 446, 473, 139 P.3d 1078 (2006). 
 
1.1(b) Fourth Amendment Analysis of Sensory-Enhancing  
Devices and Techniques 
Under the Fourth Amendment, a canine sniff does not normally 
constitute a “search” because “any interest in possessing contraband 
cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only 
reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy 
interest.’” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. 
Ed. 2d 842 (2005) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123, 
104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984)); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 
1, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013). For a discussion of the use 
of canine sniffs and probable cause, see Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 
133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013). See also infra § 2.4(b). 
Also, under the Fourth Amendment, aerial surveillance is not 
precluded merely because precautions are taken against ground 
surveillance. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 
90 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1986) (aerial surveillance of marijuana growing in a 
fenced backyard does not implicate Fourth Amendment because officer’s 
observations were merely from a public vantage point); see also Florida 
v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450, 109 S. Ct. 693, 102 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1989) 
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(surveillance of a residential backyard by a helicopter in a manner that 
does not interfere with the defendant’s normal use of their property is 
not a search). However, if highly sophisticated equipment is used in 
conducting the aerial surveillance, the Fourth Amendment may be 
implicated. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238, 106 S. 
Ct. 1819, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1986). 
There is also no legitimate expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment when one party consents to the recording of a conversation. 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 726, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 
530 (1984); see 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (“It shall not be unlawful . . . for a 
person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one 
of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such 
interception.”) (emphasis added). Therefore, a defendant who utilized a 
telephone answering service whereby both he and the caller were aware 
that a third party was taking messages had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the recorded message, and thus, no search occurred when the 
records were subsequently subpoenaed. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
740, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979). Further, under the Fourth 
Amendment, individuals maintain a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the records of their physical movements recorded and maintained through 
their cell phone’s wireless carrier service. Carpenter v. United States, 138 
S. Ct. 2206, 2217, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018). 
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the rule in Katz as adding 
to, not substituting for, the common law trespassory test that predated 
Katz. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409, 132 S. Ct. 945, 181 L. 
Ed. 2d 911 (2012). In Jones, the police attached a GPS device to the 
defendant’s vehicle without a warrant and tracked his movements for 
twenty-eight days. Id. at 403, 132 S. Ct. 945. Without addressing the 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court found that an 
improper “search” occurred because, in attaching the GPS device to the 
vehicle, the police had committed a common law trespass. Id. at 410, 132 
S. Ct. 945. This physical trespass, combined with an attempt to find 
something or obtain information, constituted a search. Id. at 407 n.5, 132 
S. Ct. 945. Accordingly, behavior possibly constituting a search is 
analyzed under either the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test 
or, when applicable, the common law trespass test resurrected in Jones. 
1.2 DEFINING “SEARCH” POST-KATZ: “CONSTITUTIONALLY 
 PROTECTED AREAS” 
Although the concept of “constitutionally protected areas” does not 
“serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem,” 
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Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 
576 (1967), the concept retains considerable clout. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has referred to “constitutionally protected areas” since Katz and 
has given special deference to the areas specifically enumerated within 
the Fourth Amendment. Because they are specifically enumerated in 
both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, houses and homes 
can be understood as such constitutionally protected areas. 
1.3 SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF POST-KATZ ANALYSIS 
1.3(a) Residential Premises 
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution states that no 
person shall have “his home invaded.” Const. art. I, § 7. The Washington 
State Supreme Court has held that article I, section 7 is more protective 
of the home than is the Fourth Amendment. State v. Groom, 133 Wn.2d 
679, 685, 947 P.2d 240 (1997). 
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.” U.S. 
Const. amend. IV. The core of the Fourth Amendment is “the right of a 
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
government intrusion.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 
81 S. Ct. 679, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1961); see also Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 34, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001) (“[I]n the case 
of the search of the interior of homes—the prototypical and hence most 
commonly litigated area of protected privacy—there is a ready criterion, 
with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of 
privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.”) 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police 
from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s 
home, absent exigent circumstances, to effect a routine felony arrest. 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 
639 (1980). In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and 
seizures of persons, courts have drawn the Fourth Amendment line at the 
entrance to the house. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511, 81 S. Ct. 679. 
A search of a home can occur even when government officers do 
not personally enter the home. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 186, 867 
P.2d 593 (1994) (“The constitutional line of privacy that encircles the 
home is more than just a barrier to physical penetration.”). Specifically, 
a search can occur when the “[g]overnment uses a device that is not in 
general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously 
have been unknowable without physical intrusion.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 
40, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (search occurred when thermal imaging device 
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monitored a home from a public street). Similarly, a search occurs when 
the government monitors an electronic device to determine whether a 
particular article or person is within an individual’s home at a particular 
time. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 
L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984); see also Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158, 84 
S. Ct. 1186, 12 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1964) (Clark, J., concurring) (the Fourth 
Amendment is implicated when a microphone used by police officers 
“penetrate[s]” the petitioner’s premises in a manner sufficient to 
constitute trespass). 
In Washington, the use of infrared surveillance of a home 
constitutes a search under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth 
Amendment. Young, 123 Wn.2d at 186, 867 P.2d 593. In contrast, using 
a flashlight to look through a window at night is no more invasive than 
using natural eyesight to look through a window in daylight, and it is 
therefore not a search. State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 400, 909 P.2d 
280 (1996). 
The privacy interest in a home is not confined to houses, but it 
extends to other types of residences. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 
U.S. 483, 490, 84 S. Ct. 889, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856 (1964) (hotel rooms); 
State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303 (1974) (apartments); 
State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 419, 937 P.2d 1110 (1997) (motel 
rooms); State v. Ramirez, 49 Wn. App. 814, 818, 746 P.2d 344 (1987) 
(hotel rooms). However, there is a reduced expectation of privacy in 
motor vehicles that are readily mobile but can also be used for sleeping. 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 389, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d 
406 (1985) (mobile motor home); see infra § 1.3(e). Additionally, there 
is a reduced privacy interest in those spaces where several persons or 
families occupy the premises in common, such as sharing common 
living quarters, where the defendant can demonstrate sole and exclusive 
control of the area searched. State v. Alexander, 41 Wn. App. 152, 155–
56, 704 P.2d 618 (1985). 
Despite the heightened protection of the home, objects and 
activities that are exposed to the “plain view” of outsiders are not 
protected because no intention to keep them private has been exhibited. 
State v. Clark, 129 Wn.2d 211, 229–30, 916 P.2d 384 (1996). 
Accordingly, a person may forfeit his or her privacy interest in an 
activity or object in the home by failing to protect the activity or 
object from observation by persons outside the home. State v. 
Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 408, 47 P.3d 127 (2002). For example, a 
privacy expectation in an individual’s home is not reasonable when the 
individual positions himself in front of a window with the lights on and 
drapes open. State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wn. App. 592, 595, 675 P.2d 631 
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(1984). In contrast, drawing the curtains demonstrates a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and the fact that an individual failed to 
completely shut the curtains does not diminish the reasonableness of that 
expectation. State v. Jordan, 29 Wn. App. 924, 927, 631 P.2d 989 
(1981). Under this “open view” doctrine, no search has occurred when 
an officer is lawfully present at a vantage point and able to detect 
something by utilization of one or more of his or her senses. State v. 
Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 313, 4 P.3d 130 (2000). 
A person may waive his or her right to privacy by willingly 
admitting a visitor; for example, waiver may occur where a person 
admits an undercover police officer into the premises to conduct an 
illegal transaction. See State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 848, 904 P.2d 
290 (1995) (defendant waived any right to privacy by willingly admitting 
plainclothes officer into a motel room to conduct a drug transaction); see 
also State v. Dalton, 43 Wn. App. 279, 284–85, 716 P.2d 940 (1986) 
(student invited officer into college dormitory to conduct an illegal drug 
transaction; warrantless entry upheld as nonintrusive because police 
were invited in and took nothing except what would have been taken by 
a willing purchaser). A person does not, however, relinquish the privacy 
interest in the home by opening the door in response to a police officer’s 
knock. State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89 (1985). For 
a discussion of the distinction between the plain view doctrine and the 
open view doctrine, see infra § 5.5. 
Courts in some jurisdictions have held that common hallways of 
multiple-dwelling buildings that are accessible to the public are not 
protected areas. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252–
53 (3d Cir. 1992); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(b), at 
739–48 (5th ed. 2012). For example, even if a building is secure and not 
accessible to the public, some courts have found no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the common hallways. See, e.g., United States 
v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993) (apartment dweller 
of “high security” apartment building has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the common areas of the building—search is valid even 
though officer trespassed). See generally 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.3(b), at 
739–48. However, certain uses may grant residents a greater expectation 
of privacy in building common areas. See State v. Houvener, 145 Wn. 
App. 408, 419–22, 186 P.3d 370 (2008) (residents in university 
dormitory had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas 
of their floor given their intimate academic and social experiences and 
“common interest” in the maintenance of their privacy). In addition, the 
Fourth Amendment is triggered when a housing inspector enters to 
conduct an administrative search. See Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 
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534, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967); City of Seattle v. McCready, 
124 Wn.2d 300, 309, 877 P.2d 686 (1994). Administrative searches are 
discussed infra § 2.9(a). 
1.3(b) The Curtilage and Adjoining Lands 
The “curtilage” of residential premises consists of “all buildings in 
close proximity to a dwelling, which are continually used for carrying on 
domestic employment; or such place as is necessary and convenient to a 
dwelling, and is habitually used for family purposes.” United States v. 
Potts, 297 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1961). The curtilage has been considered 
“part of [the] home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,” and thus 
receives Fourth Amendment protections. Oliver v. United States, 466 
U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified four factors that should be 
reviewed in determining the extent of a residence’s curtilage: 
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, 
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the 
home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the 
steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation 
by people passing by. 
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 94 L. Ed. 
2d 326 (1987). The Dunn Court expressly declined to adopt a 
“bright-line” rule that the curtilage extends “no farther than the 
nearest fence surrounding a fenced house.” Id. at 301 n.4, 107 S. Ct. 
1134. Rather, a court is to use the factors identified above as a tool 
in determining whether the area in question is so intimately tied to 
the home as to fall within “the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth 
Amendment protection.” Id. at 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134; see, e.g., United 
States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2010) (small, enclosed 
yard adjacent to a home in a residential neighborhood is “clearly 
marked” area “to which the activity of home life extends,” and therefore 
within the curtilage); United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1079–80 
(9th Cir. 2008) (workshop not within the curtilage when nearly 200 feet 
from the house, not shielded from view, set apart from house by a fence, 
and from which no domestic activity was observed); State v. 
Niedergang, 43 Wn. App. 656, 662, 719 P.2d 576 (1986) (car parked 
in cul-de-sac where any member of the public could park is not within 
curtilage). 
The curtilage also includes lands adjacent to a dwelling in which 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Wattenburg v. United States, 
388 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1968) (reasonable expectation of privacy 
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extends to backyard of lodge); see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178, 104 S. 
Ct. 1735, (individual may have legitimate expectation of privacy in 
“area immediately surrounding the home”); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at 780–92 (5th ed. 2012). 
Under Washington law, there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in areas of a home’s curtilage impliedly open to the public. State 
v. Smith, 118 Wn. App. 480, 484–85, 93 P.3d 877 (2003). An open 
curtilage is an area “apparently open to the public, such as the 
driveway, the walkway, or any access route leading to the residence.” 
State v. Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 123, 39 P.3d 324 (2002). A police 
officer with legitimate business, when acting in the same manner as a 
reasonably respectful citizen, may lawfully enter these open curtilage 
areas. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 312, 4 P.3d 130 (2000); see also 
State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280 (1996) (officer 
entitled to walk onto a porch, which was the usual access route to the 
house); State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 698–99, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) 
(unenclosed front porch held to be a public place, not a constitutionally 
protected area); State v. Gave, 77 Wn. App. 333, 337, 890 P.2d 1088 
(1995) (driveway, walkway, or access routes leading to residence or to 
porch of residence are all areas of “curtilage” impliedly open to the 
public); State v. Graffius, 74 Wn. App. 23, 24, 871 P.2d 1115 (1994) 
(driveway commonly used for guests and members of the public not 
protected). Upon entering these areas in the same manner as a 
reasonably respectful citizen, Ross, 141 Wn.2d at 312, 4 P.3d 130, the 
officer is free to use his or her senses, State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 
793, 807, 92 P.3d 228 (2004). 
When a police officer enters a property through an impliedly open 
curtilage area and discovers evidence, a court will consider a 
combination of factors to analyze the admissibility of evidence, 
including whether the officer (1) spied into the residence; (2) acted 
secretly; (3) acted after dark; (4) used the normal, most direct access 
route; (5) tried to contact the resident; (6) created an artificial vantage 
point; or (7) made the discovery accidentally. State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 
332, 345, 815 P.2d 761 (1991) (citing State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 
905, 632 P.2d 44 (1981)); see Thompson, 151 Wn.2d at 807, 92 P.3d 228 
(quoting Seagull, 95 Wn.2d at 901, 632 P.2d 44 (“The mere observation 
of that which is there to be seen does not necessarily constitute a 
search.”)); Ross, 141 Wn.2d at 312, 4 P.3d 130 (reasonably respectful 
citizen rule); State v. Boethin, 126 Wn. App. 695, 700, 109 P.3d 461 
(2005) (evidence suppressed when, in traversing from the stairs to the 
garage and putting their noses close to the garage door, officers deviated 
substantially from what a reasonably respectful citizen would have 
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done); State v. Jesson, 142 Wn. App. 852, 859, 177 P.3d 139 (2008) 
(“While the ‘No Trespassing’ signs alone are not sufficient to remove 
implied consent to the access of the property via the driveway, the closed 
gate, the primitive road, the secluded location of the home in addition to 
the posted signs are sufficient.”); State v. Mierz, 72 Wn. App. 783, 791, 
866 P.2d 65 (1994), aff’d, 127 Wn.2d 460, 901 P.2d 286 (1995) 
(warrantless intrusion into a backyard, which was enclosed by a six-
foot fence and padlocked gate, violated the Fourth Amendment). 
1.3(c) “Open Fields” 
The expectation of privacy in structures located and viewed from 
outside the curtilage, but on private property, is the same as the 
expectation of privacy in those structures viewed from public places. 
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 94 L. Ed. 2d 
326 (1987). Therefore, police officers standing in an open field could 
look into a barn even if the defendant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the barn. Id.; see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 2.4(a)–(b), at 804–32 (5th ed. 2012). Under this “open fields” doctrine, 
an expectation of privacy in open fields is unreasonable. Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 179, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984) 
(“[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities 
that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference 
or surveillance.”). 
Moreover, a person in possession of land falling within the purview 
of the open fields doctrine cannot create a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the area by taking steps to conceal activities such as posting 
“no trespassing” signs or erecting fences around the secluded areas. Id. 
at 182–83, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (issue was whether the “government’s 
intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the 
Fourth Amendment”); State v. Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 123, 39 P.3d 
324 (2002) (presence of “no trespassing” signs is not dispositive of the 
homeowner’s reasonable expectation of privacy). In addition, the fact 
that police commit a common law trespass while observing an object or 
activity in an open field does not render the intrusion a search under the 
federal constitution. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183, 104 S. Ct. 1735. Thus, an 
intrusion may be onto the land itself as well as by aerial surveillance, and 
yet it may still not be considered a search. See id. 
Under article I, section 7, the relevant inquiry is not whether the 
observed object was in a protected place or whether the defendant had a 
legitimate and subjective expectation of privacy in the observed location, 
but rather whether “the State unreasonably intruded into the defendant’s 
‘private affairs.’” State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151 
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(1984); State v. Wilson, 97 Wn. App. 578, 581, 988 P.2d 463 (1999). The 
nature of the property may be a factor in determining what constitutes 
“private affairs,” but the fact that the location of the search is an open 
field is not conclusive. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d at 513, 688 P.2d 151. 
1.3(d) Business and Commercial Premises 
The Fourth Amendment privacy protections extend to most business 
and commercial premises. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 
235, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1986); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 
436 U.S. 307, 311, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (OSHA 
inspector’s entry into the nonpublic working areas of electrical and 
plumbing business constituted a search). Some Washington courts have 
interpreted article I, section 7 to be coextensive with the Fourth 
Amendment in this context. See Seymour v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health, 
Dental Quality Assur. Comm’n, 152 Wn. App. 156, 160, 216 P.3d 1039 
(2009); Centimark Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 129 Wn. App. 368, 
375, 119 P.3d 865 (2005). The expectation of privacy in commercial 
properties, however, is less than in the home. New York v. Burger, 482 
U.S. 691, 699, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1987); Centimark Corp., 
129 Wn. App. at 376, 119 P.3d 865 (“[A]n expectation of privacy in 
commercial premises is different, and less significant, than a ‘similar 
expectation in an individual's home.’”). 
Similarly, the warrantless entry into the public lobby of a motel or 
restaurant for the purpose of serving an administrative subpoena is 
permitted although the “administrative subpoena itself [does] not 
authorize either entry or inspection of [the] premises.” Donovan v. Lone 
Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 413–14, 104 S. Ct. 769, 78 L. Ed. 2d 567 
(1984) (an employer may not insist on a warrant as a condition precedent 
to a valid administrative subpoena unless government inspectors seek 
nonconsensual entry into “areas not open to the public”). 
 Given the lesser expectation of privacy, unlike searches of private 
homes, warrantless administrative searches of commercial property may 
be authorized by the Legislature without violating the Fourth 
Amendment. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702, 107 S. Ct. 2636. The Fourth 
Amendment could be violated, however, if the Legislature, in 
authorizing these warrantless administrative searches, failed to make 
rules governing the inspection procedure. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 
594, 599, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1981). 
Courts often consider certain factors in determining whether 
warrantless administrative searches are allowed. One factor considered 
is whether a business, such as the liquor or firearms business, has 
historically been extensively regulated. See, e.g., Burger, 482 U.S. at 
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707, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (automobile junkyards have historically been 
“closely regulated”). Due to such long histories of government oversight 
in these industries, these businesses do not enjoy a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 313, 98 S. Ct. 1816 
(distinguishing the liquor and firearms industries from ordinary 
businesses on the basis of “a long tradition of close government 
supervision”). 
Whether a place is a personal residence or a business may also 
affect whether it constitutes curtilage or an open field. Dow Chem. Co., 
476 U.S. at 239, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (aerial photographs from navigable 
airspace of open areas of an industrial plant complex with numerous 
structures spread over 2,000 acres not a search because area not 
“curtilage”).  
Courts have generally upheld police investigative entries into bus 
terminals, pool halls, bars, restaurants, and general stores such as 
furniture stores and variety stores. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 2.4(b), at 816–32 (5th ed. 2012). But the “‘implied invitation 
for customers to come in’ . . . extends only to those times when the 
premises are . . . ‘open to the public’; the mere fact that certain premises 
are open to the public at certain times does not justify entry by the police 
on other occasions.” Id. 
Although an individual enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his or her commercial premises, the warrant requirements for 
administrative searches of commercial premises may differ from those 
for searches in general. See infra § 6.4(b); see also 1 LaFave, supra, § 
2.4(b), at 816–32. 
1.3(e) Automobiles and Other Motor Vehicles 
Under article I, section 7, the protection against governmental 
intrusion into one’s “private affairs” includes automobiles and their 
contents. State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 494, 987 P.2d 73 (1999). 
Passengers in a vehicle also have a constitutionally protected privacy 
interest that does not diminish merely by virtue of entering a vehicle. Id. 
at 496, 987 P.2d 73. This privacy interest is independent of the driver’s 
privacy interest. Id. Thus, even when a driver is under arrest, “where 
officers do not have articulable suspicion that an individual is armed or 
dangerous and have nothing to independently connect such person to 
illegal activity,” a search of a passenger in an automobile is invalid. Id. 
at 498, 987 P.2d 73. 
Similarly, under the Fourth Amendment, automobiles constitute 
“effects.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 
L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977), overruled on other grounds by California v. 
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Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991). As a 
result, constitutional protections against unreasonable searches apply to 
automobiles and other motor vehicles. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 
112, 106 S. Ct. 960, 89 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1986) (“A citizen does not 
surrender all the protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering an 
automobile.”); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 
85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985). Passengers and drivers in automobiles, 
however, have a reduced expectation of privacy. Wyoming v. Houghton, 
526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999); see also 
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843 
(2004). 
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, this 
reduced expectation of privacy derives from both the pervasive schemes 
of regulation and the ready mobility unique to vehicles. See Carney, 471 
U.S. at 392, 105 S. Ct. 2066. As a result, even when a vehicle is used as a 
residence, its owner has a lesser expectation of privacy when that vehicle 
is readily mobile and licensed to operate on public streets. Id. at 393, 105 
S. Ct. 2066 (mobile home in public lot was treated as a vehicle); cf. State 
v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 449, 909 P.2d 293 (1996) (lessened privacy 
interest for sleeper compartment of a tractor-trailer rig). Additionally, 
courts have held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in things 
that are located on a vehicle’s exterior in plain view of passersby. State v. 
McKinney, 148 Wn.2d 20, 32, 60 P.3d 46 (2002) (computerized check of 
defendant’s license plate and driving record did not constitute a search 
under article I, section 7); see also United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 
F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007) (no search under Fourth Amendment). But 
see Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2018) 
(automobile exception under the Fourth Amendment does not permit 
officers to remove a vehicle cover and search vehicle located within the 
home’s curtilage). 
1.3(f) Personal Characteristics 
The Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what “a person 
knowingly exposes to the public.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). Personal characteristics 
such as facial features and voice tone are continually exposed to the 
public and therefore not protected under the Fourth Amendment. United 
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14, 93 S. Ct. 764, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1973) 
(“No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know 
the sound of his voice any more than he can reasonably expect that his 
face will be a mystery to the world.”). Like speech, handwriting is also 
often exposed to the public. Accordingly, an individual has no more 
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privacy in his handwriting than in the sound of his voice. United States 
v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21, 93 S. Ct. 774, 35 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1973). Article 
I, section 7 has been interpreted using this same analysis. Bedford v. 
Sugarman, 112 Wn.2d 500, 512, 772 P.2d 486 (1989) (no privacy with 
regard to one’s personality, appearance, and behavior, which would 
normally be exposed in public). 
In contrast to the lack of a general privacy interests in facial 
characteristics, voice exemplars, and handwriting, the taking of blood, 
urine, or DNA samples is considered a search within the meaning of both 
the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7. Ferguson v. Charleston, 
532 U.S. 67, 76, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001) (urine 
samples); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 
16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (blood samples); State v. Surge, 122 Wn. App. 
448, 454, 94 P.3d 345 (2004), aff’d, 160 Wn.2d 65, 156 P.3d 208 (2007) 
(DNA samples); State v. Baldwin, 109 Wn. App. 516, 523, 37 P.3d 1220 
(2001) (breath and blood sample); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wn. 
App. 795, 818–19, 10 P.3d 452 (2000) (urine samples). 
In Washington, mandatory blood testing, although considered a 
search, may still not violate article I, section 7 or the Fourth Amendment 
when testing an individual with a diminished privacy interest. See Surge, 
160 Wn.2d at 74, 156 P.3d 208 (convicted felons); In re Juveniles A, B, 
C, D, E, 121 Wn.2d 80, 93–94, 847 P.2d 455 (1993) (sexual offenders); 
State v. Meacham, 93 Wn.2d 735, 739, 612 P.2d 795 (1980) (putative 
fathers). These searches may be justified under the special needs 
doctrine. See infra § 6.1. 
An individual may also unknowingly consent to a seizure of his or 
her bodily fluids. For example, under RCW 46.20.308, any person who 
operates a vehicle is deemed to have consented to a blood alcohol test. 
See Baldwin, 109 Wn. App. at 525 (upholding constitutionality of 
implied consent statute). Further, a person retains no privacy interest in 
his saliva when he licks an envelope and places it in the mail. State v. 
Athan, 160 Wn.2d 354, 367, 158 P.3d 27 (2007). 
1.3(g) Personal Effects and Papers 
The Fourth Amendment expressly protects the right of privacy in 
“papers . . . and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Although it is not 
explicitly stated, article I, section 7 protects personal effects in so far as 
they constitute “private affairs.” Const. art. I, § 7. With regard to a 
person’s banking and home telephone records, garbage, and motel 
registry information, article I, section 7’s protection is broader than the 
protection provided by the Fourth Amendment. 
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Under the Washington Constitution, a person’s banking records 
constitute “private affairs” that are protected from warrantless searches. 
State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 244, 156 P.3d 864 (2007). However, there 
may be no expectation of privacy to an individual’s bank records or 
business transactions when a person exposes evidence of those 
transactions to a third party, such as an insurance company. State v. 
Farmer, 80 Wn. App. 795, 801, 911 P.2d 1030 (1996). Under the Fourth 
Amendment, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s 
bank records, checks, deposit slips, and other records relating to bank 
accounts because, according to the Court, such records “contain only 
information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their 
employees in the ordinary course of business.” United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435, 442, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 71 (1976). 
Under the U.S. Constitution, individuals using their home 
telephones have no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the phone 
numbers dialed. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46, 99 S. Ct. 
2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979). In State v. Gunwall, however, the 
Washington Supreme Court declined to follow Smith v. Maryland, 
finding that article I, section 7 was violated when the police used a pen 
register—a device that records or decodes electronic impulses 
transmitted on a home telephone line, see RCW 9.73.260(1)(d)—without 
lawful authority to make a record of the local and long distance telephone 
numbers dialed on the customer’s telephone. State v. Gunwall, 106 
Wn.2d 54, 68–69, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).  
Likewise, although the U.S. Constitution does not protect an 
expectation of privacy in one’s trash after it has been left outside to be 
picked up, California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 
100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988), the Washington Constitution does, State v. 
Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 578, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990). This expectation of 
privacy, however, can be lost depending on the circumstances. For 
example, one court has found that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in garbage bags left in front of a neighboring abandoned house. 
State v. Hepton, 113 Wn. App. 673, 679, 54 P.3d 233 (2002). Another 
court has found no reasonable expectation of privacy in stolen goods 
hidden in a community garbage receptacle. State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn. 
App. 409, 418, 828 P.2d 636 (1992). Another court, however, has found 
that a person’s privacy right in his or her garbage “must be evaluated in 
terms of the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy and the 
reasonableness of the governmental intrusion . . . this privacy right is not 
limited by the location of the garbage or the act of placing the garbage 
in the can.” State v. Sweeney, 125 Wn. App. 881, 887, 107 P.3d 110 
(2005). 
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Article I, section 7 protects information that may provide intimate 
details about a person’s activities or associations contained in a motel 
registry, including information as to where an individual is located 
within the motel, as a “private affair” that the police may not search 
without an individualized suspicion. State v. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121, 
130, 156 P.3d 893 (2007). Under the Fourth Amendment, however, 
courts have found that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
motel guest registration records. United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 
1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). 
With regard to information contained on personal computers, the 
Ninth Circuit has held that an individual has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in a personal computer. United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 
1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). This privacy interest diminishes, however, 
when a person installs and uses file-sharing software, thereby exposing 
his or her computer to other people. United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 
1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit has also found that the use 
of pen registers for computers—which identified the “to” and “from” 
addresses for e-mail messages, the IP addresses of websites visited, and 
the total data transmitted—did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510, 511 (9th Cir. 2008). 
Analogizing to both physical mail and the telephone information 
obtained in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, by means 
of a pen register, the court found dispositive the fact that the police only 
obtained addressing information and not the contents of the messages. 
Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510. 
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, a search 
does not occur when the police search property that was voluntarily 
abandoned. State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282, 287–88, 27 P.3d 200 
(2001) (no expectation of privacy in the contents of a jacket that was 
abandoned during an arrest). Whether property has been abandoned 
depends on an individual’s actions and intent, which can be inferred from 
the circumstances. State v. Dugas, 109 Wn. App. 592, 595, 36 P.3d 577 
(2001) (no abandonment when defendant asked police if he could take 
off his jacket because he felt hot and then placed the jacket on the hood 
of his car); see also State v. Kealey, 80 Wn. App. 162, 173, 907 P.2d 319 
(1995) (lost or mislaid property is not considered abandoned). In 
Washington, abandonment does not occur when the property is located 
in an area that retains privacy protections, even if the individual denies 
ownership of the property. State v. Evans, 159 Wn.2d 402, 413, 150 P.3d 
105 (2007) (briefcase found in defendant’s car that defendant denied 
owning was not abandoned property when located in an area where 
defendant has a privacy interest). 
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Lastly, both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 protect a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of first-class mail and 
sealed packages. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114, 104 S. Ct. 
1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984); State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d 862, 873, 319 
P.3d 9 (2014). However, senders of mail have no reasonable expectation 
of privacy prohibiting a canine sniff of the package or protecting their 
names and addresses on the exterior of a package. State v. Stanphill, 53 
Wn. App. 623, 627, 769 P.2d 861 (1989) (release of information at request 
of police regarding arrival of package did not unreasonably intrude into 
private affairs).  
1.4 DEFINING SEIZURES OF PERSONS 
The definition of a seizure is comparatively the same under both 
article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment. A seizure occurs when an 
officer, by physical force or by show of authority, restrains an 
individual’s freedom of movement. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 553, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). More 
specifically, a seizure occurs when a police officer’s behavior would 
communicate to a reasonable, innocent person that he or she is not free 
to ignore the officer’s presence and walk away. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 
626, 629, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 155 L. Ed. 2d 814 (2003); United States v. 
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 
(2002); United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 
2009); see also State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 574, 62 P.3d 489 
(2003) (“Under article I, section 7, a person is seized only when, by 
means of physical force or a show of authority his or her freedom of 
movement is restrained and a reasonable person would not have believed 
he or she is (1) free to leave, given all the circumstances, or (2) free to 
otherwise decline an officer's request and terminate the encounter.”) 
(internal citations omitted).  
If the individual’s movement was already restricted by 
something independent from police behavior—for example, the 
individual was a passenger on a bus and wanted to remain on the bus, 
or the individual was at work and thus obligated to the employer—the 
appropriate test is whether the individual felt free to terminate the 
encounter and ignore the officer’s questions. Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 436, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991); see also I.N.S. 
v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1984) 
(finding no seizure of the workplace or of the individual workers when 
INS agents moved systematically through the factory inquiring about the 
workers’ citizenship while other INS agents were stationed at the exits). 
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Whether a seizure occurs depends on both the police officer’s 
conduct as well as the setting in which that conduct occurs. Michigan v. 
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565 
(1988). Under federal law, an individual is not seized until he or she 
submits to an officer’s show of authority. California v. Hodari D., 499 
U.S. 621, 629, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991). Rejecting 
Hodari and its subjective test, the Washington Supreme Court has held 
that the standard under article I, section 7 is a “purely objective” one. 
State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498, 501, 957 P.2d 681 (1998). Police 
behavior that could amount to a show of authority constituting a seizure 
includes “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a 
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the 
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance 
with the officer’s request might be compelled.” Id. at 512, 957 P.2d 681 
(quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554–55, 100 S. Ct. 1870). 
Accordingly, a person cannot avoid seizure by failing to yield to an 
officer’s show of authority. State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 388, 219 
P.3d 651 (2009) (citing Young, 135 Wn.2d 498, 957 P.2d 681). 
An arrest occurs when a police officer “manifests an intent to take 
a person into custody and actually seizes or detains such person.” Id. at 
387, 219 P.3d 651. Not every seizure, however, is considered an arrest. 
Brief, investigative detentions, often called Terry stops, do not constitute 
arrests, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 
889 (1968), because they are limited in scope and duration. State v. 
Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d 594 (2003) (citing State v. Williams, 
102 Wn.2d 733, 740, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984)). For an in-depth discussion 
of Terry stops, see infra § 4.5. For a discussion of the level of proof 
needed to make seizures of the person, see infra §§ 2.1 (arrest) and 2.9(b) 
(Terry stop). 
When a person is detained in his or her own home both article I, 
section 7 and the Fourth Amendment may be triggered. Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981); 
State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89 (1985). Absent 
exigent circumstances, the police are prohibited from arresting 
individuals in their homes without authority of law, usually an arrest 
warrant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 
2d 639 (1980); State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 402, 166 P.3d 698 
(2007); Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at 429, 693 P.2d 89; see also supra § 
1.3(a). “After the police obtain a valid warrant they have lawful authority 
for a limited intrusion to enter a residence, execute the arrest, and then 
promptly leave.” Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d at 402, 166 P.3d 698. In executing 
a valid search warrant at a home, it is also reasonable for an officer to 
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“briefly detain occupants of that residence, to insure officer safety 
and an orderly completion of the search.” State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 
612, 618–19, 949 P.2d 856 (1998). Further, because there is a lesser 
expectation of privacy, the police may arrest someone without a 
warrant when the person voluntarily exits the home to speak to 
officers on an unenclosed front porch. State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 
688, 696, 861 P.2d 460 (1993); see also infra § 4.2. 
1.4(a) Consensual Encounters 
Not every encounter with a police officer amounts to a seizure. 
Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 185–
86, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004). A consensual encounter 
with an officer does not trigger the Fourth Amendment, even when 
the individual has been approached by an officer and is aware of the 
officer’s identity as an officer. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 
194, 200–01, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002) (citing 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 
229 (1983)); see also State v. Belanger, 36 Wn. App. 818, 820, 677 
P.2d 781 (1984). 
There is no clear definition of a consensual social contact; it lies 
somewhere between a cordial greeting and a detention for investigative 
purposes. State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d 656, 664, 222 P.3d 92 (2009). 
A common example of behavior constituting a consensual encounter 
rather than a seizure is when an officer asks for someone’s identification. 
See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185–86, 124 S. Ct. 2451; see also State v. O’Neill, 
148 Wn.2d 564, 577, 62 P.3d 489 (2003); State v. Hansen, 99 Wn. App. 
575, 578, 994 P.2d 855 (2000). A request for identification may 
constitute a seizure, however, when it follows a “considerable display of 
authority.” State v. Carney, 142 Wn. App. 197, 202, 174 P.3d 142 
(2007). 
Under article I, section 7, a social contact can evolve into a seizure. 
Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 665–66, 222 P.3d 92. For example, in 
Harrington, the Washington State Supreme Court found that although 
the interaction between the officer and defendant may have begun as a 
social contact on the street, it evolved into a seizure when another police 
officer arrived, and the first officer asked the defendant to remove his 
hands from his pockets and subsequently frisked him. Id. at 669, 222 
P.3d 92. Although the officers’ actions, when viewed individually, may 
not have amounted to a seizure, the actions did constitute a seizure when 
viewed cumulatively. Id. at 668, 222 P.3d 92; see also United States v. 
Washington, 490 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2007) (initial consensual 
encounter escalated into a seizure when, late at night, uniformed officers 
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questioned defendant, without informing him of his right to leave, and 
directed defendant to move to a location where the officers were in 
between defendant and his car); cf. State v. Smith, 154 Wn. App. 695, 
700–02, 226 P.3d 195 (2010) (defendant’s interactions with the police 
did not evolve into a seizure when police requested, but did not order, 
defendant to exit hotel room, asked for identification, and asked for 
consent to search defendant’s openly displayed wallet). 
1.4(b) Seizures of Persons in Vehicles 
A seizure of an automobile driver occurs as soon as an officer in a 
police car activates her emergency lights and addresses the driver. State 
v. Gantt, 163 Wn. App. 133, 141, 257 P.3d 682 (2011); State v. 
DeArman, 54 Wn. App. 621, 624, 774 P.2d 1247 (1989) (police seized 
the defendant when they pulled behind the vehicle and activated their 
emergency lights). A vehicle that voluntarily stops in response to 
emergency lights and police actions directed at a third party, however, is 
not seized. United States v. Al Nasser, 555 F.3d 722, 731 (9th Cir. 2009). 
The analysis differs somewhat with regard to individuals in parked 
vehicles because, once a vehicle is parked, its “occupants” (no longer 
“passenger” or “driver”) are ostensibly pedestrians. State v. O’Neill, 148 
Wn.2d 564, 579, 62 P.3d 489 (2003); see also State v. Johnson 156 
Wn. App. 82, 92, 231 P.3d 225 (2010) (no seizure when officer parked 
behind parked car and asked for, but did not demand, defendant’s 
identification). Such an encounter, however, can still ripen into a 
seizure when the police take additional actions. See State v. Beito, 147 
Wn. App. 504, 510, 195 P.3d 1023 (2008) (seizure of passenger 
occurred when officer stood outside of passenger door, blocking 
passenger from exiting, told driver she was not allowed to leave, and 
repeatedly asked passenger for identification). 
Under article I, section 7, absent a reasonable basis for the inquiry, 
a request for identification from a passenger of a vehicle for investigatory 
purposes constitutes a seizure. State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 697, 
92 P.3d 202 (2004) (distinguishing the court’s treatment of 
passengers versus pedestrians on the heightened privacy expectations in 
a vehicle). At least one Washington court, however, has narrowed this 
rule to only those circumstances in which a police officer has stopped a 
moving car with cause to detain and question the driver but not 
necessarily the passengers. State v. Mote, 129 Wn. App. 276, 291, 120 
P.3d 596 (2005). 
Under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, a seizure 
also occurs when officers stop automobiles without suspicion pursuant 
to a systematic “spot check” or roadblock, though the courts’ evaluation 
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of constitutionality of these seizures has varied. When examining the 
constitutionality of these seizures, the courts consider the government 
interest and nature of stop itself. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 
41, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000) (holding drug checkpoints 
intended primarily to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing 
unconstitutional); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–
50, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (holding drunk driving 
checkpoint constitutional given the “magnitude of the problem” and the 
State’s interests); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555–
56, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976) (holding permanent 
checkpoint near the border to interdict illegal aliens constitutional); City 
of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 457–60, 755 P.2d 775 (1988) 
(holding Seattle’s holiday sobriety checkpoint program unconstitutional 
under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment). “Spot check” 
or “checkpoint” seizures are often justified under the “special needs” 
doctrine and examined under a reasonableness standard. See infra § 6.3. 
1.5 DEFINING SEIZURES OF PROPERTY 
The Fourth Amendment protects both a person’s possessory interest 
in his or her “effects” and his or her privacy interest. United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1983). “A 
‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference 
with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” United States 
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984); 
State v. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594, 603, 918 P.2d 945 (1996). Put 
differently, an object is seized when government agents exercise 
“dominion and control” over the object. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120, 104 
S. Ct. 1652; Jackson, 82 Wn. App. at 603–04, 918 P.2d 945. Thus, 
impounding a room or securing a home constitutes a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment. State v. Ng, 104 Wn.2d 763, 770, 713 P.2d 63 
(1985) (citing State v. Bean, 89 Wn.2d 467, 472, 572 P.2d 1102 (1978)). 
At least one Washington court has found that transferring property within 
a home from one room to another could constitute a seizure. State v. 
Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 682, 879 P.2d 971 (1994) (agents asserted 
dominion and control over a shotgun, even though that control was 
temporary, by taking shotgun from the bedroom, unloading it, and 
carrying it into another room). 
In some circumstances, interference with an individual’s 
possessory interests may also implicate an individual’s liberty interests. 
For example, in Place, the seizure of luggage at an airport was 
determined to “effectively restrain the person since he is subjected to the 
possible disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with his luggage 
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or to arrange for its return.” 462 U.S. at 708, 103 S. Ct. 2637; see also 4 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.8(e), at 1006–27 (5th ed. 
2012). 
1.6 STANDING TO RAISE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CLAIMS 
In Washington, standing to challenge police action under article I, 
section 7 may take one of two forms: automatic standing or asserting a 
violation of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the object or 
place searched or seized. State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 841, 904 P.2d 
290 (1995) (citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86–87, 100 
S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980)); see also State v. Williams, 142 
Wn.2d 17, 23–24, 11 P.3d 714 (2000); State v. Libero, 168 Wn. App. 
612, 277 P.3d 708 (2012); State v. Kypreos, 110 Wn. App. 612, 39 
P.3d 371 (2002) (discussing history of automatic standing doctrine). 
The first form of standing is automatic standing. Article I, section 
7 of the Washington Constitution confers automatic standing upon 
anyone charged with a possessory crime regardless of whether the 
defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy. State v. Evans, 159 
Wn.2d 402, 407, 150 P.3d 105 (2007) (citing State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 
170, 179, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (plurality opinion) (upholding the use of 
automatic standing based on the state constitution)). Put another way, “a 
defendant who has been charged with an offense that has possession as 
an element has automatic standing to challenge the search that led to the 
discovery of the substance the defendant is charged with possessing.” 
State v. Chelly, 94 Wn. App. 254, 258, 970 P.2d 376 (1999); State v. 
Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793, 801, 690 P.2d 591 (1984).  
In order to claim automatic standing, the defendant must show that 
(1) possession is an “essential” element of the offense for which the 
defendant is charged and (2) the defendant was in possession of the seized 
property at the time of the contested search. State v. Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 
332, 45 P.3d 1062 (2002). The “fruits of the search” must directly relate 
to the search the defendant is challenging. State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d 
17, 23, 11 P.3d 714 (2000). But see State v. Libero, 168 Wn. App. 612, 
619, 277 P.3d 708 (2012) (“Automatic standing does not permit a 
defendant to collaterally attack a search on the basis that it violated 
another’s rights.”). 
The second form of standing analysis under article I, section 7 
mirrors the standing analysis under the Fourth Amendment, see State v. 
Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 841, 904 P.2d 290 (1995) (citing Salvucci, 448 
U.S. at 86–87, 100 S. Ct. 2547), and more often applies to persons 
charged with non-possessory crimes, State v. Francisco, 107 Wn. App. 
247, 249, 26 P.3d 1008 (2001). Under the Fourth Amendment, the 
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concept of standing has been merged with the substantive law of the 
Fourth Amendment’s privacy analysis. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
138–40, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978). Accordingly, 
in order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a 
defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an 
expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his 
expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has “a source outside of 
the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real 
or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized 
and permitted by society. 
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87–88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 
2d 373 (1998) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421); 
see also Williams, 142 Wn.2d at 23, 11 P.3d 714; State v. Link, 136 
Wn. App. 685, 692, 150 P.3d 610 (2007); Francisco, 107 Wn. App. 
at 252, 26 P.3d 1008. 
By merging the standing issue with the privacy analysis, the federal 
courts abandoned the concept of automatic standing. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 
at 92–93, 100 S. Ct. 2547. Hence, although the Fourth Amendment no 
longer applies to searches of stolen goods, it does apply to searches of 
legally possessed items discovered in the search of stolen goods, because 
an “illegal search only violates the rights of those who have ‘a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the invaded place.’” Id. (quoting Rakas, 439 
U.S. at 143, 99 S. Ct. 421) (holding that unlawful possession of stolen 
goods stored in the apartment of another does not confer on thieves a 
reasonable expectation of privacy as to the interior of the apartment). A 
person who resides in an apartment with the permission of the lessee and 
who has a key to the apartment may therefore assert a privacy interest in 
the interior of the apartment. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141–42, 99 S. Ct. 421 
(citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 
2d 697 (1960)). In many instances, an individual may be able to show 
both forms of standing because, generally, an individual “who owns or 
lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of [his or her] right to 
exclude.” Id. at 143 n.12, 99 S. Ct. 421. However, passengers in vehicles 
and houseguests have been found to have diminished privacy interests 
despite their immediate possession or control over the place searched. 
See id. at 148–50; State v. Boot, 81 Wn. App. 546, 551, 915 P.2d 592 
(1996). 
A mere passenger in a motor vehicle may not assert a personal 
privacy interest in the interior of the vehicle but may challenge his or her 
own seizure. Id. at 148–50, 99 S. Ct. 421; United States v. Pulliam, 405 
F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2005) (asserting a passenger’s authorized 
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presence in the vehicle was not determinative of a legitimate expectation 
of privacy); State v. Byrd, 110 Wn. App. 259, 264, 39 P.3d 1010 (2002) 
(“[A] passenger in a vehicle stopped by police officers can contest the 
lawfulness of the stop.”). An unauthorized driver, however, may have 
standing to challenge a search of the vehicle if she has received 
permission to use the car. United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 
(9th Cir. 2006) (defendant has standing to challenge search of rental car 
when he can prove permission from the authorized renter). 
With regard to a person’s presence in someone else’s home, an 
overnight guest has standing to challenge a search of the 
home. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96–97, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L. 
Ed. 2d 85 (1990). A defendant who was legitimately, but only casually, 
on the premises, however, does not necessarily demonstrate a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the home. State v. Boot, 81 Wn. App. 546, 551, 
915 P.2d 592 (1996). Four relevant but non-exhaustive factors for 
analyzing whether a social guest had standing are “(1) the defendant’s 
relationship with the homeowner or tenant; (2) the context and duration 
of the visit during which the search took place; (3) the frequency and 
duration of the defendant’s previous visits to the home; and (4) whether 
the defendant kept personal effects in the home.” State v. Link, 136 Wn. 





Standards of Proof 
2.0 THE NATURE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
This chapter summarizes the standards for probable cause for 
searches and seizures conducted with or without a warrant. Sections 2.1 
and 2.2 discuss the nature of the standard, while sections 2.3 through 2.8 
discuss specific types of information considered in the probable cause 
determination. Finally, section 2.9 summarizes the types of searches and 
seizures for which probable cause is either not required or a lesser standard 
is applied. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides 
that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. 
amend. IV. Under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, “[n]o 
person shall be disturbed . . . without authority of law.” Const. art I, § 7. 
As under the Fourth Amendment, this “authority of law” is fulfilled by a 
warrant issued upon probable cause that is established by sworn affidavit. 
State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 465, 158 P.3d 595 (2007); see also 
State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 108, 59 P.3d 58 (2002). The probable 
cause analysis is thus substantively the same under article I, section 7 and 
the Fourth Amendment. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 141, 187 P.3d 
248 (2008). 
The probable cause requirement is a fact-based determination 
representing a compromise between society’s competing interests in 
enforcing the law and protecting the individual’s right to privacy. State v. 
Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 182, 196 P.3d 658 (2008) (citing Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)). Probable 
cause requires reasonable grounds to believe that a defendant is guilty of 
a crime. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. 
Ed. 2d 769 (2003). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 3.2 (5th ed. 2012) (discussing the general nature of probable cause). The 
police officer must be aware of reasonably trustworthy information that 
would cause a reasonable officer to believe that a crime has been 
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committed. State v. Potter, 156 Wn.2d 835, 840, 132 P.3d 1089 (2006); 
State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872 (2004); State v. Reeb, 63 
Wn. App. 678, 681–82, 821 P.2d 84 (1992) (information need only be 
reasonably trustworthy, not absolutely accurate). The belief must be 
specific to the person to be searched or seized. Grande, 164 Wn.2d at 144, 
187 P.3d 248 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 
L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979)). 
Probable cause is required for most searches and seizures regardless 
of whether a search warrant is required, see Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 479–80, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963), or an arrest 
is made, State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160 (1994). 
Where a valid search or seizure occurs without a warrant, police may 
initially determine whether probable cause exists, but the grounds for the 
search or seizure must be strong enough to obtain a warrant. Wong Sun, 
371 U.S. at 480, 83 S. Ct. 407. A neutral and detached magistrate must 
make the probable cause determination for a warrant to issue. Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948). In 
addition, a suspect arrested without a warrant may not be detained for an 
extended period of time without a judicial determination of probable 
cause. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124–25, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 
2d 54 (1975). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.1. 
When federal officers are working with and assisting state officials, 
they must comply with the Washington Constitution. State v. Johnson, 75 
Wn. App. 692, 700, 879 P.2d 984 (1994). Conversely, when federal 
officers obtain evidence pursuant to federal law and independent of state 
officials, the evidence may be used in a state criminal proceeding even if 
the procedure involved would have violated the Washington Constitution. 
State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 591, 940 P.2d 54, (1997); In re 
Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 772–73, 808 P.2d 156 (1991). Courts have 
reasoned that the Washington Constitution cannot control the independent 
conduct of federal agents. State v. Bradley, 105 Wn.2d 898, 902–03, 719 
P.2d 546 (1986). Accordingly, where a federal warrant is served, the 
federal standard for probable cause applies even though the evidence 
would be used in state courts. See Johnson, 75 Wn. App. at 699, 879 P.2d 
984. 
Though the probable cause requirement is a fact-based 
determination, it may be satisfied even when police officers make a 
reasonable mistake of fact. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 117, 59 P.3d 58 
(incorrect date of informant’s observations in affidavit did not affect the 
finding of probable cause); In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 597, 989 P.2d 512 
(1999) (failure to assert in affidavit that defendant lacked a license to sell 
explosives was not critical when magistrate could reasonably infer that 
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defendant was probably engaged in the unlicensed manufacture and sale 
of explosives); State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 900, 908, 632 P.2d 44 
(1981) (warrant valid even though officer misidentified tomato plant as 
marijuana). Likewise, negligent or innocent mistakes are insufficient to 
void a finding of probable cause. State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 296, 21 
P.3d 262 (2001), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hughes, 154 
Wn.2d 118, 110 P.3d 192 (2005); Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 479, 158 P.3d 
595; In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 597, 989 P.2d 512. Probable cause can exist 
even where an incongruity is legal rather than factual: probable cause may 
still exist at the time of arrest even if the statute under which an individual 
is being arrested is later declared unconstitutional. State v. Afana, 169 
Wn.2d 169, 183, 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Potter, 129 Wn. App. 494, 
497, 119 P.3d 877 (2005). 
The probable cause requirement may not, however, be satisfied when 
the police make an “inexcusable mistake of law” (in other words, they 
incorrectly believe that certain conduct is unlawful), State v. Melrose, 2 
Wn. App. 824, 828, 470 P.2d 552 (1970), or when probable cause is based 
on a law “so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of 
reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws.” Michigan v. 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979). 
Additionally, if the defendant can show, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the affidavit on which probable cause was based contained 
“intentional material omissions or material omissions made with reckless 
disregard for the truth,” then the omitted evidence must be considered in 
the probable cause finding. Gore, 143 Wn.2d at 297, 21 P.3d 262. The 
defendant, however, must make a substantial showing as to both 
materiality and intentionality for the omission. State v. Garrison, 118 
Wn.2d 870, 872–73, 827 P.2d 1388 (1992) (per curiam) (mere showing of 
the omission of material that is critical to a finding of probable cause is 
not a sufficient preliminary showing that the omission was a reckless 
disregard for the truth). See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 
155–56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978). 
2.1 PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD: ARREST VERSUS SEARCH 
Generally, probable cause requires the same sufficiency of evidence 
regardless of whether it concerns a search or an arrest. State v. Grande, 
164 Wn.2d 135, 142, 187 P.3d 248 (2008) (citing 2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 3.1(b) (4th ed. 2004)). In practice, however, the 
standards are not necessarily identical: probable cause for a search does 
not always constitute probable cause for an arrest, and probable cause for 
an arrest does not necessarily justify a search. See State v. Dalton, 73 Wn. 
App. 132, 140, 868 P.2d 873 (1994) (“[P]robable cause to believe a man 
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has committed a crime on the street does not necessarily give rise to 
probable cause to search his home.”) (citing Commonwealth v. Kline, 234 
Pa. Super. 12, 17, 335 A.2d 361 (1975)). 
For a search, the officer must have probable cause to believe that the 
items to be seized are connected with criminal activity and will be found 
in the place to be searched. State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 145–47, 151, 
977 P.2d 582 (1999); State v. McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560, 570, 17 
P.3d 608 (2000) (inscribed crow bar alone provided insufficient nexus 
between alleged crimes and the defendant’s residence). Broad 
generalizations of criminal activity alone, by themselves, may not be 
sufficient. Thein, 138 Wn.2d at 147, 977 P.2d 582 (rejecting generalization 
that drug dealers keep drugs at home); State v. Jackson, 111 Wn. App. 
660, 688, 46 P.3d 257 (2002) (rejecting generalization that criminals 
commonly return to the scene of their crime); State v. Nordlund, 113 Wn. 
App. 171, 182–84, 53 P.3d 520 (2002) (generalized statements about the 
computer habits of sex offenders insufficient to justify search of 
defendant’s personal computer); State v. McGovern, 111 Wn. App. 495, 
499–501, 45 P.3d 624 (2002) (magistrate could infer that evidence of drug 
dealing would be found in defendant’s home based on generalization that 
drug dealers keep drugs at their home plus additional facts suggesting that 
“this drug dealer probably keeps drugs at his or her residence”); see also 
United States v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n 
assumption that most sixteen-year-old passengers have identification does 
not lead to probable cause to search every car carrying a teenager absent 
some individualized suspicion . . . .”). The item sought need not be at the 
place to be searched at the time the warrant is issued, but the magistrate 
must have reasonable grounds to believe it will be there at the time of the 
search. State v. Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 804, 67 P.3d 1135 (2003) 
(magistrate could reasonably infer that drugs or evidence of drug dealing 
were in the defendant’s home based on evidence that the defendant was 
dealing drugs from his home); State v. Perez, 92 Wn. App. 1, 7–9, 963 
P.2d 881 (1998) (sufficient facts supported inference of large-scale drug 
dealing to support search of alleged safe house). 
For an arrest, probable cause exists when the arresting officer has 
information that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the 
suspect has committed a crime. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 
872 (2004); State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 724, 927 P.2d 227 (1996); 
State v. Cerrillo, 122 Wn. App. 341, 350–51, 93 P.3d 960 (2004). Probable 
cause to arrest is a nontechnical standard based on the facts and 
circumstances known to the officer at the time of arrest. State v. Baxter, 
68 Wn.2d 416, 420, 413 P.2d 638 (1966); State v. Lewellyn, 78 Wn. App. 
788, 797–98, 895 P.2d 418 (1995), aff’d, 130 Wn.2d 215, 922 P.2d 811 
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(1996) (officer’s observations, defendant’s driving, and field sobriety tests 
supported probable cause for DWI arrest); State v. Garcia, 63 Wn. App. 
868, 870–75, 824 P.2d 1220 (1992) (hotel maid’s observations of folded 
papers in a drawer, diesel fuel smell, and telephone calls at all hours were 
not sufficient by themselves, but when combined with the police 
information of the suspect’s car on a drug trafficking tip sheet, did 
constitute sufficient probable cause); State v. Griffith, 61 Wn. App. 35, 
39–40, 808 P.2d 1171 (1991) (police had probable cause to arrest the 
defendant on a DWI charge when the defendant drove erratically, hit a 
roadway construction sign, did not stop in response to police emergency 
flashers, and proceeded to a home); State v. Fore, 56 Wn. App. 339, 343–
44, 783 P.2d 626 (1989) (probable cause existed based on officer’s 
observation of drug transactions in area with reported narcotics activity 
and performed in a manner similar to undercover buys made by the 
officer); see also State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 824–825, 147 P.3d 
1201 (2006) (probable cause existed for blood draw of suspect to compare 
with DNA samples from hospital rape-kit performed on victim), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wn.2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 
(2014); State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539, 541–42, 918 P.2d 527 (1996) 
(information obtained after defendant was arrested could not be used to 
establish probable cause for the arrest). Facts that arise after a warrant is 
issued are immaterial unless they were reasonably inferable when the 
warrant was issued. State v. Goble, 88 Wn. App. 503, 508, 945 P.2d 263 
(1997). Finally, where a seizure does not amount to an arrest, varied 
standards may apply. See infra § 2.9. 
2.2 PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD: CHARACTERISTICS  
2.2(a) Objective Test 
Under both the federal and state constitutions, the probable cause 
standard is an objective one. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S. Ct. 223, 
13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964); State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872 
(2004). The officer’s subjective belief is not determinative. State v. Huff, 
64 Wn. App. 641, 645, 826 P.2d 698 (1992). Accordingly, an officer’s 
good faith is not enough to justify a search absent probable cause, and 
likewise, an officer’s belief that probable cause was not present is also not 
determinative. Id.; see also State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702, 706, 60 
P.3d 116 (2002) (officer’s good faith reliance on an agency “hot sheet” 
would not validate an arrest if the “hot sheet” was not based upon probable 
cause), aff’d on other grounds, 152 Wn.2d 64, 93 P.3d 872; State v. 
Rodriguez-Torres, 77 Wn. App. 687, 693, 893 P.2d 650 (1995) (officer’s 
subjective belief that probable cause did not exist was not dispositive); 
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Huff, 64 Wn. App. at 645–46, 826 P.2d 698 (officer’s subjective belief that 
an offense has been committed does not cure a lack of probable cause). 
Additionally, the probable cause standard is determined with 
reference to a reasonable person with the expertise and experience of the 
officer in question. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897–98, 95 
S. Ct. 2585, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1975) (border patrol officers are entitled to 
draw inferences in light of their prior experience with aliens and 
smugglers). As a result, an officer’s particular training and expertise is 
highly important. State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 289, 906 P.2d 925 (1995) 
(acknowledging officer’s drug enforcement experience and ability to 
identify marijuana smell), abrogated on other grounds by In re Det. of 
Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 42 P.3d 952 (2002); Rodriguez-Torres, 77 Wn. 
App. at 693–94, 893 P.2d 650 (probable cause existed when an officer 
with specialized training in narcotics enforcement observed exchange of 
money for hidden, cupped object in an area known for narcotics, and de-
fendant fled upon notice of officer’s presence). The officer’s basis of 
knowledge, specific training, and experience must be included in the 
affidavit so that the magistrate may make an independent determination of 
probable cause and establish more than the officer’s personal belief. State 
v. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. 669, 678, 89 P.3d 232 (2004), reversed on other 
grounds, 154 Wn.2d 596, 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (noting that an affidavit’s 
failure to indicate an officer’s experience and education is not fatal to the 
resulting warrant’s validity if other facts establish probable cause), 
superseded by statute as stated in State v. Conover, 183 Wn.2d 706, 355 
P.3d 1093 (2015); State v. Johnson, 79 Wn. App. 776, 780, 904 P.2d 1188 
(1995). Similarly, a dog’s training and experience is important for 
establishing probable cause predicated on a canine sniff alert. See Florida 
v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 247, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013). 
2.2(b) Quantum of Evidence Required 
Probable cause is a quantum of evidence “less than . . . would 
justify . . . conviction,” yet “more than bare suspicion.” Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949). Although 
a single fact in isolation may not be sufficient, probable cause may exist 
when that fact is read together with other facts stated in the affidavit. State 
v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 110, 59 P.3d 58 (2002); State v. Tarter, 111 Wn. 
App. 336, 341, 44 P.3d 889 (2002). 
Accordingly, to make an arrest, the officer need only have reasonable 
grounds for suspicion and evidence of circumstances sufficiently strong 
enough to justify a cautious and disinterested person in believing that the 
suspect is guilty. State v. Scott, 93 Wn.2d 7, 10–11, 604 P.2d 943 (1980) 
(officers possessing description of car used in robbery and license number 
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of similar car used in robbery involving similar modus operandi had 
probable cause to arrest persons who were driving a similar vehicle toward 
the address where the car’s license number was traced). The exact 
quantum of evidence required is unclear and may depend in part on the 
nature of the intrusion and the seriousness of the offense. See generally 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(e) (5th ed. 2012). 
2.2(c) Individualized Suspicion 
Probable cause to arrest an individual exists only if police have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the particular individual has committed 
the crime. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 
238 (1979); State v. Grande 164 Wn.2d 135, 145, 187 P.3d 248 (2008). 
Accordingly, Washington courts have required individualized suspicion as 
to each occupant of a vehicle; the passenger cannot be arrested based 
solely on individualized suspicion as to the driver. Grande, 164 Wn.2d at 
146–47, 187 P.3d 248. Under the Fourth Amendment, however, a police 
officer may reasonably infer a “common enterprise” among passengers in 
a vehicle. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371–73, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 
L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003). 
Individualized suspicion may also be described as a sufficient nexus 
between the suspects to be searched and the criminal activity. State v. 
Carter, 79 Wn. App. 154, 158, 901 P.2d 335 (1995). This was not the case 
in Carter, where a police informant observed residents and non-residents 
of a building buying, selling, and using illegal drugs, but the informant 
was unable to identify any of the individuals by name. Id. at 156, 901 P.2d 
335. Based upon the informant’s observations, the police obtained a 
warrant to search “all ‘persons at the residence at the time the warrant i[s] 
being served as well as persons arriving at and leaving the residence at the 
time the warrant is being executed for controlled substances and papers of 
identification.’” Id. Upon execution of the warrant, the police found the 
defendant asleep on a mattress in the living room and discovered rock 
cocaine in his pants pocket. Id. at 157, 901 P.2d 335. The court held that 
the warrant did not justify a search of the defendant’s person because the 
observations of the informant did not support the conclusion that only 
illegal conduct occurred within the apartment and that any person present 
was likely to be involved with criminal activity “in such a way as to have 
evidence of the criminal activity on his person.” Id. at 161, 901 P.2d 335 
(quoting Stokes v. State, 604 So.2d 836, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)). 
However, the court carefully noted that it was not deciding whether 
warrants with “all persons present” language would be valid under 
different circumstances. Id. Washington courts also require individualized 
suspicion before the police search motel registries for outstanding 
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warrants. See State v. Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121, 130, 156 P.3d 893 (2007); 
In re Nichols, 171 Wn.2d 370, 377, 256 P.3d 1131 (2011). 
Individualized suspicion may not be required when the police are 
conducting a valid vehicle roadblock or spot check. See infra § 5.18. 
Further, individualized suspicion may also not be required for some 
administrative searches. See generally infra § 6.4(b)–(c). 
2.3 INFORMATION CONSIDERED: IN GENERAL 
A court reviewing a probable cause determination considers only the 
information that was available to the magistrate at the time that the warrant 
was issued to the officer. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
481–82, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); State v. Murray, 110 Wn.2d 
706, 709–10, 757 P.2d 487 (1988). Probable cause must be based on facts 
and not on mere conclusions. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113, 84 S. 
Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), abrogated on other grounds by Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); State v. 
Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 145–47, 977 P.2d 582 (1999). In addition, probable 
cause must exist at the actual time of arrest or search, and it cannot be 
stale. See State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d 354, 368, 275 P.3d 314 (2012) (no 
timely probable cause when affidavit failed to state when the informant 
observed a marijuana grow operation); State v. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d 499, 
505–06, 98 P.3d 1199 (2004) (delay in executing a warrant “may render 
the magistrate’s probable cause determination stale,” while the test for 
staleness is based on the facts and circumstances identified in the 
affidavit). 
Affidavits for search warrants must be evaluated in a commonsense, 
non-hypertechnical manner. In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 597, 989 P.2d 512 
(1999); State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 965, 639 P.2d 743 (1982); see infra 
§ 3.3(c). “The support for issuance of a search warrant is sufficient if, on 
reading the affidavits, an ordinary person would understand that a 
violation existed and was continuing at the time of the application.” 
Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 965, 639 P.2d 743 (quoting State v. Clay, 7 Wn. App. 
631, 637, 501 P.2d 603 (1972)). Upon review, all doubts are resolved in 
favor of the warrant’s validity. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d at 509, 98 P.3d 1199; 
State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 195, 867 P.2d 593 (1994); State v. Olson, 
73 Wn. App. 348, 354, 869 P.2d 110 (1994). 
Information need not be admissible at trial in order to support 
probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172–74, 69 S. Ct. 
1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949); Bokor v. Dep’t of Licensing, 74 Wn. App. 
523, 526, 874 P.2d 168 (1994). For example, marital privilege does not 
prevent a spouse’s statements from being used to establish probable cause. 
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State v. Bonaparte, 34 Wn. App. 285, 289, 660 P.2d 334 (1983). See 
generally infra § 7.3. 
Even if a search may have occurred illegally, “a search warrant [will] 
not [be] rendered totally invalid if the affidavit contains sufficient facts to 
establish probable cause independent of the illegally obtained 
information.” State v. Coates, 107 Wn.2d 882, 887, 735 P.2d 64 (1987). 
In Coates, police obtained a search warrant based partially on facts in 
violation of the defendant’s right to remain silent. Id. However, the court 
upheld the search warrant because other facts in the affidavit supported a 
finding of probable cause. Id. at 888–89, 735 P.2d 64. 
2.3(a) Hearsay 
Hearsay from an informant can establish probable cause for a warrant 
as long as there is evidence that provides reason to believe that the 
informant is reliable and has an adequate basis of knowledge. Spinelli v. 
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), 
abrogated on other grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 
2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113–14, 
84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), abrogated on other grounds by 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317; State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 
437–38, 688 P.2d 136 (1984) (“If the informant’s information is hearsay, 
the basis of knowledge prong can be satisfied if there is sufficient 
information so that the hearsay establishes a basis of knowledge.”). As a 
result, a magistrate may rely on a police officer’s affidavit or other 
testimony that relays hearsay information based on a fellow officer’s 
personal knowledge. State v. Lodge, 42 Wn. App. 380, 386, 711 P.2d 1078 
(1985). The affidavit may also relate hearsay from informants as long as 
there is a basis for crediting it. State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 209–10, 720 
P.2d 838 (1986); State v. Lund, 70 Wn. App. 437, 449–50 n.9, 853 P.2d 
1379 (1993); see infra § 2.5. Multiple levels of hearsay may also be 
considered if the requirements are met for each person in the chain of 
information. See Huft, 106 Wn.2d at 209–10, 720 P.2d 838 (concerned 
citizen information not sufficient without basis of informant’s 
knowledge); State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. App. 679, 683, 544 P.2d 786 (1975) 
(information passed to second detective by detective with personal 
knowledge of informant’s reliability sufficient to establish probable cause 
for arrest). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(d) 
(5th ed. 2012). 
2.3(b) Prior Arrests, Prior Convictions, and Reputation 
A magistrate or police officer making a probable cause determination 
may consider prior convictions that have probative value to the specific 
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probable cause inquiry. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 111 n.51, 59 P.3d 
58 (2002); State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 749, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001) 
(defendant’s prior conviction was “helpful in establishing probable cause” 
when the conviction was of the same general nature as the crime under 
investigation); State v. Sterling, 43 Wn. App. 846, 851, 719 P.2d 1357 
(1986) (occupant’s two prior convictions for narcotics can be a factor in 
determining probable cause). A prior criminal record—even of the same 
type of criminal conduct—does not alone justify a warrantless search. 
State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d 429 (1980); State v. Duncan, 
81 Wn. App. 70, 78, 912 P.2d 1090 (1996); see Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 
97, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 3.2(d) (5th ed. 2012). While prior acts may establish 
probable cause when the modus operandi is similar and distinctive, see 2 
LaFave, supra, § 3.2(d), a general assertion of criminal reputation is 
insufficient, Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 
L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has noted that an officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s 
reputation is a “practical consideration of everyday life” upon which an 
officer (or a magistrate) may rely in determining the reliability of an 
informant. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29 
L. Ed. 2d 723 (1971) (plurality opinion). Specific facts leading to a 
conclusion that a suspect has a bad reputation may also be considered. Id.; 
see 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.2(d). 
2.3(c) Increased Electrical Consumption 
Standing alone, an increase in electrical use does not constitute suf-
ficient probable cause to issue a search warrant. State v. Olson, 73 Wn. 
App. 348, 356, 869 P.2d 110 (1994); State v. Sterling, 43 Wn. App. 846, 
851, 719 P.2d 1357 (1986); State v. McPherson, 40 Wn. App. 298, 301, 
698 P.2d 563 (1985). Further, evidence of increased power consumption, 
absent other information, is an innocuous fact and cannot corroborate an 
anonymous tip of suspected criminal activity. State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 
173, 196, 867 P.2d 593 (1994); see also State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211, 
720 P.2d 838 (1986) (“[T]here are too many plausible reasons for 
increased electrical use to allow a search warrant to be issued based on 
increased consumption.”). When the increase in power consumption is 
combined with other factors, however, the increase may be considered in 
determining whether probable cause exists. State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 
291, 906 P.2d 925 (1995), overruled on other grounds by In re Det. of 
Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 801, 42 P.3d 952 (2002) (increase in electrical 
consumption is a proper factor in determining probable cause when 
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combined with other suspicious factors); Sterling, 43 Wn. App. at 851–52, 
719 P.2d 1357 (400 to 500 percent increase in power usage combined with 
suspicious facts supported probable cause for search warrant). For 
example, Washington courts have considered evidence of power usage 
three to four times greater than the previous occupant’s, in combination 
with the absence of accumulated snow on the roof when neighboring 
buildings had 20 to 30 inches, in determining that probable cause was not 
established. State v. Rakosky, 79 Wn. App. 229, 239–40, 901 P.2d 364 
(1995). 
An individual has a protected privacy interest in power usage records 
such that a disclosure of this information is prohibited unless there is 
written notice to the utility company that the person is suspected of 
criminal activity. RCW 42.56.335 (formerly RCW 42.17.314, prohibiting 
the inspection or copying of a person’s utility records by law enforcement 
unless the utility is provided a written statement that indicates the person 
is suspected of committing a crime and there is a reasonable belief that the 
records could determine or help determine whether the suspicion is true). 
See generally Cole, 128 Wn.2d at 290, 906 P.2d 925 (a search warrant 
satisfies the requirements of former RCW 42.17.314); In re Maxfield, 133 
Wn.2d 332, 341–42, 945 P.2d 196 (1997) (no reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity because electrical service was new and records showed 
high electrical consumption pottery kilns were to be used at location); 
State v. Maxwell, 114 Wn.2d 761, 767–69, 791 P.2d 223 (1990) 
(telephonic request for utility record not admissible because verbal request 
was in violation of former RCW 42.17.314); In re Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606, 
613–16, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986) (recognizing the need to balance the 
public’s interest in disclosure of information leading to arrests and the 
individual and societal interest in preventing “fishing expeditions” by the 
government), superseded by statute as stated in Doe ex rel. Roe v. 
Washington State Patrol, 185 Wn.2d 363, 374 P.3d 63 (2016). 
2.3(d) Polygraph Results 
The results of a polygraph test may be considered in a magistrate’s 
probable cause determination, even though such results are inadmissible 
at trial unless stringent conditions are satisfied. State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 
731, 749–50, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001). Although the qualifications of the FBI 
agent who administered the polygraph test in Clark were not set forth in 
the affidavit, the court noted that information from a reliable informant has 
corroborative value even if the informant’s basis of knowledge is not 
specified. Id. at 750, 24 P.3d 1006 (citing State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 
712, 630 P.2d 427 (1981)). In Clark, the FBI agent’s basis of knowledge 
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was “the administration of the polygraph test and his clinical and common 
sense observation of Clark’s performance.” Id. 
2.3(e) Taking of Blood Samples 
Probable cause exists to justify the seizure of a person’s blood sample 
if the police believe that a person’s blood sample will provide evidence of 
criminal activity and the facts and circumstances known to the officers 
justify their belief that the person is intoxicated and has committed a 
crime for which intoxication is an element. State v. Curran, 116 Wn.2d 
174, 184, 804 P.2d 558 (1991), abrogated on other grounds by  State v. 
Berlin, 133 Wn.2d 541, 947 P.2d 700 (1997); see also State v. Schulze, 
116 Wn.2d 154, 161, 804 P.2d 566 (1991) (no right to counsel prior to 
undergoing a mandatory blood draw); State v. Komoto, 40 Wn. App. 
200, 208, 697 P.2d 1025 (1985) (police may enter the home of a sus-
pected drunk driver if police “have probable cause to believe that the 
suspect was under the influence, that he has committed a felony of 
which being under the influence of alcohol is an element, and that he is 
presently at home”). 
2.4 LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ FIRST-HAND OBSERVATIONS 
Because the existence of probable cause is dependent on a fact-based 
inquiry, it is impossible to define when an officer’s observations are 
sufficient to constitute probable cause. However, the following common 
factual situations provide some general guidance. 
2.4(a) Particular Crimes: Stolen Property 
Suspicious conduct suggesting that property is stolen does not always 
establish probable cause. For example, when officers saw two men park a 
car in an alley, load it with cartons, drive away, and later return and repeat 
their conduct, the officers did not have probable cause to believe that the 
cartons contained stolen property. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 99, 
103, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959). 
The alternative outcome occurred in a case where officers stopped a 
vehicle after learning that its owner had an outstanding warrant for a traffic 
violation. State v. Glasper, 84 Wn.2d 17, 18, 523 P.2d 937 (1974). The 
police then saw an unpadded, unsecured television in the open trunk. Id. 
A passenger in the car claimed ownership of the set but was unable to 
identify the brand. Id. The court held that the police had reasonable cause 
to believe that the television was stolen. Id. at 21, 523 P.2d 937. Similarly, 
items wrapped in a blanket on a street and thrown into bushes when police 
approached were indicative of stolen property when police had previous 
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experience with similar situations. State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335, 337–
38, 340, 823 P.2d 1068 (1992). However, in another case, the existence of 
an expensive briefcase in a car that had not been reported stolen was not 
sufficient to establish probable cause for a vehicle search. State v. Ozuna, 
80 Wn. App. 684, 688–89, 911 P.2d 395 (1996). See generally 2 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(a) (5th ed. 2012). 
2.4(b) Particular Crimes: Illegal Substances 
The odor of an illegal substance may establish probable cause as long 
as the odor is detected by someone trained and experienced in detecting 
illegal substances. State v. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. 669, 678, 89 P.3d 232 
(2004), rev’d on other grounds, 154 Wn.2d 596, 115 P.3d 281 (2005); 
State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 356, 869 P.2d 110 (1994) (trained 
officer’s detection of marijuana odor); State v. Vonhof, 51 Wn. App. 33, 
41–42, 751 P.2d 1221 (1988) (odor combined with experience in smelling 
the illegal substance constituted probable cause). The affidavit in support 
of a warrant must set forth the officer’s training and experience in 
identifying the odor. See State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 724–25, 927 
P.2d 227 (1996); State v. Remboldt, 64 Wn. App. 505, 510, 827 P.2d 282 
(1992); State v. Solberg, 66 Wn. App. 66, 79, 831 P.2d 754 (1992), rev’d 
on other grounds, 122 Wn.2d 688, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (officer had 
experience in identifying marijuana grow operations); State v. Fore, 56 
Wn. App. 339, 343–44, 783 P.2d 626 (1989) (officer training relevant to 
surveillance of drug transactions in park). However, even if the officer’s 
experience and education are not in the affidavit, the omission is not fatal 
to the search warrant’s validity if other facts in the affidavit demonstrate 
probable cause. Jacobs, 121 Wn. App. at 678, 89 P.3d 232. 
Absolute certainty as to the identity of a substance is not required. 
Graham, 130 Wn.2d at 725, 927 P.2d 227 (quoting Fore, 56 Wn. App. at 
345, 783 P.2d 626). Moreover, odor may be used in concert with other 
suspicious activities to establish probable cause. See State v. Huff, 64 Wn. 
App. 641, 647–48, 826 P.2d 698 (1992) (odor of methamphetamine 
combined with furtive gestures and lying to police during car stop created 
probable cause). Documentation purporting to authorize a defendant’s use 
of marijuana will not negate an officer’s probable cause. State v. Fry, 168 
Wn.2d 1, 6, 228 P.3d 1 (2010). The authorization creates only a potential 
affirmative defense that would excuse the criminal act. Id. at 7–8, 228 
P.3d 1. However, the officer’s experience with and training on the 
characteristics of those who cultivate illegal substances, without more, are 
not enough to establish probable cause. Olson, 73 Wn. App. at 357, 869 
P.2d 110 (officer’s experience that those who cultivate marijuana usually 
hide records and materials in a safe house under their control did not 
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satisfy probable cause for search warrant of the safe house premises); State 
v. Perez, 92 Wn. App. 1, 7–8, 963 P.2d 881 (1998) (sufficient facts 
supported inference of large-scale drug dealing to support search of 
alleged safe house); see State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 150, 977 P.2d 582 
(1999) (magistrate could not infer that evidence might be found in the 
defendant’s home based solely on generalization that drug dealers likely 
keep drugs at their home); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
3.6(b) (5th ed. 2012). 
In the case of a drug enforcement dog sniff, an alert establishes 
probable cause if the dog’s training and reliability are known to the 
officers and set forth in the affidavit for a warrant. State v. Jackson, 82 
Wn. App. 594, 606–07, 918 P.2d 945 (1996) (alert by police dog after 
temporary seizure of Federal Express package constituted probable cause); 
State v. Flores-Moreno, 72 Wn. App. 733, 740–41, 866 P.2d 648 (1994) 
(probable cause established from observations of drug deal combined with 
positive canine sniff); State v. Stanphill, 53 Wn. App. 623, 632, 769 P.2d 
861 (1989) (corroborating canine sniff overcame any deficiency in the 
reliability of an informant). The U.S. Supreme Court has found that 
“evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training 
program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust [the dog’s] alert[]” 
such that a court can initially presume that the alert provides probable 
cause to search. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 
(2013). In Harris, however, the Court used the “totality of the 
circumstances” test established in Illinois v. Gates to determine that 
probable cause was not invalidated by the absence of records establishing 
the dog’s track record in locating substances in the field. Id. at 1055, 185 
L. Ed. 2d. 61. The Washington State Supreme Court, however, has 
declined to follow the test set out in Illinois v. Gates, and therefore the 
applicability of the totality of the circumstances test under article I, section 
7 to probable cause based on a canine sniff alert remains unclear. State v. 
Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); see Florida v. Jardines, 
133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013). 
2.4(c) Association: Persons and Places 
Because of the individualized suspicion requirement, mere 
association with a person whom police have grounds to arrest does not 
constitute probable cause for arrest. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 
587, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210 (1948) (search of a car passenger 
unjustified when the driver was arrested for possession of counterfeit 
ration coupons). Mere proximity to others suspected of criminal activity 
does not in itself establish probable cause for a search of the associate. 
State v. Crane, 105 Wn. App. 301, 312, 19 P.3d 1100 (2001), overruled 
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on other grounds by State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 62 P.3d 489 (2003); 
State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459, 466, 698 P.2d 1109 (1985) (probable 
cause based on association with others engaged in criminal activity 
requires an additional circumstance that reasonably implies knowledge of 
or participation in that activity). An officer must establish an 
individualized finding of probable cause to make a lawful arrest. State v. 
Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 140, 187 P.3d 248 (2008). In Grande, the court 
held that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest and search a car 
passenger based solely on the smell of marijuana emanating from the car. 
Id. at 146, 187 P.3d 248. Additionally, race or color alone, including 
“racial incongruity” (“a person of any race being allegedly ‘out of place’ 
in a particular geographic area”) can never constitute probable cause of 
criminal activity. State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335, 346, 823 P.2d 1068 
(1992); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–87, 
95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975). 
Neither is an individual’s presence in a high-crime area sufficient, by 
itself, to establish probable cause. See Crane, 105 Wn. App. at 312, 19 
P.3d 1100; see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 
L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979). Suspicion of dangerousness must relate to the person 
searched, not to the area in which he is found. State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 
449, 452–53, 688 P.2d 146 (1984) (general practice of frisking individuals 
in particularly dangerous area of the city is not justified by probable 
cause). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(g) 
(5th ed. 2012).  
2.4(d) Furtive Gestures and Flight 
A suspect’s furtive gestures or flight, without more, cannot establish 
probable cause; however, they may be a factor in determining whether 
probable cause exists. State v. Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 725–26, 927 P.2d 
227 (1996) (finding probable cause when the defendant quickly concealed 
an object in his pants pockets, ignored the officers’ request to stop, looked 
nervous, and sweated profusely on a cold night); State v. Baxter, 68 Wn.2d 
416, 421–22, 413 P.2d 638 (1966) (“flight is an element of probable 
cause”); State v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641, 647, 826 P.2d 698 (1992) (furtive 
movements and lying to police about identity support probable cause); 
State v. Hobart, 24 Wn. App. 240, 243, 600 P.2d 660 (1979), rev’d on 
other grounds, 94 Wn.2d 437, 617 P.2d 429 (1980) (defendant grabbed 
his pocket and turned away from an officer after the officer asked if the 
defendant had cocaine in his pocket); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 
U.S. 40, 66–67, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968) (probable cause 
existed when strangers tiptoed from apartment and fled from police 
officer); State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 645, 611 P.2d 771 (1980) 
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(suspect’s leaving at the time a police cruiser arrives does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that it is reasonable to suspect the person of 
committing a crime). Probable cause, however, is not negated merely 
because it is possible to imagine an innocent explanation for observed 
activities. Graham, 130 Wn.2d at 725, 927 P.2d 227 (quoting State v. Fore, 
56 Wn. App. 339, 344, 783 P.2d 626 (1989)) (noting that absolute certainty 
as to the identity of a suspicious substance is not required). 
2.4(e) Response to Questioning 
A suspect’s response to police questioning can establish probable 
cause when combined with other circumstances. State v. Glover, 116 
Wn.2d 509, 514, 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (officer’s disbelief of defendant’s 
statement that he lived at housing complex, combined with suspicious 
gestures, constituted probable cause for criminal trespass); State v. Huff, 
64 Wn. App. 641, 647, 826 P.2d 698 (1992) (lying to police about identity 
coupled with furtive gestures and identification of illegal substance odor 
established probable cause); see also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 
897, 95 S. Ct. 2585, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1975) (border patrol may consider 
nature of responses to questioning to help establish probable cause). 
A suspect’s failure or refusal to answer an officer’s questions, 
however, may not be taken into account. State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 106, 
640 P.2d 1061 (1982) superseded by statute as stated in State v. Graham, 
130 Wn.2d 711, 927 P.2d 227 (1996); see Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 
53 n.3, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979). See generally 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(f) (5th ed. 2012). Similarly, a suspect’s 
silence after Miranda warnings have been given may not be considered in 
determining probable cause. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617–18, 96 S. 
Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). Nor may the suspect’s failure to 
challenge the officer’s actions be considered. United States v. Di Re, 332 
U.S. 581, 594, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210 (1948) (officers could not infer 
probable cause from suspect’s failure to protest arrest or to proclaim 
innocence). 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Fourth 
Amendment cannot compel a suspect to answer questions, a state may 
criminalize a suspect’s refusal to identify herself if the request for 
identification is reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the 
investigative stop. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, Humboldt 
Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 187–89, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004); 
see State v. Turner, 103 Wn. App. 515, 525–26, 13 P.3d 234 (2000) 
(holding the defendant’s refusal to provide his name combined with the 
defendant’s lunging at the officer were sufficient to support an arrest for 
obstruction of a law enforcement officer); State v. Contreras, 92 Wn. App. 
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307, 316, 966 P.2d 915 (1998) (recognizing the defendant’s right to refuse 
to answer questions, but including the defendant’s giving a false name as 
one reason that supported a charge for obstruction of justice). See 
generally RCW 9A.76.020(1) (Washington’s obstruction of justice 
statute). 
2.5 INFORMATION FROM AN INFORMANT: IN GENERAL 
Different sets of rules govern information received from an 
informant depending on whether the informant is a criminal informant, a 
citizen informant, a police informant, or an anonymous informant. This 
section discusses general rules that apply to all informants; section 2.6 
focuses on citizen informants; section 2.7 covers the rules for when the 
informant is a fellow police officer; and section 2.8 deals with anonymous 
informants. 
Traditionally, under the Fourth Amendment, information from an 
informant could establish probable cause only when the information 
available to the police satisfied the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test, which 
requires that an informant’s basis of knowledge and reliability be 
established. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415–16, 89 S. Ct. 584, 
21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 
1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 3.3(a) (5th ed. 2012). While the Supreme Court has since 
rejected Aguilar-Spinelli in favor of a less stringent totality of the 
circumstances approach for determining when an informant’s tip may 
establish probable cause, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231–32, 
103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), the Washington State 
Supreme Court has held that article I, section 7 requires adherence to 
the Aguilar-Spinelli test. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 111–12, 59 P.3d 
58 (2002) (citing State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 440, 688 P.2d 136 
(1984)). 
A Washington trial court may not use the Gates “totality of the 
circumstances” test. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 71 n.2, 93 P.3d 872 
(2004); Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 443, 688 P.2d 136; see 2 LaFave, supra, § 
3.3(a). As a result, under article I, section 7, a strong showing as to an 
informant’s basis of knowledge cannot overcome a deficiency in the 
informant’s credibility and vice versa. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 441, 688 
P.2d 136. But probable cause may still be established despite such a 
deficiency if the police can support this missing prong by sufficiently 
corroborating the informant’s tip. Id. at 445, 688 P.2d 136. 
Under the “basis of knowledge” prong, the facts must enable the 
person making the probable cause determination, such as a magistrate, to 
decide whether the informant had a basis for the allegation of criminal 
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conduct. Id. at 444, 688 P.2d 136 (basis of knowledge not satisfied when 
informant could not establish how he knew the defendant was a drug 
dealer). Under the “veracity” prong, the facts must enable the magistrate 
to determine either the informant’s inherent credibility or reliability on the 
particular occasion. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415–16, 89 S. Ct. 584. An 
informant’s tip may provide police with grounds to stop a person only if 
there are some indicia of reliability. State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 455, 
688 P.2d 146 (1984) (officers’ reliance on street kids to lead them to 
suspect is not permissible when the officers questioned the reliability 
of children). If either the basis of knowledge or veracity prong is 
deficient, the police may cure the deficiency by corroborating the 
informant’s tip through an independent investigation. Vickers, 148 
Wn.2d at 112, 59 P.3d 58. 
2.5(a) Satisfying the “Basis of Knowledge” Prong by  
Personal Knowledge 
The best way to satisfy the “basis of knowledge” prong is to show 
that the informant based his or her information on personal knowledge. 
See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 
2d 723 (1964); State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 112, 59 P.3d 58 (2002); 
State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v. Bauer, 
98 Wn. App. 870, 875, 991 P.2d 668 (2000). For example, an informant’s 
statement that he had observed a marijuana grow operation in the 
defendant’s residence will satisfy the basis of knowledge prong. State v. 
Wolken, 103 Wn.2d 823, 827, 700 P.2d 319 (1985). The affidavit need 
only show that the informant had personal knowledge of the facts asserted. 
Vickers, 148 Wn.2d at 113, 59 P.3d 58 (affidavit did not need to establish 
that informant had actually seen the weapons or ammunition used in a 
robbery, but did need to establish that the informant had personal 
knowledge of the facts asserted in the affidavit regarding the defendants’ 
conversations about committing an armed robbery). Personal knowledge 
of only innocuous facts about the defendant, however, is insufficient. State 
v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 196, 867 P.2d 593 (1994) (phone number, 
address, and abnormally high electrical consumption considered 
innocuous facts); State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d 838 (1986). 
Lastly, the basis of an informant’s knowledge may be established by 
hearsay. See Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 437, 688 P.2d 136; State v. Casto, 39 
Wn. App. 229, 233, 692 P.2d 890 (1984). 
Under article I, section 7, a deficiency in the basis of knowledge 
prong may be remedied by “independent police investigatory work that 
corroborates the tip to such an extent that it supports the missing 
elements.” Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 438, 688 P.2d 136; see also State v. 
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Kennedy, 72 Wn. App. 244, 249–50, 864 P.2d 410 (1993); State v. Adame, 
39 Wn. App. 574, 576–77, 694 P.2d 676 (1985). The corroborated 
information, like an informant’s first-hand knowledge, must itself suggest 
criminal activity; “[m]erely verifying ‘innocuous details,’ commonly 
known facts or easily predictable events should not suffice to remedy [the] 
deficiency.” Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at 438, 688 P.2d 136; State v. Maddox, 
116 Wn. App. 796, 803, 67 P.3d 1135 (2003), aff’d, 152 Wn.2d 499, 98 
P.3d 1199 (2004) (corroboration of alleged drug dealing sufficient when 
police searched informant before a controlled buy, observed his entrance 
and exit, and then re-searched the informant after the controlled buy); State 
v. Maxwell, 114 Wn.2d 761, 769–70, 791 P.2d 223 (1990) (frequent 
visitors, tin foil on windows, and suspicious conversation not sufficient 
evidence of illegal activity). 
Lastly, even if a deficiency in the information renders it insufficient 
to establish probable cause, it may be used to corroborate other cognizable 
information. State v. Lund, 70 Wn. App. 437, 450 n.10, 853 P.2d 1379 
(1993) (anonymous police informant’s tip of possible drug activity in 
prison not enough to establish probable cause, but could be considered in 
corroborating another police informant’s similar information and for 
independent police investigation of tip); State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 712, 
630 P.2d 427 (1981) (statements by a reliable informant may establish 
probable cause when used to corroborate information provided by an 
informant whose reliability has not yet been established). See generally 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(f) (5th ed. 2012). 
2.5(b) Satisfying the “Veracity” Prong by Past Performance 
The veracity prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test is a measure of an 
informant’s truthfulness. State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wn.2d 30, 41, 162 P.3d 
389 (2007). This prong is met when the affidavit supporting the search 
warrant shows the informant’s credibility or contains sufficient facts from 
which a magistrate can independently determine the veracity of the 
informant. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 112, 59 P.3d 58 (2002); State 
v. Garcia, 140 Wn. App. 609, 619, 166 P.3d 848 (2007) (quoting State v. 
McCord, 125 Wn. App. 888, 893, 106 P.3d 832 (2005)); State v. Maddox, 
116 Wn. App. 796, 803, 67 P.3d 1135, aff’d, 152 Wn.2d 499, 98 P.3d 1199 
(2004) (informant’s “track record” of two successful controlled buys 
sufficient to support an inference of veracity). 
An informant’s reliability may be established if the informant has 
previously provided information that was proven to be reliable, thereby 
establishing a “track record” of reliability. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 
432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v. Shaver, 116 Wn. App. 375, 380–
81, 65 P.3d 688 (2003) (confidential informant had provided reliable 
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information to the officer in the past); State v. Lopez, 70 Wn. App. 259, 
264, 856 P.2d 390 (1993) (informant’s successful assistance in prior 
controlled buys established a track record of reliability); see 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(b) (5th ed. 2012). In the absence of 
circumstances demonstrating unreliability, an officer need not have 
personal knowledge of the informant’s track record, but may rely on 
information from fellow officers. State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. App. 679, 681–
82, 544 P.2d 786 (1975); see infra § 2.7(b). Further, similar to an 
informant’s basis of knowledge, an informant’s credibility may be verified 
by independent police investigation. See State v. Emery, 161 Wn. App. 
172, 202, 253 P.3d 413 (2011) (informant’s veracity confirmed by police 
investigation); Shaver, 116 Wn. App. at 380–81, 65 P.3d 688 (confidential 
informant’s credibility corroborated by officer’s ongoing investigation of 
drug activity at a residence for many years prior to informant’s tip and 
officer’s observations that residence was frequented by known drug users). 
2.5(c) Satisfying the “Veracity” Prong with Admissions Against  
Interest and Motive 
The veracity prong may also be established when the informant has 
a clear motive for being truthful, such as receiving a benefit in return for 
good information. State v. Bean, 89 Wn.2d 467, 469–71, 572 P.2d 1102 
(1978) (offer of a favorable sentence recommendation gave informant a 
strong motive to provide accurate information); State v. Estorga, 60 Wn. 
App. 298, 305, 803 P.2d 813 (1991) (offer to drop charges in exchange for 
accurate information established strong motive to be truthful); State v. 
Smith, 39 Wn. App. 642, 647–48, 694 P.2d 660 (1984) (offer of reduction 
in charge from felony to misdemeanor gave informant strong motive to be 
truthful). An informant’s statement against penal interest, or recitation of 
another person’s statement against interest, particularly when supported 
by other indicia of reliability, may also demonstrate a motive for being 
truthful and thereby establish credibility. State v. Chamberlin, 161 Wn.2d 
30, 42, 162 P.3d 389 (2007) (informant’s confession of driving under the 
influence of narcotics, supported by his willingness to be a named 
informant, established reliability); State v. Merkt, 124 Wn. App. 607, 
613−14, 102 P.3d 828 (2004); State v. Shaver, 116 Wn. App. 375, 380–
81, 65 P.3d 688 (2003) (confidential informant relayed comments against 
penal interest made by suspected drug dealer). 
2.6 CITIZEN INFORMANTS: VICTIM/WITNESS INFORMANTS IN GENERAL 
The Aguilar-Spinelli test also applies to the use of information from 
a citizen informant. State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 22, 51 P.3d 830 
(2002); State v. Tarter, 111 Wn. App. 336, 340, 44 P.3d 899 (2002) 
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(Aguilar-Spinelli test applied where informants were named citizens). 
Again, multiple levels of hearsay are acceptable as long as each instance 
in the chain meets the two-prong test. See, e.g., State v. Vanzant, 14 Wn. 
App. 679, 683, 544 P.2d 786 (1975) (information passed to second 
detective by detective with personal knowledge of informant’s reliability 
sufficient to establish probable cause for arrest). See generally 2 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4  (5th ed. 2012). Lastly, a 
demonstration of reliability may not be required if a citizen provides 
noncriminal, nonaccusatory information that strongly suggests that the 
informant is relating personal observations. State v. Nordlund, 113 Wn. 
App. 171, 181, 53 P.3d 520 (2002); State v. Stone, 56 Wn. App. 153, 156, 
782 P.2d 1093 (1989). 
2.6(a) Satisfying the “Basis of Knowledge” Prong 
The basis for the citizen informant’s knowledge must be established. 
See State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d 838 (1986). The basis of 
the knowledge prong is satisfied by information showing that the 
informant has personally seen the facts asserted and is passing on firsthand 
information. State v. Smith, 110 Wn.2d 658, 663, 756 P.2d 722 (1988); 
State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d. 432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v. 
Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 23, 51 P.3d 830 (2002). However, the basis of 
the informant’s knowledge must be demonstrated if the informant was not 
the eyewitness, or when the information requires some expertise, such as 
the identification of the odor of marijuana. State v. Boyer, 124 Wn. App. 
593, 606, 102 P.3d 833 (2004) (affidavit failed to establish citizen 
informant’s expertise in identifying cocaine); see 2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 3.4(b) (5th ed. 2012). 
2.6(b) Satisfying the “Veracity” Prong by Partial Corroboration of  
Informant’s Tip and by Self-Verifying Detail 
Washington courts require a showing of reliability for citizen 
informants. State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 72–73, 93 P.3d 872 (2004); 
State v. Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. 695, 698–99, 812 P.2d 114 (1991) (noting 
the different types of informants). Accordingly, the police must present 
the issuing magistrate with sufficient facts to determine the informant’s 
inherent credibility or reliability unless the police corroborate the 
informant’s tip. State v. Bauer, 98 Wn. App. 870, 876–77, 991 P.2d 668 
(2000) (credibility established when informant was a concerned citizen, 
had been a Washington citizen for more than nine years, was a registered 
voter, and feared retaliation); State v. Duncan, 81 Wn. App. 70, 76, 912 
P.2d 1090 (1996); State v. Huff, 33 Wn. App. 304, 307–08, 654 P.2d 1211 
(1982). 
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With an identified citizen informant, however, the burden for 
establishing credibility is generally lower, and the court will presume the 
citizen informant’s reliability. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 72–73, 93 P.3d 872; 
State v. McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560, 572–73, 17 P.3d 608 (2001) 
(citizen informant was readily identifiable from affidavit and provided 
information in “entirely unsuspicious circumstances”); Ibarra, 61 Wn. 
App. at 699, 812 P.2d 114; State v. Franklin, 49 Wn. App. 106, 109, 741 
P.2d 83 (1987) (noting that the standard is relaxed but the information 
must support an inference of truthfulness and must establish a basis of 
knowledge). This is because a citizen informant is unlikely to have an 
established “track record” of providing information to the police, such that 
the citizen informant’s veracity may be otherwise difficult to establish. 
Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. at 699, 812 P.2d 114. Naming an informant is not 
alone a sufficient ground on which to credit an informant, but it is 
considered in the determination of whether the informant is actually a 
citizen informant. State v. McCord, 125 Wn. App. 888, 893, 106 P.3d 832 
(2005) (citing Duncan, 81 Wn. App. at 78, 912 P.2d 1090); see also State 
v. Atchley, 142 Wn. App. 147, 162, 173 P.3d 323 (2007) (credibility of 
citizen informant established when the informant provided his or her name 
and contact information, received no compensation for the tip, and a 
background check made no indication of untrustworthiness). The standard 
is generally not relaxed, however, when the citizen informant remains 
unidentified to the magistrate. State v. Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d 
838 (1986); State v. Garcia, 140 Wn. App. 609, 619, 166 P.3d 848 (2007); 
Ibarra, 61 Wn. App. at 699, 812 P.2d 114. Lastly, an informant is 
presumed reliable if the circumstances that establish personal knowledge 
are sufficiently detailed. State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702, 707, 60 P.3d 
116 (2002), aff’d on other grounds, 152 Wn.2d 64, 93 P.3d 872 (2004); 
State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 24, 51 P.3d 830 (2002) (no independent 
corroboration required); State v. Tarter, 111 Wn. App. 336, 340, 44 P.3d 
899 (2002) (State’s burden is “relaxed” with regard to the veracity of 
citizen informants). 
2.6(c) Sufficiency of Information Supplied 
Factors that have been considered in determining whether sufficient 
information has been provided by a victim informant or witness informant 
include (1) the particularity of the description of the offender or the 
vehicle; (2) the size of the area in which the perpetrator might be found; 
(3) the number of persons in the area; (4) the direction of flight; (5) the 
activity or condition of the person arrested; and (6) the person’s knowledge 
that his or her vehicle has been involved in other similar criminal activity. 
See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.4(c) (5th ed. 2012). 
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When a citizen can identify a suspect by photograph, the information 
is sufficient to establish probable cause. See Simmons v. United States, 390 
U.S. 377, 384, 88 S. Ct. 967, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968). Witness 
descriptions of the attire, vehicle, and physical build of the suspect may 
also provide probable cause when used in combination. State v. Palmer, 
73 Wn.2d 462, 464–65, 438 P.2d 876 (1968) (probable cause for arrest 
was established when 45 minutes after robbery the victim identified an 
automobile by make, year, color, and dirty white top, and described 
suspect by hair color and attire); State v. Kohler, 70 Wn.2d 599, 605, 424 
P.2d 656 (1967) (probable cause established when two witnesses provided 
descriptions of vehicle, clothing, and build of suspects, and when 
probability was slight that two similar cars would be traveling within the 
limited area of Seattle at 12:30 a.m.); State v. Baker, 68 Wn.2d 517, 520, 
413 P.2d 965 (1966) (probable cause established when robbery victims 
identified make, color, and license plate number of suspect vehicle). 
2.7 POLICE AS INFORMANTS 
2.7(a) Satisfying the “Veracity” and “Basis of Knowledge” Prongs 
As with citizen informants’ veracity under federal law, the veracity 
of police informants’ statements may be presumed. See United States v. 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 110, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1965); State 
v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 71–73, 93 P.3d 872 (2004). Generally, there must 
be a showing that the officer had a basis for his or her knowledge. Gaddy, 
152 Wn.2d at 72, 93 P.3d 872. Conclusory allegations will suffice in 
limited, complex situations, when explaining the grounds for the belief 
may be difficult. Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 223–24, 85 S. Ct. 
1365, 14 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1965) (in tax evasion case, affidavit need not 
explain every basis of the allegation). 
2.7(b) Multiple Hearsay 
An arresting officer need not have personal knowledge of the facts 
establishing probable cause, but may rely on another officer’s assessment. 
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 
(1971) (“fellow officer rule”); Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 70–71, 93 P.3d 872 
(officer may rely on information from a police bulletin or “hot sheet” if 
the issuing agency has probable cause). However, probable cause must 
actually exist for the arrest to be valid. Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568–69, 91 
S. Ct. 1031; Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 70–71, 93 P.3d 872; see 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.5(b) (5th ed. 2012). An arresting officer’s 
good faith reliance is irrelevant. State v. Gaddy, 114 Wn. App. 702, 706, 
60 P.3d 116 (2002), aff’d, 152 Wn.2d 64, 93 P.3d 872 (2004). 
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Although determining probable cause on the basis of collective 
information in an agency is generally permissible, the chain of 
communication must be shown. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 12 Wn. App. 
309, 310, 529 P.2d 873 (1974). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.5(c). 
Whether the State must prove the reliability of the agency’s records may 
depend on whether the court considers the agency to be a citizen 
informant. See Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d at 71–74, 93 P.3d 872 (treating 
Department of Licensing as a citizen informant and finding Department’s 
information presumptively reliable regarding defendant’s driving record); 
State v. Sandholm, 96 Wn. App. 846, 848, 980 P.2d 1292 (1999) (no 
evidence provided to show reliability of information from WACIC radio). 
2.8 INFORMATION FROM ANONYMOUS OR UNKNOWN INFORMANTS: 
SATISFYING THE “VERACITY” PRONG 
Generally, an anonymous informant’s tip fails to meet the Aguilar-
Spinelli requirements of basis of knowledge and veracity unless the tip is 
corroborated. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413, 89 S. Ct. 584, 
21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S. Ct. 
1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 195, 867 
P.2d 593 (1994). Even a named but unknown informant is not entitled to 
a presumption of reliability. See State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 48, 621 P.2d 
1272 (1980) (reliability of named but unknown telephone informant not 
significantly different from anonymous telephone informant). If the 
informant is a citizen informant and wishes to remain anonymous, “the 
affidavit must contain ‘background facts to support a reasonable inference 
that the information is credible and without motive to falsify.’” State v. 
Atchley, 142 Wn. App. 147, 162, 173 P.3d 323 (2007) (quoting State v. 
Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 28788, 906 P.2d 925 (1995)); State v. Ibarra, 61 
Wn. App. 695, 700, 812 P.2d 114 (1991). 
If, however, a police investigation corroborates the informant’s 
information and constitutes more than mere public or innocuous facts, the 
Aguilar-Spinelli test will be satisfied. Young, 123 Wn.2d at 195, 867 P.2d 
593; State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 438, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); State v. 
Kennedy, 72 Wn. App. 244, 249, 864 P.2d 410 (1993). The fact that the 
anonymous informant accurately describes a vehicle is insufficient. State 
v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 943–44, 530 P.2d 243 (1975) (citing Whiteley 
v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971)). 
2.9 SPECIAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES REQUIRING  
LESSER OR GREATER LEVELS OF PROOF 
Although a majority of searches will fall under the general rubric 
discussed above, three types of searches are either conducted on less than 
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probable cause or, in contrast, require additional constitutional safeguards. 
Administrative searches, discussed in section 2.9(a), and Terry 
investigatory stops, covered in section 2.9(b), are permissible under 
relaxed standards. Searches that intrude into an individual’s body require 
a greater level of proof and are discussed in section 2.9(c). 
2.9(a) Administrative Searches 
The protections of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of 
the Washington Constitution extend to administrative and regulatory 
searches. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528–34, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967); Rental Owners Ass’n v. Thurston Cnty., 85 Wn. 
App. 171, 183, 931 P.2d 208 (1997). Therefore, such searches must either 
be conducted pursuant to a warrant or fall within one of the narrowly 
drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 
534, 87 S. Ct. 1727. To obtain an administrative warrant to search 
commercial or residential premises, law enforcement officers must either 
offer specific proof of a violation, or show that “reasonable legislative or 
administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied 
with respect to a particular [establishment].” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 
436 U.S. 307, 320–21, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (brackets 
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S. Ct. 
1727). Administrative searches excepted from the warrant requirement 
must be reasonable in light of the individual’s expectation of privacy and 
the asserted government interest. Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App. 297, 
307–08, 62 P.3d 533 (2003). For a discussion of administrative searches 
in general, see infra § 6.4. 
When officers seek a warrant based on a general administrative 
program, they must set forth sufficient details of the program to enable the 
magistrate to determine whether the program is reasonable. City of Seattle 
v. Leach, 29 Wn. App. 81, 85, 627 P.2d 159 (1981). Inventory searches 
are one type of search based on a general administrative program that can 
be justified without probable cause. State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 766, 
958 P.2d 982 (1998) (inventory searches pursuant to standard police 
procedures are “reasonable”). 
2.9(b) Terry Stops and Frisks 
Police may stop an individual for investigation with less than 
probable cause if they have reasonable and articulable facts that point 
toward criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 
L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 69899, 92 P.3d 
202 (2004) (police may request identification from a passenger for 
investigatory purposes with an articulable suspicion of criminal activity 
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by the passenger); State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 8, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). 
However, the stop must not exceed the scope and purpose of a Terry 
stop—the stop must be reasonably limited in scope to “whatever 
reasonable suspicions legally justified the stop in the first place.” State v. 
Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 293–94, 290 P.3d 983 (2012) (citing State v. 
Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 350, 979 P.2d 833 (1999)). If the officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe the person is armed and currently 
dangerous, he or she may perform a limited frisk of the suspect for 
weapons. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S. Ct. 1868; State v. Hudson, 124 
Wn.2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160 (1994). For a complete discussion of Terry 
stops and frisks, see generally infra Chapter 4. 
2.9(c) Intrusions into the Body 
Under article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, taking a blood 
sample is a search and seizure that must be supported by probable cause. 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 
103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989); State v. Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d 176, 184, 
240 P.3d 153 (2010). If probable cause exists, neither an adversarial 
hearing nor notice to defense counsel is required before a search warrant 
to obtain a blood sample may be issued. State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d 
525, 53436, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993). However, due to the invasive nature 
of intrusions into the body, the U.S. Supreme Court has iterated three 
additional requirements beyond the probable cause requirement. In order 
for the search to be lawful, there must be (1) a “clear indication” that the 
desired evidence will be found if the search is performed, (2) the method 
of searching must be reasonable, and (3) the search must be performed in 
a reasonable manner. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769–70, 86 
S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (finding that the “interests in human 
dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects” require a 
heightened standard). However, buccal swabs of arrestees for DNA 
identification is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine 
booking procedure under the Fourth Amendment. Maryland v. King, 569 
U.S. 435, 465, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 186 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013). 
More intrusive procedures may be permitted in special 
environments. For example, in prisons and jails, strip searches and cavity 
searches may be done without a warrant. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
560, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (finding full body cavity 
searches of prison inmates following contact visits not categorically 
unreasonable); State v. Harris, 66 Wn. App. 636, 642, 833 P.2d 402 (1992) 
(finding exigent circumstances justified strip search of juvenile before 
placement in holding cell when police had prior experience with gang 
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members taping razor blades to their skin). For a full discussion of forced 






Search Warrants  
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution states “No 
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, 
without authority of law.” As such, it requires that a search warrant be 
supported by probable cause to be valid. State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 
18283, 196 P.3d 658 (2008); State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 140, 977 
P.2d 582 (1999) (citing State v. Cole, 128 Wn.2d 262, 286, 906 P.2d 925 
(1995)). This is consistent with the Fourth Amendment which also 
provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
These provisions were enacted as a response to the evils of general 
warrants and writs of assistance. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
62627, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886). General warrants and writs 
had provided law enforcement officers virtually unlimited discretion to 
search whomever, wherever, and whenever they chose. With the Fourth 
Amendment, the Framers sought to curb the abuses of unconstrained 
searches. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 76061, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 
23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). Despite these efforts, there are a number of 
situations in which searches and seizures may be made without warrants. 
See infra Chapter 5. 
This chapter focuses on a valid search warrant and its execution 
under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. This 
chapter addresses general requirements for a valid warrant, the description 
of the place to be searched and the items to be seized, the scope and 
intensity of the search, the “knock and announce” requirement, detentions 
of persons on the premises, and challenges to an affidavit. The standards 
discussed below may also apply to arrest warrants as well as to search 
warrants. Issues pertaining specifically to arrests are discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
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3.1 TYPES OF ITEMS THAT MAY BE SEARCHED AND SEIZED 
A warrant may be issued to search for and seize any evidence of a 
crime; contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally 
possessed; weapons or other things by means of which a crime has been 
committed or reasonably appears about to be committed; or a person for 
whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is unlawfully restrained. CrR 
2.3(b); CrRLJ 2.3(b). 
Warrants can be issued to recover evidence of a crime as long as 
probable cause exists to “establish a reasonable inference that the 
defendant is involved in criminal activity and that evidence the criminal 
activity can be found at the place to be searched.” State v. Fry, 168 Wn.2d 
1, 46, 228 P.3d 1 (2010) (procuring warrant to search a suspected 
marijuana grow operation) (citing State v. Maddox 152 Wn.2d 499, 505, 
98 P.3d 1199 (2004)); State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 811, 167 P.3d 1156 
(2007) (issuing warrants to search for a possible methamphetamine lab and 
evidence of child pornography).  
The State may seek a warrant to search and seize items that constitute 
“mere evidence” of a crime, i.e., items that have evidentiary value only. 
See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307, 87 S. Ct. 1642, L. Ed. 2d 782 
(1967); State v. Bullock, 71 Wn.2d 886, 89091, 431 P.2d 195 (1967) 
(adopting Warden and admitting a letter found with marijuana in an 
apartment search). To obtain a warrant for “mere evidence,” the State must 
show probable cause to believe that the evidence will aid in apprehending 
or convicting a suspect. See CrR 2.3(b)–(c); Bullock, 71 Wn.2d at 89091, 
431 P.2d 195. 
Lastly, a search warrant may be issued for evidence containing 
incriminating statements without violating the Fifth Amendment because 
the Fifth Amendment provides protection only where the act of producing 
evidence is, itself, testimonial. In re Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 776, 808 
P.2d 156 (1991) (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S. Ct. 
2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976)) (finding that a letter written voluntarily by 
the defendant to his friend did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights).  
3.2 WHO MAY ISSUE WARRANTS: REQUIREMENT OF A NEUTRAL AND 
DETACHED MAGISTRATE 
Warrants provide protection against abuse because the determination 
of probable cause is made by a neutral and detached magistrate rather than 
by a police officer. See State v. Hill, 17 Wn. App. 678, 683, 564 P.2d 841 
(1977). The requirement provides protection from “overzealous police 
officers” because “the judicial officer will more objectively balance the 
interests of privacy against the interests of criminal investigations than will 
the investigating police officer, who might distort the independent 
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judgment of probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment.” State v. 
Smith, 16 Wn. App. 425, 427, 558 P.2d 265 (1976).  
3.2(a) Qualifications of a “Magistrate” 
Washington State has limited those empowered to issue warrants to 
judges in the state supreme court, court of appeals, superior court, and 
district court, as well as “all municipal officers authorized to exercise the 
powers and perform the duties of district judges.” RCW 2.20.020. The 
magistrate need not be an attorney or a judge so long as he or she is 
“neutral and detached” and “capable of determining whether probable 
cause exists for the requested arrest or search.” State v. Porter, 88 Wn.2d 
512, 515, 563 P.2d 829 (1977). Case law has specifically included court 
commissioners. State v. Gross, 78 Wn. App. 58, 62, 895 P.2d 861 (1995) 
(citing Porter, 88 Wn.2d at 514, 563 P.2d 829). However, this power does 
not extend to court clerks. State v. Walker, 101 Wn. App. 1, 78, 999 P.2d 
1296 (2000) (finding that a court clerk, acting alone, was not empowered 
to issue a bench warrant); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 4.2(c), at 62024 (5th ed. 2012) (“Although the Court found that a 
layman-clerk could assess probable cause for rather simple ordinance 
violations, it does not inevitably follow that such a person is likewise 
capable of making the much more sophisticated judgments required for 
the issuance of search warrant . . . .”).  
Even when the person issuing the warrant is a magistrate in title, he 
or she must make an independent probable cause determination and may 
not act as a “rubber stamp for the police.” Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 
111, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d 
354, 360, 275 P.3d 314 (2012). 
3.2(b) Neutrality 
The magistrate issuing the warrant must be neutral. This requires that 
the warrant be issued by a judge who is divorced from law enforcement 
investigation and activities. State v. Neslund, 103 Wn.2d 79, 88, 690 P.2d 
1153 (1984). If a magistrate cannot be neutral, then he or she is 
disqualified from issuing a warrant in that case. For instance, magistrates 
are per se disqualified from issuing a warrant in a case if they act as a 
prosecutor in that same case. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 
450, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971), overruled on other grounds 
by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 
(1990). Similarly, the magistrate’s involvement in the execution of a 
warrant may constitute a violation of the neutrality requirement. Id. at 450, 
91 S. Ct. 2022. For example, an administrative “warrant” signed by the 
parole officer conducting the search is invalid. Hocker v. Woody, 95 
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Wn.2d 822, 82526, 631 P.2d 372 (1981) (holding that a search of a third 
party’s residence was unlawful because the warrant was not signed by a 
neutral and detached magistrate). 
A pro-tempore judge that is also a part-time prosecutor is not 
automatically disqualified if he or she has not been involved in the 
prosecution of that particular case and there is no evidence of bias. State 
v. Hill, 17 Wn. App. 678, 683, 564 P.2d 841 (1977). Similarly, there is no 
per se disqualification for a judge who issued a search warrant in a case 
that was before him on special inquiry. State v. Neslund, 103 Wn.2d 88, 
88, 690 P.2d 1153 (1984). In Neslund, the court did not per se disqualify 
the judge from issuing warrants because the warrants were not issued in 
subsequent court proceedings “arising” from the inquiry. Id. at 8283, 690 
P.2d 1153; see RCW 10.27.180. Search warrants have been upheld when 
the issuing judicial officer knew from an affidavit that he might be a 
witness against the defendant. State v. Smith, 16 Wn. App. 425, 42728, 
558 P.2d 265 (1976); 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.2(b), at 617–20. 
Even when an individual is not per se disqualified from issuing a 
warrant, that individual’s conduct under the facts of a particular case may 
cause him or her to lose their status as a neutral magistrate. Neslund, 103 
Wn.2d at 88, 690 P.2d 1153. For instance, in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 
a judge’s conduct was found to have improperly merged with the police 
investigation when he accompanied police during the search of an adult 
bookstore owned by the defendant, reviewed material for obscenity, and 
added it to a previous signed search warrant. 442 U.S. 319, 326–27, 99 S. 
Ct. 2319, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920 (1979).  
Lastly, a magistrate is no longer neutral when he or she receives a 
fee for each search warrant issued. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 
250, 97 S. Ct. 546, 50 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1977) (having a pecuniary interest in 
issuing warrants compared with denying them renders a magistrate neither 
neutral nor detached); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 4.2(b), at 617–20 (5th ed. 2012). 
3.2(c) Presentation of Evidence to a Second Magistrate 
Washington courts have not yet squarely addressed the question of 
whether or under what circumstances a prosecuting authority may, in an 
attempt to obtain a search warrant, present the same evidence to a second 
magistrate after one denial. However, commentators appear to agree that 
a magistrate’s initial probable cause determination is not a final order and 
that the principle of collateral estoppel does not preclude the government 
from presenting the same evidence to a second judicial officer, so long as 
the government notifies the second officer that the application was 
previously denied. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.2(e), 
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at 63133 (5th ed. 2012); see also United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 
422 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding the second warrant valid but expressing 
disapproval that the second judge had not been informed of the prior 
attempt). 
The presentation of the same evidence to a second magistrate is not 
tantamount to forum shopping unless the government visits numerous 
magistrates before convincing one to issue the disputed warrant. United 
States v. Czuprynski, 8 F.3d 1113, 1115 (6th Cir. 1993), on reh’g en banc, 
46 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 1995), supplemented, 65 F.3d 169 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(condemning prosecutor who took the case to two district court judges 
before taking it to a magistrate who he knew had hard feelings for the 
defendant). 
3.2(d) Burden of Proof 
Unless a magistrate is disqualified under the per se rule of Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971), 
overruled on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. 
Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990), the defendant bears the burden of 
proving a magistrate’s lack of neutrality. See State v. Hill, 17 Wn. App. 
678, 683, 564 P.2d 841 (1977). 
3.3 CONTENT OF THE WARRANT 
As a search warrant is issued only if the court determines there is 
probable cause, the person seeking the warrant must present supporting 
evidence “in the form of affidavits, a document as provided in RCW 
9A.72.085 or any law amendatory thereto, or sworn testimony establishing 
the grounds for issuing the warrant and may be provided to the court by 
any reliable means.” CrR 2.3(c); see also CrRLJ 2.3(c). 
3.3(a) A Supporting Affidavit 
An affidavit must contain the underlying facts and circumstances 
upon which the court can determine whether probable cause exists. See 
State v. Patterson, 83 Wn.2d 49, 52, 515 P.2d 496 (1973). An affidavit 
establishes probable cause to support a search warrant if the affidavit sets 
forth facts sufficient to allow a reasonable person to conclude both that the 
defendant is involved in criminal activity and that evidence of the crime 
can be found at the place to be searched. See State v. Maddox, 152 Wn.2d 
499, 509, 98 P.3d. 1199 (2004); In re Yim, 139 Wn.2d 581, 59495, 989 
P.2d 512 (1999); see also State v. Fry, 168 Wn.2d 1, 6, 228 P.3d 1 (2010) 
(finding probable cause when the officer smelled marijuana wafting from 
the house, even when the defendant produced a marijuana permit). 
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Evidence from a prior warrantless search conducted under an exception to 
general search and seizure rules may be used by the issuing magistrate in 
determining probable cause. A magistrate may also rely on hearsay 
statements from a police officer’s affidavits. State v. Chenoweth, 160 
Wn.2d 454, 465, 158 P.3d 595 (2007); see CrR 2.3(c). See generally 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.5(b), at 335–51 (5th ed. 2012). 
3.3(b) Oath or Affirmation Requirement; Pseudonym Affiants 
The person presenting the supporting affidavit must swear to the 
information contained in the affidavit. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see CrR 
2.3(c). Any sworn testimony must be recorded and shall be transcribed if 
it is ordered by the court, or if a party wishes to challenge the validity of a 
warrant. CrR 2.3(c); CrRLJ 2.3(c).  
The Washington State Supreme Court has, however, upheld a 
warrant when the affidavit was not sworn but was signed in the presence 
of the magistrate. State v. Douglas, 71 Wn.2d 303, 30910, 428 P.2d 535 
(1967). A signed affidavit is not a constitutional requirement for the 
issuance of a search warrant. State v. Mannhalt, 33 Wn. App. 696, 699, 
658 P.2d 15 (1983). If, however, the court finds there is probable cause, 
the person seeking the warrant shall obtain the court’s signature and 
display it on the warrant identifying and describing the property or person 
to be searched. CrR 2.3(c); CrRLJ 2.3(c). 
Washington courts have yet to rule on whether an incorrect name or 
pseudonym on the affidavit makes it defective. Likewise, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has not addressed this issue directly. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 4.3(f), at 66364 (5th ed. 2012). However, when a 
warrant has been challenged in federal courts on constitutional grounds, 
incorrect names were found to make a warrant defective. Id.; see also, e.g., 
United States ex rel. Pugh v. Pate, 401 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1968); King v. 
United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960). 
Nonetheless, a handful of federal circuits have found a warrant still 
effective despite an incorrect name or pseudonym. See generally 2 
LaFave, supra, § 4.3(f), at 66365 & n.71. See, e.g., United States v. 
Causey, 9 F.3d 1341 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding the affidavit effective when 
“the issuing judge has an opportunity to question the affiant, the judge is 
in fact not deceived, and there is sufficient probable cause notwithstanding 
the false information”). 
3.3(c) Insufficient Information, Omissions, and Staleness 
A warrant is most commonly defective for one of three reasons: (1) 
there is insufficient information to establish probable cause; (2) material 
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information was omitted during the warrant process; or (3) the information 
in the affidavits is stale. 
First, an affidavit is factually insufficient when it contains nothing 
more than a mere declaration of suspicion or personal belief that evidence 
of a crime will be found on the premises to be searched. Maddox, 152 
Wn.2d at 505, 98 P.3d. 1199; see State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 196 P.3d 
658 (2008) (holding that empty baggies and prior criminal history are 
insufficient to support probable cause). For example, generalizations about 
the behavior of drug dealers concerning where they keep controlled 
substances are insufficient. See State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 147, 977 
P.2d 582 (1999); see also Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5, 47 S. 
Ct. 250, 71 L. Ed. 505 (1927). At the same time, affidavits for search 
warrants must be tested in a commonsense manner, not a hyper-technical 
one. State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 265, 76 P.3d 217 (2003). 
The court must determine if the warrant is valid by “consider[ing] 
only the information that was brought to the attention of the issuing judge 
or magistrate at the time the warrant was requested.” State v. Garcia-
Salgado, 170 Wn.2d 176, 187, 240 P.3d 153 (2010). Thus, if the warrant 
is invalid due to insufficient information, it cannot be made valid later by 
adding further information, even if that information was known at the time 
of issuance but not presented to the magistrate. See Whiteley v. Warden, 
401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971) (holding 
that permitting the record to be expanded with information known to the 
police, but not disclosed to the magistrate, would “render the warrant 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment meaningless”). 
Second, under article I, section 7, if there is an omission in the 
affidavit, the warrant is valid so long as the omission is neither intentional 
nor made with a reckless disregard for the truth and the warrant is facially 
valid, i.e., there is sufficient information to find probable cause. See 
Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 478, 158 P.3d 595.  
To invalidate a search warrant based on a misrepresentation in the 
supporting affidavit, the court must find not only that the allegedly 
improper statement was material to finding probable cause but also that 
statement was knowingly and intentionally made in disregard of the truth. 
State v. Olson, 74 Wn. App. 126, 872 P.2d 64 (1994). Thus, innocent or 
negligent mistakes do not satisfy the burden stated above. Id. The defense 
must allege intentional lies or intentional reckless disregard for the truth 
and make a substantial preliminary showing to be entitled to a hearing 
respecting alleged misrepresentations. Id. For instance, an incorrect date 
on an affidavit is immaterial. State v. Vickers, 148 Wn.2d 91, 109, 59 P.3d 
58 (2002).  
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For example, in In re Yim, the court found the warrant valid even 
though the affidavit failed to expressly state that the defendant did not have 
an explosives license, a necessary element of the crime. 139 Wn.2d 581, 
59596, 989 P.2d 512 (1999). In State v. Chenoweth, the court found that 
the warrant was valid even though the prosecutor had failed to do a 
complete search of the informant’s criminal history. 160 Wn.2d at 45862, 
158 P.3d 595. Had she run a search, she would have turned up a large 
criminal history, including crimes implicating veracity. Id. However, the 
court found that the prosecutor, “who prosecutes more than 200 cases a 
year, did not intentionally hide any information from the magistrate and 
did not act in bad faith in failing to gather relevant information,” and she 
was therefore not reckless. Id. at 481, 158 P.3d 595. 
Third, the information establishing probable cause must not be stale 
at the time it is presented to the judge. State v. Lyons, 174 Wn.2d 354, 275 
P.3d 314 (2012) (finding the warrant stale when there was no date on the 
affidavit detailing when the informant had witnessed the grow operation). 
The information is not stale so long as “the facts and circumstances in the 
affidavit support a commonsense determination that there is continuing 
and contemporaneous possession of the property intended to be seized.” 
Maddox, 152 Wn.2d at 50506, 98 P.3d. 1199 (holding that information 
discovered in the interim does not render the first probable cause 
determination stale so long as it does not negate probable cause). 
In evaluating the staleness of facts underlying a warrant, courts 
examine the totality of the circumstances; the period of time between the 
issuance and execution of the warrant is only one factor to be considered. 
Id. Other relevant factors include the “nature of the criminal, the character 
of the evidence to be seized, and the nature of the place to be searched.” 
State v. Hosier, 124 Wn. App. 696, 715, 103 P.3d 217 (2004). The facts 
and circumstances taken together must establish that “criminal activity is 
occurring at or about the time the warrant is issued.” State v. Perez, 92 
Wn. App. 1, 89, 963 P.2d 881 (1998); see also State v. Ague-Masters, 
138 Wn. App. 86, 101, 156 P.3d 265 (2007) (information was not stale 
after two days when it appeared there could be continued manufacture of 
controlled substances). But cf. State v. Higby, 26 Wn. App. 457, 462–63, 
613 P.2d 1192, 1195 (1980) (determining that observations weeks in the 
past were stale and insufficient to establish probable cause).  
3.3(d) Oral Testimony 
In Washington, a search warrant may be based on a single affidavit, 
on several affidavits, or on oral testimony. CrR 2.3(c). Oral testimony 
includes situations in which an affiant makes a sworn telephonic statement 
to a judge. Id.; see also State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 818, 167 P.3d 1156 
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(2007); State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 701, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983) 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 
436 (1986) (finding that the availability of telephonic warrants increased 
the quality of police work). However, after the magistrate has taken a 
sworn telephonic statement, the magistrate must produce a record of the 
conversation. State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 338, 815 P.2d 761 (1991); 
State v. Ettenhofer, 119 Wn. App. 300, 30406, 79 P.3d 478 (2003). And 
the judge must record a summary of any additional evidence on which the 
warrant was based. Ettenhofer, 119 Wn. App. at 303 n.2, 79 P.3d 478 
(quoting CrR 2.3(c)).  
If the affiant’s sworn testimony was not recorded during the 
telephonic process, the State is not allowed to reconstruct the affidavit 
without corroboration of the magistrate. Myers, 117 Wn.2d at 338, 815 
P.2d 761 (finding the warrant invalid when the affiant made a summary of 
their own statement, but the magistrate did not summarize the statement 
and could not recall the conversation); see also State v. Smith, 87 Wn. App. 
254, 25759, 941 P.2d 691 (1997) (discussing the types of evidence that 
may be used to reconstruct a telephonic affidavit). In State v. Garcia, the 
court found the lack of a recording did not invalidate the warrant when the 
magistrate testified that the affidavit he was presented with matched his 
recollection of the conversation. 140 Wn. App. 609, 61920, 166 P.3d 848 
(2007). For a discussion of various objections to this procedure, see 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.3(c), at 65054 (5th ed. 2012). 
3.3(e) Administrative Warrants 
Administrative warrants are subject to Fourth Amendment protection 
but may be issued on less than probable cause when authorized by a 
statute. City of Seattle v. McCready (McCready III), 131 Wn.2d 266, 931 
P.2d 156 (1997); see Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967) (holding that administrative searches to enforce 
local codes must be supported by “reasonable legislative or administrative 
standards”). An administrative warrant may be based on either (1) specific 
evidence of an existing violation, or (2) a general inspection program 
based on reasonable legislative or administrative standards derived from 
neutral sources. City of Seattle v. Leach, 29 Wn. App. 81, 84, 627 P.2d 159 
(1981) (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320–21, 98 S. Ct. 
1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978)). 
Although a warrant may be issued on less than probable cause 
pursuant to an authorizing statute, if there is no authorizing statute, then 
the magistrate does not have authority to issue warrants for civil 
infractions, even with probable cause. City of Seattle v. McCready 
(McCready II), 124 Wn.2d 300, 309, 877 P.2d 686 (1994). See generally 
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infra § 6.4 (administrative searches). Pursuant to article I, section 7, when 
a magistrate issues a warrant without authority, it is invalid. Bosteder v. 
Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 117 P.3d 316 (2005), superseded by statute on 
other grounds as recognized in Wright v. Terrell, 162 Wn.2d 192, 170 
P.3d 570 (2007); see also State v. Lansden, 144 Wn.2d 654, 663, 30 P.3d 
483 (2001) (observing that courts of limited jurisdiction have no inherent 
authority to issue administrative search warrants). Notably, a statute 
giving a right of entry is not sufficient authorization to issue warrants. 
McCready II, 124 Wn.2d at 309, 877 P.2d 686. But if, under city 
ordinance, the willful or knowing violation of the city code is a 
misdemeanor, the court may issue a warrant for a civil violation. Exendine 
v. Sammamish, 127 Wn. App. 574, 582, 113 P.3d 494 (2005). If the 
administrative warrant was issued for inspection and not in connection to 
a crime, then that warrant cannot be used to assemble proof of a crime. 
City of Seattle v. See, 26 Wn. App. 891, 894, 614 P.2d 254 (1980). 
3.4 PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF PLACE TO BE SEARCHED 
Both article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution and the 
Fourth Amendment require a detailed description of the places to be 
searched and the items to be seized. This requirement prevents the 
execution of general searches, the seizure of objects that are not within the 
magistrate’s authorization, and the issuance of warrants based on vague, 
loose, or doubtful facts. See State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 545, 834 
P.2d 611 (1992). The requirement also limits discretion of the officers 
executing the warrant. See id.; State v. Rivera, 76 Wn. App. 519, 522, 888 
P.2d 740 (1995); see also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 
S. Ct. 74, 72 L. Ed. 231 (1927). 
3.4(a) General Considerations 
The description of the place to be searched must be sufficiently 
detailed such that “the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable 
effort ascertain and identify the place intended.” State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 
962, 967, 639 P.2d 743 (1982) (internal quotations omitted) (citing State 
v. Rood, 18 Wn. App. 740, 74344, 573 P.2d 1325 (1977)). This need not 
be a brick and mortar location. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 251, 
268, 76 P.3d 217 (2003) (determining that the “place” to be searched in 
attaching a GPS to a car was the travel pattern of the vehicle). However, 
if there is a possibility that a mistaken search could occur, the warrant is 
not sufficiently particular. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 967, 639 P.2d 743; see also 
State v. Bohan, 72 Wn. App. 335, 33940, 864 P.2d 26 (1993) (explaining 
the test of whether a mistaken search could occur is one of practical 
application given the facts of the case). 
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When a warrant contains errors, the burden is on the party 
challenging the warrant to show that errors could have resulted in a search 
of the wrong premises. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 967, 639 P.2d 743; see also 
State v. Smith, 39 Wn. App. 642, 649, 694 P.2d 660 (1984) (upholding 
search where incorrect town was identified in warrant because defendant 
made no showing that a similar address existed that could have been 
mistakenly searched). The test is not whether an officer could 
hypothetically or theoretically search the wrong premises, but whether, 
under the circumstances presented, an officer could reasonably determine 
the correct premises to be searched. Bohan, 72 Wn. App. at 339, 864 P.2d 
26. Clerical or ministerial errors will invalidate a warrant only if prejudice 
is shown. State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 25, 51 P.3d 830 (2002); see 
State v. Busig, 119 Wn. App. 381, 388, 81 P.3d 143 (2003) (finding a 
warrant that did not match the pleading paper for the affidavit to be valid). 
In urban areas, places are usually identified by a street address. The 
address is unnecessary, however, if other facts make it clear that a 
particular place is intended. State v. Trasvina, 16 Wn. App. 519, 52223, 
557 P.2d 368 (1976) (finding sufficient a warrant describing premises as 
two-story, white-frame house located directly behind particular address); 
see also State v. Chisholm, 7 Wn. App. 279, 283, 499 P.2d 81 (1972) 
(holding that a warrant that failed to specify street location was sufficiently 
clear when officers could identify premises with reasonable certainty and 
when reason for failure to specify street was included in affidavit for 
warrant). Rural areas may be identified by a legal description of the 
property. See State v. Cockrell, 102 Wn.2d 561, 570, 689 P.2d 32 (1984).  
In the execution of the search, carelessness on the part of the officers 
executing the warrant will not render the warrant insufficient regarding the 
place to be searched; however, it is required that the executing officers 
could have confined their search to the areas delineated in the warrant with 
a “reasonable effort.” See id. (warrant identified place to be searched but 
did not list an address; officers attempted to serve warrant on persons 
outside the described area); see also Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 967, 639 P.2d 
743 (finding that with a “reasonable effort” the officers could have 
confined themselves to the place listed in the warrant). When there is no 
other information that would allow the officer to identify the premises to 
be searched, then the search warrant lacks the particularity required by the 
Washington State Constitution. See State v. Rood, 18 Wn.App. 740, 745–
46, 573 P.2d 1325 (1977).  
3.4(b) Inadequacy and Severability 
If a warrant fails to sufficiently describe the place to be searched, the 
warrant is invalid even if the magistrate made a probable cause 
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determination. In absence of such description, there are three sources of 
information from which courts can determine whether the premises to be 
searched were sufficiently identified. First, other physical descriptions of 
the premises contained in the warrant or affidavit. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d at 
967, 639 P.2d 743. Second, an officer’s personal knowledge of the location 
of the premises or its occupants. State v. Rood, 18 Wn. App at 744, 573 
P.2d 1325. And third, an officer’s personal observations at the time the 
warrant was executed. Id. at 744–45. See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 4.5(a)(e) (5th ed. 2012). The initial determination 
of whether a description is adequate is made with reference only to the 
warrant itself, including any attached documents. See State v. Stenson, 132 
Wn.2d 668, 69193, 696, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). A description may appear 
adequate on its face, but upon execution be found to be ambiguous or 
erroneous. Id. 
If a warrant is inadequate with respect to one location, the adequate 
portion may still be valid if the inadequacy can be severed from the 
warrant. For example, if a warrant separately and distinctly describes two 
targets and it is determined afterward that probable cause existed for 
issuance of the warrant for only one target, the warrant may be treated as 
severable and upheld as to the one target. State v. Cockrell, 102 Wn.2d 
561, 571, 689 P.2d 32 (1984) (finding portions of the warrant that 
identified outbuildings severable from the rest of the warrant that was for 
the residence); see also 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.5(c), at 74348. 
3.4(c) Particular Searches and Exceptions 
Generally, to be valid a search warrant for a multiple-occupancy 
building must describe with sufficient definiteness the particular subunit 
to be searched. State v. Alexander, 41 Wn. App. 152, 704 P.2d 618 (1985). 
See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(b), at 731 
(5th ed. 2012). However, the warrant is not defective for failing to specify 
a subunit if the building looks like a single occupancy structure from the 
outside and the officers have no reason to know that it is a multiple-unit 
structure. State v. Chisholm, 7 Wn. App. 279, 282, 499 P.2d 81 (1972). 
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that a warrant may authorize the search 
of an entire premise containing multiple units while reciting probable 
cause to a portion of the premise if the defendant was in control of the 
whole premises or they were occupied in common, if the entire premises 
were suspect, or if the multiunit character of the premises was not known 
to the officers. United States v. Gillman, 684 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1982); 
see also 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.5(b), at 73443. Additionally, the 
“community living unit” rule will generally apply when several people 
occupy the entire premises in common, but have separate bedrooms. 
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Under the community living unit rule, a single warrant describing the 
entire premises is valid and justifies a search of the entire premises. 
Alexander, 41 Wn. App. at 156, 704 P.2d 618 (adopting the community 
living unit rule in Washington). 
A warrant authorizing the search of an apartment may also include 
the search of a padlocked locker located in a storage room next to the 
defendant’s apartment. State v. Llamas-Villa, 67 Wn. App. 448, 453, 836 
P.2d 239 (1992) (concluding that because the storage locker did not 
constitute a separate building and was not intentionally excluded from the 
warrant, the officers did not exceed the scope of the warrant when they 
searched the locker). In State v. Boyer, the court upheld a search of a 
storage room belonging to a different apartment because “the fact that the 
outside door was labeled apartment B implied to the casual visitor that the 
hallway and its doorways were all part of apartment B.” 124 Wn. App. 
593, 604, 102 P.3d 833 (2004). 
However, this exception does not extend to outbuildings. In State v. 
Kelley, officers’ search of “outbuildings” exceeded the scope of a search 
warrant that authorized the search of a residence and the attached carport, 
but did not authorize the search of “outbuildings,” which included a barn 
and a garage. 52 Wn. App. 581, 586, 762 P.2d 20 (1988). Further, probable 
cause to search a house does not provide probable cause to search 
outbuildings when the outbuildings are under the control of other persons. 
State v. Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App. 11, 1617, 939 P.2d 706 (1997). 
A warrant issued to search a defendant’s premises may include the 
defendant’s automobile if it is located on the premises. State v. Claflin, 38 
Wn. App. 847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984) (a search warrant authorizing 
search of defendant’s house and premises includes search of his car located 
on the premises). However, a warrant to search a house does not include a 
search of a vehicle that is not within the curtilage—the area contiguous to 
the occupant’s home. State v. Graham, 78 Wn. App. 44, 5152, 896 P.2d 
704 (1995). For a more detailed description, see infra § 3.9. 
3.4(d) Particular Searches: Persons 
Search warrants may be issued for persons, as well as for places, if 
there is probable cause to believe that a specific individual has evidence 
on his or her person. CrR 2.3(c); State v. Rollie M., 41 Wn. App. 55, 5859, 
701 P.2d 1123 (1985). When a search warrant is issued for a person, the 
general rule requiring particularity still applies. State v. Martinez, 51 Wn. 
App. 397, 399400, 753 P.2d 1011 (1988) (holding that a warrant is 
sufficient if it provides a detailed description of the person to be searched, 
including the person’s place of residence); Rollie M., 41 Wn. App. at 
5859, 701 P.2d 1123 (finding insufficient a warrant that authorized 
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search of a person found in general vicinity of a specified place); see also 
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(e), at 75563 (5th ed. 2012). 
For a discussion of when a premises search warrant authorizes the 
search of persons not named in the warrant, see infra § 3.8(b). Generally, 
when a premises search warrant is executed, police may conduct a 
warrantless search of a person only if they have individualized probable 
cause to search that person. See State v. Rivera, 76 Wn. App. 519, 524, 
888 P.2d 740 (1995); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338, 
62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979). Nonetheless, a warrant authorizing the search of 
“all persons present” at a location to be searched might be upheld in 
Washington if the warrant establishes a nexus between all persons present, 
the place, and the criminal activity. State v. Carter, 79 Wn. App. 154, 161, 
901 P.2d 335 (1995) (assuming without deciding that such warrants may 
pass muster). 
3.5 PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THINGS TO BE SEIZED 
As with the location to be searched, article I, section 7 requires that 
the courts “never authorize general, exploratory searches.” York v. 
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 315, 178 P.3d 995 (2008). 
Instead, article I, section 7 requires that “warrants describe with 
particularity the things to be seized.” State v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 28, 846 
P.2d 1365 (1993). The requirement “eliminates the danger of unlimited 
discretion in the executing officer’s determination of what to seize.” State 
v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 814, 167 P.3d 1156 (2007) (citing State v. 
Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 546, 834 P.2d 611 (1992)). Courts look to the 
purposes of the “particular description” requirement to determine whether 
the description is valid. These purposes include (1) preventing general 
exploratory searches; (2) protecting against “seizure of objects on the 
mistaken assumption that they fall within” the warrant; and (3) ensuring 
that probable cause is present. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 545, 834 P.2d 611; 
see also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L. 
Ed. 231 (1927). 
In the Ninth Circuit, three factors are relevant to the existence of 
sufficient particularity: (1) whether probable cause exists for all classes of 
items in the warrant; (2) whether the warrant sets out objective standards 
that allow the executing officer to decide what may be seized and what 
may not; and (3) whether the government was able to describe the things 
to be seized with any greater particularity. United States v. Mann, 389 F.3d 
869, 878 (9th Cir. 2004). For a discussion of searches requiring heightened 
protection, see infra § 3.13. 
Because the facts in each case differ greatly, the fact patterns of prior 
cases generally are not referenced when determining whether a warrant is 
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sufficiently particular. See State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 149, 97 P.2d 
582 (1999) (citing State v. Helmka, 86 Wn.2d 91, 93, 542 P.2d 115 
(1975)). Instead, the degree of specificity required depends on the 
circumstances and the type of items involved. State v. Jackson, 150 Wn.2d 
251, 268, 76 P.3d 217 (2003). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 4.6(a)(f) (5th ed. 2012). 
Pursuant to a warrant, officers may also seize objects that establish 
the defendant’s dominion and control over the premises. State v. Weaver, 
38 Wn. App. 17, 22, 683 P.2d 1136 (1984); see Ewing v. Stockton, 588 
F.3d 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 2009) (warrant for articles establishing identity 
of persons in control of premises not overbroad). In State v. Weaver, the 
court held that although a cardboard box bearing defendant’s name would 
not generally be considered “paper,” police could seize the box because 
the obvious purpose of the warrant was seizure not only of controlled 
substances, but also of evidence enabling the state to demonstrate 
defendant’s dominion and control over the premises. 38 Wn. App. at 22, 
683 P.2d 1136. 
3.5(a) General Rules 
While there is no bright-line rule, a few general principles can be 
gleaned from case law that indicate when a warrant is sufficiently definite 
to allow the executing officer to identify the property with reasonable 
certainty. 
First, more ambiguity is tolerated when the police have acquired the 
most complete description that could reasonably be expected. See State v. 
Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 754, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001) (finding warrant for 
“trace evidence” valid when it would be impossible to know what type of 
trace evidence could be present beforehand). Thus, a description need not 
be detailed if it is “as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the 
activity, or crime, under investigation permits.” State v. Stenson, 132 
Wn.2d 668, 692, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). However, a warrant is overbroad 
if the affidavit is much more specific yet the warrant fails to reflect the 
affidavit’s specificity. State v. Higgins, 136 Wn. App. 87, 92, 147 P.3d 
649 (2006) (finding warrant overbroad when it allowed search for “Assault 
2nd DV” when the affidavit listed Glock pistol, spent casings, and entry 
and exit points). 
The use of a generic term or general description in a warrant is not a 
per se violation if a more specific description is impossible and if probable 
cause is shown. See State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 547, 834 P.2d 611 
(1992). “When the nature of the underlying offense precludes a descriptive 
itemization, generic classifications such as lists are acceptable.” State v. 
Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 28, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993); see also Stenson, 132 
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Wn.2d at 692, 940 P.2d 1239. However, in such instances, “the search 
warrant must [also] be circumscribed by reference to the crime under 
investigation.” Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 29, 846 P.2d 1365. In State v. Reid, the 
“phrase ‘any other evidence of homicide’ specifically limited the warrant 
to the crime under investigation [and] specific items listed, such as a 
shotgun and shotgun shells provided guidelines for the officers conducting 
the search.” 38 Wn. App. 203, 212, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). The warrant must 
also be definite enough to allow the searching officer to identify the 
objects sought with reasonable certainty. State v. Nordlund, 113 Wn. App. 
171, 180, 53 P.3d 520 (2002) (citing Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 69192, 940 
P.2d 1239). 
Second, greater care and particularity are required when the property 
sought is inherently innocuous as opposed to property that is inherently 
illegal. State v. Wible, 113 Wn. App. 18, 28, 51 P.3d 830 (2002) (citing 
State v. Chambers, 88 Wn. App. 640, 644, 945 P.2d 1172 (1997)). Thus, 
a less precise description is adequate for controlled substances. See 
Chambers, 88 Wn. App. at 64748, 945 P.2d 1172 (finding that a search 
for “any and all controlled substances” is sufficient in a search for 
marijuana under the circumstances); State v. Olson, 32 Wn. App. 555, 
55758, 648 P.2d 476 (1982). 
Third, failure to provide all available descriptive facts is not fatal 
when the omitted facts could not have assisted the officer in a more 
circumscribed search. See Chambers, 88 Wn. App at 64748, 945 P.2d 
1172 (holding that a warrant authorizing search for “all controlled 
substances” when the affidavit recited probable cause for a marijuana 
grow operation did not fail to be particular). In State v. Christiansen, the 
court held that “[t]he fact the warrant could have been more precise in 
terms of identifying marijuana as the focus of the search does not affect its 
validity, since reasonable particularity is all that is required.” 40 Wn. App. 
249, 254, 698 P.2d 1059 (1985). 
Finally, an error is not fatal if the officer is able to determine the 
items to be seized from the other facts provided in the warrant. State v. 
Dodson, 110 Wn. App. 112, 121, 39 P.3d 324 (2002) (holding that police 
officer merely corrected a clerical error in changing a warrant to specify a 
search for methamphetamine instead of marijuana where court had 
determined probable cause to search for methamphetamine); see also 
Wible, 113 Wn. App. at 2526, 51 P.3d 830 (warrant only invalid for 
clerical errors upon a showing of prejudice). 
3.5(b) Severability 
As with the place to be searched, discussed in section 3.4(b) above, 
when one part of the warrant is insufficiently particular regarding the items 
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to be seized, the portion sometimes may be severed. However, the 
severability doctrine must not be applied when doing so would render the 
particularity standards meaningless. State v. Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 
55657, 834 P.2d 611 (1992) (holding that a warrant authorizing a general 
search of materials protected by the First Amendment was impermissibly 
broad and invalid in its entirety). 
Washington courts may examine five factors when determining 
whether invalid portions of a warrant may be severed from valid portions: 
(1) whether the warrant lawfully authorized entry into the premises; (2) 
whether the warrant includes at least one particularly described item for 
which there is probable cause; (3) whether the portion of the warrant that 
is valid is significant when compared to the warrant as a whole; (4) 
whether the searching officers found and seized any disputed items while 
executing the valid part of the warrant; and (5) whether the officers 
conducted a general search in flagrant disregard of the warrant’s scope. 
State v. Maddox, 116 Wn. App. 796, 80709, 67 P.3d 1135 (2003), aff’d, 
152 Wn.2d 499 (2004). 
3.6 “KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE” REQUIREMENT 
Absent exigent circumstances, officers executing a valid warrant 
must identify themselves as police officers and announce their purpose 
prior to entering private premises. See RCW 10.31.040; Ker v. California, 
374 U.S. 23, 3740, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963) (announcing 
the rule but leaving the states to administer the standard of 
reasonableness). The State has the burden of proving that these 
requirements were met. State v. Talley, 14 Wn. App. 484, 490, 543 P.2d 
348 (1975). An appropriate remedy for an unexcused violation of the 
“knock and announce rule” is the suppression of the evidence obtained as 
a result of the violation. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 11 Wn. App. 311, 522 
P.2d 1179 (1974). But see Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 126 S. Ct.. 
2159, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006) (holding that suppression of evidence is not 
required in all cases).  
The “knock and announce rule” applies only where an officer 
attempts to enter a building by “breaking open” a door or window. 
“Breaking open” means simply entering without permission. State v. 
Miller, 7 Wn. App. 414, 419, 499 P.2d 241(1972). Therefore, the rule does 
not apply when officers enter the premises with the consent of an occupant 
as it does not constitute “breaking open.” State v. Hartnell, 15 Wn. App. 
410, 418, 550 P.2d 63 (1976).  Importantly, this rule applies to both outer 
and inner doors. RCW 10.31.040. It also applies to the execution of both 
arrest and search warrants. State v. Richard, 87 Wn. App. 285, 289, 941 
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P.2d 710 (1997); State v. Shelly, 58 Wn. App. 908, 910, 795 P.2d 187 
(1990). 
The knock and announce rule is designed to reduce the potential for 
violence, to prevent the physical destruction of property, and to protect an 
occupant’s privacy. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 411, 47 P.3d 127 
(2002). Strict compliance with this rule is required unless exigent 
circumstances exist or police officers have a reasonable belief compliance 
would be dangerous or futile. Id. at 41112, 47 P.3d 127; State v. Richards, 
136 Wn.2d 361, 374, 962 P.2d 118 (1998). In some situations, when there 
is substantial compliance with the statute, the entry is valid. State v. 
Reid, 38 Wn. App. 203, 210, 687 P.2d 861 (1984) (finding substantial 
compliance when the police loudly announced themselves after opening a 
door that they thought was an outer hallway). 
The U.S. Supreme Court, like the Washington State Supreme Court, 
has held that a “no-knock” entry is permissible where the police have a 
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under 
the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or would 
inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by allowing the destruction 
of evidence. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 
137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997). 
3.6(a) Types of Entry Requiring Notice 
The phrase “break open” in Washington’s knock and announce 
statute refers to all nonconsensual entries, not simply to those involving 
forcible breaking. See State v. Richards, 136 Wn.2d 361, 370–73, 962 P.2d 
118 (1998). As a consensual entry is not “breaking open,” officers have no 
duty to announce themselves in that situation. See State v. Williamson, 42 
Wn. App. 208, 211, 710 P.2d 205 (1985). However, the circumstances 
must reasonably indicate that the occupant has actually consented to the 
officer’s entry. See State v. Sturgeon, 46 Wn. App. 181, 183, 730 P.2d 93 
(1986) (holding that the knock and announce statute was violated when 
the police knocked, the defendant shouted “yeah,” and the police entered 
the apartment). If officers are attempting to gain entry to the residence 
through a “knock and talk” procedure and gain consent for a search, then 
the officer must announce he or she is an officer and inform the suspect 
that he or she has the right to refuse entry. State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 
103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998); see also State v. Schultz, 170 Wn.2d 746, 248 
P.3d 484 (2011). 
Even if the police are able to freely enter the residence, they must 
still announce themselves. For instance, when officers attempt to gain 
entry through an unlocked or open door. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 7 Wn. 
App. 414, 416, 499 P.2d 241 (1972) (holding an entry unlawful when the 
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officer entered through an open door and did not announce his presence); 
see also Coyle, 95 Wn.2d at 6, 621 P.2d 1265 (holding that officer entering 
dwelling must give notice of his office and purpose even though door to 
apartment was partially open). Notice is also required for entry by use of 
a pass key. See Ker, 374 U.S. at 38–41, 83 S. Ct. 1623. 
An officer’s failure to knock and announce himself before entering a 
fenced backyard through an unlocked gate, however, does not violate 
RCW 10.31.040 when the officer can observe that the backyard is 
unoccupied. State v. Schimpf, 82 Wn. App. 61, 65, 914 P.2d 1206 (1996). 
The court in Schimpf determined that “a knock and announcement at the 
gate in these circumstances would serve none of the purposes of the rule 
and statute.” Id. No one was present in the backyard, so there was little 
risk of violence; the unlocked gate allowed the deputy to enter without any 
property damage; and the low fence meant that the deputy could already 
see into the backyard, suggesting there were no significant privacy 
interests involved. Id. 
3.6(b) Entry Obtained by Deception 
The Washington State Supreme Court has held that consent obtained 
by deception may still be effective consent under certain circumstances. 
State v. Myers, 102 Wn.2d 548, 552, 689 P.2d 38 (1984), modified on other 
grounds by State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 19–21, 921 P.2d 1035 (1996). If 
the ruse is unsuccessful, then the “knock and wait” requirement must be 
observed. State v. Ellis, 21 Wn. App. 123, 129, 584 P.2d 428 (1978).  
For instance, in State v. Myers, the police obtained a search warrant. 
102 Wn.2d at 549, 689 P.2d 38 (1984). They were aware it would be 
difficult to execute the warrant given that the doors and windows to the 
defendant’s house were covered by iron bars and that the defendant kept a 
handgun. Id. Officers prepared a fictitious warrant for the defendant’s 
arrest for a traffic offense. Id. at 550, 689 P.2d 38. Upon being permitted 
to enter his house, the police executed the search warrant. Id. The court 
held that even though the officers failed to announce their purpose to 
search, the occupant of the house had granted “valid permission” for them 
to enter. Id. at 554, 689 P.2d 38; see also State v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 5, 
621 P.2d 1265 (1980).  
The Myers court determined this ruling was consistent with the 
interests underlying the knock and announce requirement. See Myers, 102 
Wn.2d at 555, 689 P.2d 38. An occupant’s right to privacy is protected 
because the occupant may not deny entry to police who possess a valid 
search warrant, there is no damage to property as the entry was consensual, 
and the possibility for violence is lower with consent. State v. Richards, 
136 Wn.2d 361, 373, 962 P.2d 118 (1998). Thus, an officer need not 
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announce he is an officer or state his purpose because—as the suspect has 
given consent—no “breaking” occurs within the terms of the statute. State 
v. Williamson, 42 Wn. App. 208, 211, 710 P.2d 205 (1985). 
Similarly, in State v. Huckaby, the court found the knock and 
announce statute inapplicable when undercover officers entered the 
suspect’s home with the suspect’s consent and for the apparent purpose of 
conducting a drug transaction. 15 Wn. App. 280, 290, 549 P.2d 35 (1976). 
See generally William D. Bremer, Annotation, What Constitutes 
Compliance with Knock-and-Announce Rule in Search of Private 
Premises—State Cases, 85 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2001). 
3.6(c) Identification and Waiting Period 
The police must wait only a reasonable period of time after they 
announce their presence before entering the residence if no one answers 
their knock. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 411, 47 P.3d 127 (2002); 
see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(c), at 85362 (5th 
ed. 2012). The waiting period is over once “the door of the premises is 
open, attended by an occupant, and the police have announced their 
identity and purpose while face-to-face with the occupant.” State v. 
Alldredge, 73 Wn. App. 171, 177, 868 P.2d 183 (1994). The 
announcement of office and purpose may be made to the person answering 
the door even when that person is not in possession of the premises. See 
State v. Sainz, 23 Wn. App. 532, 537 n.3, 596 P.2d 1090 (1979). 
Whether the officer waited a reasonable amount of time is a question 
of law and is determined with regard to the particular circumstances of the 
case. State v. Richards, 136 Wn.2d 361, 374, 962 P.2d 118 (1998); State 
v. Johnson, 94 Wn. App. 882, 890, 974 P.2d 855 (1999). If it is clear that 
the inhabitants are aware of the police presence, the police may enter 
immediately. See Richards, 136 Wn.2d at 374, 962 P.2d 118 (holding that 
officers did not violate the knock and wait rule when they entered the 
apartment immediately after announcing their identity because they were 
visible through sliding screen door); State v. Woodall, 32 Wn. App. 407, 
411, 647 P.2d 1051 (1982) reversed on other grounds by State v. Woodall, 
100 Wn.2d 74, 666 P.2d 364 (1983) (holding three to four second wait 
reasonable when someone inside the clubhouse had seen the officers long 
before they reached the door and announced their presence). 
So long as the police wait a reasonable amount of time after 
announcing their presence, they need not wait for an affirmative denial. 
See United States v. Bustamante–Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 10–11 (9th Cir. 
1973); Richards, 136 Wn.2d at 374, 962 P.2d 118. Denial of admittance 
may be implied from the occupant’s lack of response. See State v. Schmidt, 
48 Wn. App. 639, 644–45, 740 P.2d 351 (1987). 
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Because the length of a “reasonable” wait depends on the situation, 
courts have held that short waiting periods are appropriate if the suspect 
may be armed or the evidence is easily disposable. In State v. Berlin, the 
court held that the defendant’s possession of weapons and his history of 
violence did “bear upon the reasonableness of the length of time that the 
police waited after announcing themselves.” 46 Wn. App. 587, 593–94, 
731 P.2d 548 (1987). In State v. Schmidt, the court found that a three-
second wait was reasonable when there was the possibility that the 
occupants had been alerted to police presence by barking dogs, the suspect 
had a history of gun possession, and the place to be searched was a very 
small shed, meaning the knock could have been quickly answered. 48 Wn. 
App. at 646, 740 P.2d 351 (1987). 
When an officer has satisfied the knock and announce requirements, 
but is met with a refusal, the officer may then use reasonable force to 
execute the warrant. See RCW 10.31.040; State v. Young, 76 Wn.2d 212, 
216, 455 P.2d 595 (1969). The reasonableness of the force used by law 
enforcement is determined by the totality of the circumstances. See State 
v. Coyle, 95 Wn.2d 1, 9–11, 621 P.2d 1256 (1980).  
 
3.6(d) Exceptions: Useless Gesture and Exigent Circumstances 
Police are excused from compliance with the knock and announce 
rule when it would be a useless gesture or when the police face exigent 
circumstances. The State has the burden of demonstrating that exigent 
circumstances exist. Ellis, 21 Wn. App. at 125, 584 P.3d 428. Although 
Washington courts have not addressed this situation, at the federal level, 
law enforcement officers may be excused from the knock and announce 
requirement when covert entry of the premises is the only way to 
effectively execute the warrant. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 
24748, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979). 
Under the “useless gesture” exception, compliance with the knock 
and announce rule is excused if the officers are “virtually certain” that the 
occupants are aware of their presence and purpose on the premises. Coyle, 
95 Wn.2d at 11, 621 P.2d 1265; State v. Shelly, 58 Wn. App. 908, 911, 795 
P.2d 187 (1990). See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
4.8(f), at 879–81 (5th ed. 2012). Once the defendant has opened the door 
and the police officers have identified themselves and their purpose, 
waiting for a grant or denial of entrance by the defendant is a useless 
gesture. See Shelly, 58 Wn. App. at 911, 795 P.2d 187. The useless gesture 
exception has also been applied to justify a police officer’s forcible entry 
when the officer identified himself but was unable to state his purpose 
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before the suspect tried to close the door. State v. Neff, 10 Wn. App. 713, 
717, 519 P.2d 1328 (1974).  
Officers may enter immediately and with force when exigent 
circumstances are present. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37–41, 83 
S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963); State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 
412, 47 P.3d 127 (2002); State v. Young, 76 Wn.2d 212, 216, 455 P.2d 595 
(1969). Exigent circumstances exist, for example, when the evidence may 
be easily disposed, the defendant may escape, or the defendant poses a 
threat to public safety. 
Washington has rejected the blanket rule, favored by some courts, 
that permits an unannounced entry when the warrant is for easily 
disposable items, such as drugs. State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362, 634 
P.2d 312 (1981). In Washington, the police must possess specific 
information indicating that the items are in imminent danger of destruction 
or removal. See Young, 76 Wn.2d at 215–16, 455 P.2d 595 (holding that 
belief of exigent circumstances cannot be based on suspicion or 
ambiguous acts); State v. Dugger, 12 Wn. App. 74, 81, 528 P.2d 274 
(1974) (holding that destruction of evidence exigency was not established 
because prior to their entry police had heard nothing to suggest such 
destruction was in progress). See generally 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.8(d).  
In Washington, the courts look to six factors to determine if exigent 
circumstances exist: (1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with 
which the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably 
believed to be armed; (3) whether there is reasonably trustworthy 
information that the suspect is guilty; (4) whether there is strong reason to 
believe that the suspect is on the premises; (5) the likelihood that the 
suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and (6) whether the entry 
is made peaceably. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 406, 47 P.3d 127. 
A police officer’s reasonable belief that announcing his or her office 
and purpose would jeopardize police or public safety is another type of 
exigent circumstance. See id. at 410–12, 47 P.3d 127; State v. Reid, 38 
Wn. App. 203, 209–10, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). A mere good faith concern 
for safety, however, is not sufficient. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. at 363, 634 P.2d 
312 (finding no exigent circumstances existed when officer had prior 
knowledge of defendant’s possession of gun but not of any propensity for 
defendant to use it to resist arrest). Police must know from prior 
information or from direct observation that the suspect both keeps 
weapons and has a propensity to use them. State v. Allyn, 40 Wn. App. 27, 
31, 696 P.2d 45 (1985).  
Finally, law enforcement may rely on the exigent circumstances 
exception when they obtained specific prior information that would lead 
them to believe that a suspect has made preparations to escape. See State 
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v. Gallo, 20 Wn. App. 717, 723–24, 582 P.2d 558 (1978) (holding that 
police had probable cause to believe the armed suspect was in his 
apartment;  knocked and announced repeatedly without a response; and 
heard a sound of something being dragged across the floor, indicating 
either that “an escape was being attempted or that some fortification was 
being effected so as to resist arrest”).  
3.7 SEARCH AND DETENTION OF PERSONS ON THE PREMISES  
BEING SEARCHED 
3.7(a) Detention of Persons on Premises Being Searched 
A valid search warrant carries with it the authority to detain the 
occupants of the premises while the search is being conducted. Michigan 
v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981); 
State v. Flores-Moreno, 72 Wn. App. 733, 739, 866 P.2d 648 (1994). 
However, this authority is narrower than either a detention supported by 
probable cause or a Terry stop. State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 618–19, 
949 P.2d 856 (1998) (stating that a “narrower application is that even 
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, it is 
reasonable for an officer executing a search warrant at a residence to 
briefly detain occupants of that residence, to insure officer safety and an 
orderly completion of the search”). To detain a person not listed in a search 
warrant, the police must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 
person has committed or is about to commit a crime or that she is a threat 
to safety. See State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486, 498, 987 P.2d 73 (1999). 
In executing a search warrant, the police may ascertain whether any 
individual arriving on the scene might interfere with the search and may 
determine what business, if any, the individual has at the premises. State 
v. Galloway, 14 Wn. App. 200, 202, 540 P.2d 444 (1975), abrogated on 
other grounds by State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 60, 882 P.2d 747 (1983). 
Such a limited stop, however, “is not a license to detain and frisk all 
persons approaching within 100 feet of the location of the search[.]” State 
v. Melin, 27 Wn. App. 589, 592, 618 P.2d 1324 (1980). 
3.7(b) Search of Persons on Premises Being Searched 
Generally, a premises search warrant justifies a search of personal 
effects of the owner found therein [that] “are plausible repositories for the 
objects named in the warrant.” State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 643, 870 P.2d 
313 (1994). Officers have only the power to detain other persons who are 
present, but they may not conduct personal searches of the persons other 
than the occupant. See State v. Worth, 37 Wn. App. 889, 892, 683 P.2d 
622 (1984); State v. Galbert, 70 Wn. App. 721, 727, 855 P.2d 310 (1993) 
1356 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:1277 
(rejecting “mere presence” of contraband as a justification to search 
persons who are merely located at the search scene). This protection 
extends to “readily recognizable personal effects . . . which an individual 
has under his control and seeks to preserve as private.” State v. Lohr, 164 
Wn. App. 414, 423, 263 P.3d 1287 (2011) (internal quotations omitted) 
(citing Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d 622); see also 2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9(b)(c), at 894–902 (5th ed. 2012). Thus, 
if the police can identify the item as belonging to a person other than the 
occupant, they may not search it. See Worth, 37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d 
622; see also State v. Jackson, 107 Wn. App. 646, 649, 27 P.3d 689 (2001) 
(holding that police properly searched a jacket where there was confusion 
over whether it was owned by the lawfully arrested driver or the non-
arrested passenger). 
This protection also extends to personal effects that are worn or held 
and those effects nearby the person at the time of the search: “A narrow 
focus on whether a person is holding or wearing a personal item would 
tend to undercut the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and leave 
vulnerable readily recognizable effects, such as [a] purse, which an 
individual has under [her] control and seeks to preserve as private.” Worth, 
37 Wn. App. at 893, 683 P.2d 622. The Washington State Supreme Court 
has held, however, that one has no privacy interest in items left at another’s 
house. See State v. Reynolds, 144 Wn.2d 282, 287, 27 P.3d 200 (2001) 
(holding that the defendant voluntarily abandoned her coat and, 
consequently, had no constitutionally protected privacy interest in coat's 
contents). 
There are limited instances in which the police may conduct a search 
of a person on the premises but not named in the warrant. State v. 
Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 301, 654 P.2d 96 (1982). For searches 
conducted incident to arrest, see infra § 5.1. If the search is not incident to 
a lawful arrest, then police may only detain or search an individual other 
than the occupant if there is “presence plus.” Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at 301, 
654 P.2d 96. “Presence plus” is detailed below. 
Suspicious behavior. First, a person not named in the warrant but 
present on the premises may be searched if the police “have reasonable 
cause to believe [that the person] has the articles for which the search is 
instituted upon his person.” State v. Halverson, 21 Wn. App. 35, 38, 584 
P.2d 408 (1978) (citations omitted). “Reasonable cause” requires that the 
person engage in some type of suspicious activity. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at 
301, 654 P.2d 96. For instance, in the execution of a search warrant for 
narcotics, police were justified in searching a person’s fists when, at the 
time of the officer’s entry, the person was observed kneeling in front of a 
weighing scale and then rising with his fists clenched. Halverson, 21 Wn. 
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App. at 36–37, 584 P.2d 408. In contrast, police are not justified in 
searching a purse, however, when the owner of the purse gave no evidence 
of suspicious behavior. Lohr, 164 Wn. App. at 423, 263 P.3d 1287. 
Search for weapons. Second, police may conduct a limited search 
for weapons to protect themselves during the execution of the warrant. 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979); 
Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at 301, 654 P.2d 96; State v. Allen, 93 Wn.2d 170, 
172, 606 P.2d 1235 (1980). The police must, however, have a reasonable 
suspicion that the person searched is armed. State v. Lennon, 94 Wn. App. 
573, 580–81, 976 P.2d 121 (1999) (A “[g]eneralized suspicion” that 
people present during narcotic searches are often armed is insufficient to 
justify a search.). The search must also be limited to ascertaining whether 
the individual is armed. See Allen, 93 Wn.2d at 172, 606 P.2d 1235 
(holding that an officer conducting a pat-down may not examine the 
contents of a wallet found on the individual “after satisfying himself that 
the ‘bulge’ [wallet] was not a weapon”). For a more detailed discussion, 
see infra § 4.5. 
3.8 PERMISSIBLE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF SEARCH 
Assuming that a search warrant describes the area and items with the 
requisite particularity, the remaining question is the permissible scope and 
intensity of the search. The nature of the items to be seized governs the 
permissible degree of intensity for the search. State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 
717, 630 P.2d 427 (1981) (holding that a search for marijuana has a high 
degree of intensity). “Any express or implied limitations or qualifications 
may reduce the scope of consent in duration, area, or intensity.” State v. 
Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 133, 101 P.3d 80 (2004). Once the purpose 
of the warrant has been carried out, the authority to search ends. See State 
v. Legas, 20 Wn. App. 535, 541, 581 P.2d 172 (1978) (holding that a 
warrant permitting a search in a bedroom for papers linking defendant to 
the premises did not justify a search of a small box after such papers had 
been discovered). 
Generally, a premises search warrant “justifies a search of personal 
effects of the owner found therein [that] are plausible repositories for the 
objects specified in the warrant.” State v. Worth, 37 Wn. App. 889, 892, 
683 P.2d 622 (1984) (citing State v. White, 13 Wn. App. 949, 538 P.2d 
860 (1975)); see also State v. Anderson, 41 Wn. App. 85, 96, 702 P.2d 481 
(1985) (holding that a warrant to search for clothing used in a robbery 
extended to the entire residence where clothing might be found, including 
the inside of a garbage-can-sized commercial vacuum cleaner).  
In a search for documents, courts have recognized that officers must, 
out of necessity, examine documents not specifically listed in the warrant. 
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See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 478, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 
2d 627 (1976); State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 692–95, 940 P.2d 1239 
(1997). In the course of such a search, officers may also seize evidence 
found that is not specifically described in the warrant if “it will aid in a 
particular apprehension or conviction, or [if it] has a sufficient nexus with 
the crime under investigation.” Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 695, 940 P.2d 1239. 
3.8(a) Area 
Police “must execute a search warrant strictly within the bounds set 
by the warrant.” State v. Cheatam, 112 Wn. App. 778, 783, 51 P.3d 138 
(2002), aff’d, 150 Wn.2d 626 (2003) (citing State v. Kelley, 52 Wn. App. 
581, 585, 762 P.2d 20 (1988)). But a search of the premises and 
outbuildings extends to the curtilage of the house as well. See State v. 
Rivera, 76 Wn. App. 519, 525, 888 P.2d 740 (1995) (citing State v. Claflin, 
38 Wn. App. 847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984)). Police may enter areas not 
explicitly named in the warrant when such entry is necessary to execute 
the warrant. See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 248, 99 S. Ct. 
1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979) (holding that a warrant explicitly 
authorizing planting of hidden microphone implicitly authorized covert 
entry onto premises). Additionally, officers may search for items thrown 
outside of the premises if knowledge of police presence at the premises 
provoked that action. See State v. Dearinger, 73 Wn.2d 563, 567, 439 P.2d 
971 (1968) (finding that officers acted within ambit of warrant in seizing 
a sack and its contents thrown by occupant into the adjoining yard during 
the search). 
As discussed further in section 3.4(c), above, a warrant that 
authorizes the search of a house with no mention of outbuildings does not 
include a search of outbuildings not under defendant’s control. State v. 
Kelley, 52 Wn. App. 581, 586, 762 P.2d 20 (1988) (suppressing evidence 
located in a barn and garage that were not specified in the warrant); see 
also State v. Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App. 11, 16, 939 P.2d 706 (1997) (holding 
that warrant application describing drug buy at a mobile home did not give 
rise to probable cause to search travel trailer located on same property but 
not under suspect’s control). Generally, where it is reasonable for an 
officer to believe that a storage area is appurtenant to the area covered by 
a valid search warrant, the officers may search the storage area. See State 
v. Boyer, 124 Wn. App. 593, 602, 102 P.3d 833 (2004). 
It has been suggested that police may also enter adjacent areas if they 
reasonably fear for their safety, i.e., conduct a protective sweep. See 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.10(a), at 94245 (5th ed. 2012). 
However, in Washington, the protective sweep incident to arrest has not 
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been extended to search warrants because no court has yet considered this 
question. Boyer, 124 Wn. App. at 602, 102 P.3d 833.  
3.8(b) Personal Effects 
See supra § 3.7(b). If officers have a warrant to search a person, they 
may conduct a strip search of the defendant to procure evidence if such 
search is conducted in a reasonable manner and place as prescribed by 
statute. State v. Colin, 61 Wn. App. 111, 11415, 809 P.2d 228 (1991). In 
Colin, the court utilized RCW 10.79.080 and RCW 10.79.100 by analogy 
in determining standards of reasonableness. Id. In State v. Hampton, the 
court held that the strip search pursuant to a search warrant was reasonable 
because it was conducted in a reasonably private place, a police van with 
tinted windows, without unnecessary touching, and by persons of the 
defendant’s gender. 114 Wn. App. 486, 49495, 60 P.3d 95 (2002). 
3.8(c) Vehicles 
Officers with authority to search a residence for illegal drugs also 
have authority to search vehicles that are under the control of the defendant 
and located on the premises to be searched. State v. Claflin, 38 Wn. App. 
847, 853, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984). But a trailer that is used as a residence is 
treated as a residential outbuilding rather than as a vehicle. State v. 
Gebaroff, 87 Wn. App. 11, 16, 939 P.2d 706 (1997) (holding that because 
the trial court found that the defendant treated the trailer as his residence, 
the reviewing court treated it like a residential outbuilding). And police 
have no authority to search vehicles that are not within the curtilage of the 
home. See, e.g., State v. Graham, 78 Wn. App. 44, 5152, 896 P.2d 704 
(1995) (holding that a truck parked next to, and slightly in, a public street 
is not within the curtilage of the house where there was no fence or other 
barrier between the occupant’s yard and the street). 
In State v. Pourtes, the court held that the street and the shoulder of 
the roadway were not within the curtilage of a residence. 49 Wn. App. 579, 
581, 744 P.2d 644 (1987). Likewise, in State v. Niedergang, the court held 
that a vehicle is not within the curtilage of a house when it is parked in a 
space that lawfully could be used by anyone coming to the adjoining house 
on legitimate business. 43 Wn. App. 656, 662, 719 P.2d 576 (1986). 
3.9 SEIZURE OF UNNAMED ITEMS: REQUIREMENTS IN GENERAL 
Items not listed in the search warrant may be seized when the seizure 
falls within one of the general exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, 
e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563 (1996) (search 
incident to arrest). See generally infra Chapter 5. For example, officers 
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may often see an incriminating object that was not listed in the warrant 
during a search and use the plain view and open view exceptions to seize 
that object. See State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280 (1996) 
(explaining the “open view” doctrine); State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 
346, 815 P.2d 761 (1991) (explaining the “plain view” doctrine). Items 
may also be seized in order to show dominion and control of the premises. 
State v. Weaver, 38 Wn. App. 17, 22, 683 P.2d 1136 (1984). 
3.10 DELIVERING WARRANT AND INVENTORY: REQUIREMENTS FOR 
EXECUTION OF WARRANTS 
Washington statutes or court rules impose requirements on the 
execution of warrants beyond those mandated by the U.S. Constitution. 
For instance, in Washington, an officer shall give a copy of the warrant to 
the person who controls the premises being searched. CrR 2.3(d). If no one 
is present, the officer must post a copy of the warrant. Id. An inventory of 
articles taken must be made in the presence of at least one person other 
than the searching officer. Id.  
Washington follows the majority rule which holds that defects 
relating to the delivery of a search warrant are ministerial and do not 
compel invalidation of the warrant absent a showing of prejudice. State v. 
Temple, 170 Wn. App. 156, 161 n.8, 285 P.3d 149 (2012). In State v. Aase, 
the court held that suppression was not required under either the federal or 
the state constitution when an officer conducted a search and took several 
minutes to provide the defendant with copy of warrant. 121 Wn. App. 558, 
567, 89 P.3d 721 (2004). “Absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant, 
procedural noncompliance does not compel invalidation of the warrant or 
suppression of its fruits.” State v. Parker, 28 Wn. App. 425, 426, 626 P.2d 
508 (1981). 
3.11 CHALLENGING THE CONTENT OF AN AFFIDAVIT 
A defendant is generally entitled to examine an affidavit in order to 
challenge whether there was probable cause to issue the warrant. Franks 
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978); State 
v. Haywood, 38 Wn. App. 117, 120, 684 P.2d 1337 (1984). Relevant issues 
relating to a challenge to an affidavit’s contents include the disclosure of 
an informant’s identity and misrepresentations or omissions in the 
affidavit. 
3.11(a) Informant’s Identity 
The court may excise portions of an affidavit that identify a 
confidential or unnamed informant to protect the State’s interest in 
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maintaining the confidentiality of such informants. See State v. Moen, 150 
Wn.2d 221, 230, 76 P.3d 721 (2003); see CrR 4.7(f)(2) (“Disclosure of an 
informant’s identity shall not be required where the informant’s identity is 
a prosecution secret and a failure to disclose will not infringe upon the 
constitutional rights of the defendant.”). 
When the informant is undisclosed, however, the defendant lacks 
access to the very information he or she needs to challenge the veracity of 
an affidavit. State v. Casal, 103 Wn.2d 812, 818, 699 P.2d 1234 (1985). 
Courts have held that when the “informant provided information relating 
to probable cause only, rather than the defendant’s guilt or innocence, 
disclosure of the identity of an informant is not required.” State v. Atchley, 
142 Wn. App. 147, 156, 173 P.3d 323 (2007); see also Casal, 103 Wn.2d 
at 81516, 699 P.2d 1234.  
There are instances, however, where fundamental fairness may 
require the disclosure of an informant’s identity to assess the affiant’s 
credibility or accuracy. See State v. White, 50 Wn. App. 858, 865, 751 P.2d 
1202 (1988). In such cases, the court must balance the risks of disclosure 
against the risk that nondisclosure may conceal police perjury. Id.; State v. 
Wolken, 103 Wn.2d 823, 829, 700 P.2d 319 (1985). The discretionary 
nature of the rule recognizes that search warrant affidavits may contain 
some false allegations. White, 50 Wn. App. at 865, 751 P.2d 1202. 
A defendant may be entitled to an in camera hearing on whether to 
disclose the informant’s identity if the defendant “casts a reasonable doubt 
on the veracity of material representations made by the affiant.” White, 50 
Wn. App. at 865, 751 P.2d 1202 (quoting Casal, 103 Wn.2d at 820, 699 
P.2d 1234). This hearing is available on only a “minimal showing of 
inconsistency.” Id. Even so, “a Casal hearing is required only whe[n] a 
search warrant affidavit contains no other independent basis for 
establishing probable cause.” Id. at 865 n.4, 751 P.2d 1202. If the 
informant verifies the affiant’s story and the judge is convinced that 
probable cause existed, the informant’s identity is not to be disclosed. Id. 
at 822, 751 P.2d 1202. But if the judge finds a substantial showing of 
falsehood, an open evidentiary hearing is required. Id. 
3.11(b) Misrepresentations and Omissions in an Affidavit 
A defendant may challenge the validity of a warrant based on a 
misrepresentation of fact in the supporting affidavit. Franks, 438 U.S. at 
15556, 98 S. Ct. 2674; State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 158 P.3d 595 
(2007). The Franks test also applies to allegations of material omissions. 
State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 367, 693 P.2d 81 (1985). 
Under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, the 
defendant must first make a substantial showing that a false statement in 
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the affidavit (1) was made either knowingly and intentionally or in reckless 
disregard for the truth, and (2) was necessary or material to the finding of 
probable cause. State v. Garrison, 118 Wn.2d 870, 872, 827 P.2d 1388 
(1992); see also Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 47879, 158 P.3d 595. An 
omission or misrepresentation that was made in a negligent or grossly 
negligent manner will not give rise to a Franks hearing; the omission or 
misrepresentation must be made recklessly. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 
47879, 158 P.3d 595; State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 908, 632 P.2d 44 
(1981). The showing must be based on specific facts and offers of proof 
rather than on conclusory assertions. Garrison, 118 Wn.2d at 872, 827 
P.2d 1388. 
If the defendant fails to meet these preconditions, the inquiry ends. 
Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 47981, 158 P.3d 595; State v. Jackson, 111 
Wn. App. 660, 677, 46 P.3d 257 (2002). If the defendant is successful in 
proving the truth of his allegations, the affidavit must be examined with 
the false statements deleted and the omissions inserted. State v. Atchley, 
142 Wn. App. 147, 158, 173 P.3d 323 (2007). If the modified affidavit is 
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, the defendant is entitled 
to an evidentiary hearing under the Fourth Amendment. Franks, 438 U.S. 
at 17172, 98 S. Ct. 2674; Garrison, 118 Wn.2d at 873, 827 P.2d 1388. 
Close cases should be assessed in favor of the defendant when the 
misstatements are removed from the affidavit. United States v. Kelley, 482 
F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). 
3.12 SPECIAL SITUATIONS 
The search and seizures of materials protected by the First 
Amendment, intrusions into the body, and warrants directed at non-
suspects require additional limitations.  
3.12(a) First Amendment Materials 
When a warrant authorizes the search of materials protected by the 
First Amendment it must “follow the Fourth Amendment’s particularity 
requirement with ‘scrupulous exactitude.’” State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 
815, 167 P.3d 1156 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Nothing should be 
“left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” Stanford v. 
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 S. Ct. 506, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1965). This 
includes warrants for books, pictures, films, or recordings. State v. 
Perrone, 119 Wn.2d 538, 547, 834 P.2d 611 (1992); see Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1978).  
If the objects to be seized are books or films, and are being seized 
because of their content, the requirement of particularity is especially 
important.” Perrone, 119 Wn.2d at 548, 834 P.2d 611; see also 2 Wayne 
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R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(e) (5th ed. 2012). Oftentimes, the 
seizure of protected materials happens to be allegedly obscene material. 
2 LaFave, supra, § 4.6(e), at 812 (“a description of these materials by title 
or similar identifying characteristic, or by a specific statement as to the 
type of contents which would render the materials presumptively obscene” 
is required). For instance, in State v. Perrone, the court held that a warrant 
for “child pornography” was insufficiently particular because 
pornography implicates “obscenity,” a term that is presumptively 
protected by the First Amendment. 119 Wn.2d 538, 547, 834 P.2d 611 
(1992).  
Likewise, in State v. Reep, the court held that “the fictitious crime of 
‘child sex’ is even broader and more ambiguous than the term 
‘child . . . pornography.’” 161 Wn.2d 808, 815, 167 P.3d 1156 (2007). In 
contrast, in the Ninth Circuit, a warrant for “computers, compact disks, 
floppy disks, hard drives, memory cards, printers, and other portable 
digital devices, DVDs, and video tapes” was not too broad, as the 
computer-related equipment was described in the narrowest terms 
reasonably likely to contain the images. States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
The scrupulous exactitude standard has not been extended to all 
searches and seizures involving the First Amendment. State v. Walter, 66 
Wn. App. 862, 869, 833 P.2d 440 (1992) (citing New York v. P.J. Video, 
Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875, 106 S. Ct. 1610, 89 L. Ed. 2d 871 (1986)) 
(determining that greater scrutiny was not required merely because 
photographs were involved). For instance, computers themselves are not 
subject to heightened protection just because they frequently store material 
protected by the First Amendment. United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 
882 (9th Cir. 2008).  
Lastly, in some cases, a search warrant has been found to satisfy the 
particularity requirement despite having a catchall phrase. In Andresen v. 
Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a search warrant that listed 
specific documents pertaining to a particular crime, but then added the 
catchall phrase “together with other fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence 
of crime.” 427 U.S. 463, 479–82, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976). 
The Anderson ruling was in sharp contrast to United States v. Heredia. In 
Heredia, the Ninth Circuit found a warrant for “any and all” records 
related to a certain organization too broad because the organization had 
not been shown to be pervasively criminal. 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007). 
3.12(b) Intrusions into the Body 
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the 
Washington State Constitution, a forced intrusion into the body is a search. 
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Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 
103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989); State v. Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d 176, 184, 
240 P.3d 153 (2010). This includes, among other things, DNA sampling, 
tests of a defendant’s blood for alcohol content, breathalyzer tests, cavity 
searches, and strip searches.  
If the defendant voluntarily discards bodily fluids, no warrant is 
necessary. State v. Athan, 160 Wn.2d 354, 367, 158 P.3d 27 (2007) 
(finding no privacy interest in saliva on envelope mailed to the defendant 
by a police officer posing as an attorney). A trial court may also order 
samples to be taken from the defendant’s body; however, the court’s 
power to do so is subject to constitutional limitations. CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi); 
see Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d at 18586, 240 P.3d 153 (2010). Thus, 
intrusion into the body is covered by the warrant requirement. 
For an intrusion into the body, the regular requirements under article 
I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment apply. State v. Kalakosky, 121 
Wn.2d 525, 532, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993) (holding that valid search warrant 
based on probable cause is constitutionally sufficient to obtain blood 
sample from suspect). However, three more requirements must be met: (1) 
there must be a “clear indication” that the desired evidence will be found 
if the search is performed, (2) the method of searching must be reasonable, 
and (3) the search must be performed in a reasonable manner. Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–72, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 
(1966); Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d at 18485, 240 P.3d 153.  
When alcohol content of the defendant’s blood is an element of the 
crime, however, the police may take a blood sample without a warrant if 
the test used to measure blood alcohol content is reasonable and performed 
in a reasonable manner. State v. Curran, 116 Wn.2d 174, 185, 804 P.2d 
558 (1991), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Berlin, 133 Wn.2d 
541, 947 P.2d 700 (1997). For example, taking a blood sample from a 
defendant charged with negligent homicide was valid when the police 
have probable cause to believe that evidence of intoxication will be found 
and the test used to measure blood alcohol content is reasonable and 
performed in a reasonable manner. State v. Judge, 100 Wn.2d 706, 712, 
675 P.2d 219 (1984).  
Washington has also upheld mandatory blood testing in certain cases; 
for instance, in the case of putative fathers. See State v. Meacham, 93 
Wn.2d 735, 739, 612 P.2d 795 (1980). Washington mandatory HIV and 
DNA testing of convicted sexual offenders is permissible. Kalakosky, 121 
Wn.2d at 536, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993) (upholding mandatory HIV testing of 
sexual offenders as it presents a minimal Fourth Amendment intrusion for 
which the State’s reasons are compelling); State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73, 
93, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993) (upholding mandatory DNA testing of convicted 
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sexual offenders in order to establish DNA databank). It is also permissible 
to take DNA samples from convicted felons. State v. Surge, 160 Wn.2d 
65, 156 P.3d 208 (2007) (upholding mandatory DNA testing of felons 
without a warrant). Once the police have the DNA sample in their 
possession, they may compare it to unrelated cases without a warrant. State 
v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 826–27, 147 P.3d 120 (2006), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wn.2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014). 
More intrusive procedures may be permitted in special 
environments. In prisons and jails, strip searches and cavity searches may 
be done without a warrant. State v. Harris, 66 Wn. App. 636, 642, 833 
P.2d 402 (1992) (finding exigent circumstances justified strip search of 
juvenile before placement in holding cell when police had prior experience 
with gang members taping razor blades to their skin); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 560, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (finding full body 
cavity searches of prison inmates following contact visits not 
unreasonable). Similar intrusive procedures may be allowed at the 
country’s borders. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 
531, 537, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1985) (holding that suspect 
fitting the profile for a drug smuggler may be subjected to rectal cavity 
search when search warrant was based on profile and suspect’s 
unwillingness to eat, drink, or defecate during sixteen-hour confinement). 
See generally infra §§ 6.2 (prisons), 6.3. The U.S. Supreme Court also 
upheld the use of DNA sampling for persons arrested for, but not convicted 
of, a crime. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 186 L. 
Ed. 2d 1 (2013).  
3.12(c) Warrants Directed at Non-suspects 
The Fourth Amendment also applies to non-suspects. Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 55960, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525 
(1978). Critics have argued that a search warrant of a third party is per se 
unreasonable and that a subpoena duces tecum can adequately protect law 
enforcement interests. See Peter A. Pastore, The Reasonableness of 
Warranted Searches of Nonsuspect Third Parties, 44 Alb. L. Rev. 212, 
232–35 (1979). In response to Zurcher, Congress enacted the Privacy 
Protection Act of 1980 (PPA), which prohibits the government from 
searching or seizing any work product material “possessed by a person 
reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a 
newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public 
communication” without first issuing a subpoena duces tecum. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12. 
These protections have not been extended outside the media, and 
Washington has not yet addressed the issue. See generally 2 Wayne R. 
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LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 4.2(c), 4.1(f)(i) (5th ed. 2012). Disputes 
often occur over the search of non-suspect attorneys’ offices. See, e.g., 
O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (finding that 
the protections of client confidentiality, attorney–client privilege, attorney 
work product, and a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to counsel 
cannot keep enforcement officers from rummaging through documents in 
search of items to be seized when such officers possess a warrant to search 






Seizure of the Person: Arrests and Stop-and-Frisks 
This chapter covers principles that are unique to seizure of a person. 
This chapter will discuss the following: (1) the basics of arrests, both with 
and without warrants, for felony charges and misdemeanor charges; (2) 
the specifics of arrests, such as force, custodial arrests for minor offenses, 
judicial review, and booking charges; and (3) Terry stops, including the 
reasonable suspicion standard, frisks, investigative questioning, and the 
dimensions of a reasonable stop. 
4.0 SEIZURE 
Article I, section 7, provides greater protections for individual 
privacy interests than the Fourth Amendment. State v. Winterstein, 167 
Wn.2d 620, 631, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009). In Washington, a seizure occurs 
when a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances would 
not feel free either to leave or to decline an officer’s requests due to the 
officer’s use of force or display of authority. State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 
689, 695, 92 P.3d 202 (2004); State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 574, 62 
P.3d 489 (2003). 
Unlike the Fourth Amendment, Washington’s standard is a purely 
objective one. State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d 656, 663, 222 P.3d 92 
(2009); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 62629, 111 S. Ct. 
1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991). To determine whether a reasonable person 
would feel free to leave, courts consider the officer’s conduct. See O’Neill, 
148 Wn.2d at 574, 62 P.3d 489; see also Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 663, 
222 P.3d 92. Thus, the relevant question is whether, under the 
circumstances, the officer’s conduct would have communicated to a 
reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 
at 574, 62 P.3d 489; State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9, 14, 991 P.2d 720 
(2000), abrogated on other grounds by Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 220 
P.3d 1226. The defendant has the burden of proving that a seizure occurred 
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in violation of article I, section 7. See O’Neill, 99 Wn. App. at 574, 62 P.3d 
489. 
Coercive conduct that constitutes a seizure is established by a series 
of acts, rather than a single act. See State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 Wn. App. 20, 
25, 841 P.2d 1271 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thorn, 
129 Wn.2d 347, 917 P.2d 108 (1996). The Washington State Supreme 
Court has embraced a nonexclusive list of factors that likely result in a 
seizure: “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a 
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, 
or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 
officer’s request might be compelled.” State v. Young, 135 Wn.2d 498, 
512, 957 P.2d 681 (1998) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 554–55, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980)). 
If the officers merely ask the defendant a few questions or ask for 
identification, however, they have initiated a social contact, not a seizure. 
See Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 664–65, 222 P.3d 92 (finding a social 
contact when only one officer was present, the defendant had use of the 
sidewalk, and the police officer was on foot); State v. Hansen, 99 Wn. 
App. 575, 576, 994 P.2d 855 (2000) (holding that handing defendant’s 
identification from one officer to another for the purpose of identification 
does not amount to a seizure); see supra Chapter 1. 
When an individual consents to the police–civilian contact, that 
interaction may or may not constitute a seizure. See, e.g., Morales v. New 
York, 396 U.S. 102, 90 S. Ct. 291, 24 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1969) (remanded to 
determine whether defendant’s “confrontation with the police was 
voluntarily undertaken by him”). Federal courts have considered the 
question of whether a defendant’s consent was really “voluntary.” See, 
e.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 155 L. Ed. 2d 814 
(2003); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. 
Ed. 2d 497 (1980). In such cases, courts have considered the totality of 
circumstances including the following factors: 
[T]he time, place and purpose of the encounter; the words used by 
the officer, his tone of voice and general demeanor in requesting the 
defendant to accompany him to the police station; the officer’s 
statements to others who were present during the encounter; the 
manner in which the defendant was escorted out of the house and 
transported to the stationhouse; the officer’s response to any 
questions by the defendant or his parents regarding the defendant’s 
right to refuse to go to the stationhouse; and the defendant’s verbal 
or non-verbal responses to any directions given to him by the officer. 
3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(a), at 5–6 (5th ed. 2012). 
Similarly, in Washington, a seizure was found when the defendant 
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voluntarily entered a police car that could not be opened from inside. 
Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. at 14, 991 P.2d 720. In situations where there is 
more than one police officer or the officers use a threatening tone, the court 
has found seizures as well. See Harrington, 167 Wn.2d at 660, 222 P.3d 
92 (arrival of second police officer and request to pat down instigated a 
seizure); State v. Gleason, 70 Wn. App. 13, 17, 851 P.2d 731 (1993) 
(seizure found when two officers were present, and one officer yelled 
“[c]an I talk to you a minute?” to the suspect, approached him, and 
requested identification). 
4.1 ARREST 
A defendant is placed under arrest when “a duly authorized officer 
of the law manifests an intent to take a person into custody and actually 
seizes or detains such person.” State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 387, 219 
P.3d 651 (2009). The moment of arrest occurs when the officer manifests 
this intent, not when the officer actually restrains the defendant. Id. 
(holding that a defendant was under arrest at the point when officer told 
him he was under arrest even though the defendant ran). 
To determine whether a person has been arrested the court asks 
“whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position at the time would 
have thought so.” State v. Rivard, 131 Wn.2d 63, 75, 929 P.2d 413 (1997). 
The subjective intent of the arresting officer is irrelevant. State v. Radka, 
120 Wn. App. 43, 50, 83 P.3d 1038 (2004). For instance, in State v. Rivard, 
the court found that no arrest occurred because the defendant was not 
physically apprehended, restrained, handcuffed, or placed in a police 
vehicle. 131 Wn.2d at 75, 929 P.2d 413. Similarly, in State v. Radka, the 
court found no arrest even though the defendant was told he was under 
arrest and placed in a patrol car because he was neither frisked nor 
handcuffed, and he was allowed to make calls on his cell phone. 120 Wn. 
App. at 50, 83 P.3d 1038. 
Although a seizure restrains an individual’s freedom of movement, 
not all seizures amount to arrests. See State v. Lyons, 85 Wn. App. 267, 
270, 932 P.2d 188 (1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 
20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) (finding investigative detention was not 
transformed into an arrest when the investigating officer physically 
restrained a suspect and stated that he was under arrest)). For instance, a 
seizure, but not necessarily an arrest, has taken place when a police officer 
asks an individual to step out of his or her car during a stop. See State v. 
O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 58182, 62 P.3d 489 (2003). 
It is not a defense in a criminal prosecution that a defendant was 
illegally arrested. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, 7 S. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed. 
421 (1886); State v. Waters, 93 Wn. App. 969, 976, 971 P.2d 538 (1999). 
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The legality of the arrest, however, affects the legality of any search or 
confession that takes place after the arrest, as well as the admissibility of 
evidence derived from the arrest. See generally infra Chapter 7. 
4.2 ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS 
Arrests are not subject to the same strict warrant requirements as 
searches, giving officers more freedom to arrest without a warrant. This 
section summarizes general rules for warrantless arrests in public places 
and in the home. This section also examines the standards for warrantless 
arrests for felony offenses and for misdemeanors. 
4.2(a) Public Arrests 
An officer may make a warrantless felony arrest in a public place 
even though the officer had time to obtain a warrant. State v. Solberg, 122 
Wn.2d 688, 696, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (citing United States v. Watson, 423 
U.S. 411, 42224, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976)). Such arrests 
must be supported by probable cause. Id.; 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 5.1(b), at 22–23 (5th ed. 2012). “Probable cause exists when 
the arresting officer is aware of facts or circumstances . . . sufficient to 
cause a reasonable officer to believe a crime has been committed.” State 
v. Moore, 161 Wn.2d 880, 887, 169 P.3d 469 (2007) (emphasis removed) 
(citing State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 70, 93 P.3d 872 (2004)); see 
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 
(2003). 
Probable cause must be specific to the individual arrested; thus, if an 
officer smells marijuana emanating from a vehicle and two individuals are 
present, the officer may not arrest both if he cannot discern where the odor 
is coming from. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 146, 187 P.3d 248 
(2008). Probable cause, however, is not subject to calculation by formula 
or by mathematical certainty. See State v. Morgan, 78 Wn. App. 208, 212, 
896 P.2d 731 (1995); see also supra Chapter 2. 
A defendant is entitled to a prompt judicial determination of probable 
cause following a warrantless arrest. Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wn.2d 277, 
295, 892 P.2d 1067 (1994); see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 
S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975) (“Once the suspect is in custody . . . the 
reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate’s neutral judgment 
evaporate.”); see also infra § 4.4(c). 
4.2(b) Home Arrests 
Although officers may make a warrantless arrest in a public area, 
they may not make a warrantless arrest after a nonconsensual entry into a 
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suspect’s home. State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 912, 259 P.3d 172 
(2011) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 58990, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 
63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)). If the officers have a warrant, they may enter the 
home if they reasonably believe the defendant resides therein. State v. 
Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 39596, 166 P.3d 698 (2007); see infra § 4.3(c) 
(discussing Hatchie). The defendant’s home includes trailers even when 
the “trailer home [is] so small that [the defendant] could open the front 
door while lying in his bed.” United States v. Quaempts, 411 F.3d 1046, 
1047 (9th Cir. 2005). Washington courts have not extended the protections 
provided by Payton beyond the home. See State v. White, 129 Wn.2d 105, 
109, 915 P.2d 1099 (1996). 
In Washington, the arrest of a suspect who is standing in the doorway 
of his or her home is treated the same as an arrest in the home. See State 
v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 697, 861 P.2d 460 (1993) (citing State v. 
Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89 (1985)). The location of the 
suspect, not the location of the officer, is material to the issue of whether 
an arrest occurs in the home. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at 429, 693 P.2d 89; 
see Solberg, 122 Wn.2d at 697, 861 P.2d 460. And if the officers force the 
suspect out of his home, the arrest is considered as taking place inside the 
home. United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985). Notably, 
an arrest of a suspect who is on a front porch, as opposed to in the doorway, 
is considered a public arrest. See Solberg, 122 Wn.2d at 700, 861 P.2d 460 
(“[T]he protections afforded in Payton clearly do not apply outside the 
physical boundaries of the home as the theoretical basis of the Payton 
decision is that an arrest within a home violates the sanctity of the home 
whereas outside the boundaries of the home, no such violation is 
present.”). 
Washington courts have not adopted the bright-line rule applied 
under the Fourth Amendment that an officer may, in all circumstances, 
accompany an arrestee into the arrestee’s home after the arrest. See State 
v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 82021, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); see also State 
v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 86, 118 P.3d 307 (2005). Under article I, section 7, 
when a person is arrested for a minor violation, the arresting officer may 
not follow the arrestee into his or her home unless the officer can 
reasonably conclude that the officer’s safety is endangered, evidence 
might be destroyed, or escape is a strong possibility. Kull, 155 Wn.2d at 
8889, 118 P.3d 307 (finding that the officer could not follow the 
defendant into her house because he did not fear for his safety and had no 
other justification). If the officer knows of specific, articulable facts that 
indicate a threat to the officer’s safety, the officer may follow the 
defendant inside. State v. Wood, 45 Wn. App. 299, 30809, 725 P.2d 435 
(1986) (finding that sufficient reason existed to accompany the arrestee 
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into residence for security purposes when the officer was executing an 
arrest warrant for a felony parole violation). An officer may also enter a 
home without a warrant under exigent circumstances or in response to a 
medical emergency. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d at 912, 259 P.3d 172; State v. 
Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 386, 5 P.3d 668 (2000); see infra §§ 5.125.14 
(exigent circumstances). 
A warrantless search based on the emergency exception is valid 
only if 
(1) the officer subjectively believed that someone likely needed 
assistance for health or safety reasons; (2) a reasonable person in the 
same situation would similarly believe that there was a need for 
assistance; and (3) there was a reasonable basis to associate the need 
for assistance with the place searched. 
Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 386, 5 P.3d 668; State v. Gibson, 104 Wn. App. 792, 
79697, 17 P.3d 635 (2001) (upholding arrest of defendant under 
emergency exception when officers entered house to secure the safety of 
the children before arresting defendant). 
4.2(c) Felony Arrest 
Under the common law standard and the Fourth Amendment, the 
authority to arrest without a warrant applies to felonies. United States v. 
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 42223, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976); 
Kellogg v. State, 94 Wn.2d 851, 854, 621 P.2d 133 (1980). 
An officer may arrest for a felony committed outside of his presence 
if “he has reasonable grounds to believe that (1) the offense committed is 
a felony, and (2) the person apprehended committed the felony.” RCW 
10.31.100; see also Watson, 423 U.S. at 42223, 96 S. Ct. 820. In deciding 
whether an officer had a reasonable belief that a felony was committed, 
the court must consider all of the information known to the officer at the 
time of the arrest, as well as the officer’s expertise. State v. Rose, 175 
Wn.2d 10, 22, 282 P.3d 1087 (2012) (holding that plain view of pipe with 
residue, coupled with the detective’s training, provided cause to make a 
warrantless arrest). 
An officer may also make an arrest without a warrant for the purpose 
of preventing the commission of a felony. State v. Baxter, 68 Wn.2d 416, 
413 P.2d 638 (1966) (holding that there was probable cause to arrest 
without a warrant when the officers first saw the defendant at 4 a.m., he 
appeared to have come from behind or out of some business houses in an 
area containing just a few such businesses, he was wearing one hat and 
was carrying two others, the police automobile drove past him, stopped 
and backed up, and he took flight.); State v. Cottrell, 86 Wn.2d 130, 542 
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P.2d 771 (1975) (holding that there was probable cause to arrest when the 
officer had recently seen the defendant in possession of controlled 
substances and had additional reliable information suggesting the same). 
4.2(d) Misdemeanor Arrest 
To make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest, an officer must have 
probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor is being committed in his 
presence. RCW 10.31.100; State v. Green, 150 Wn.2d 740, 742, 82 P.3d 
239 (2004) (per curiam). Under common law, an officer has the authority 
to make a warrantless arrest of a person who breaches the peace, but the 
authority is not limited to such offenses. See Kalmas v. Wagner, 133 
Wn.2d 210, 218, 943 P.2d 1369 (1997); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 5.1(b), at 15–17 (5th ed. 2012). But see Atwater v. Lago Vista, 
532 U.S. 318, 327, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001). If a 
misdemeanor is committed in the presence of the officer, the officer may 
arrest without a warrant. Green, 150 Wn.2d at 742, 82 P.3d 239. The 
common law presence rule is not constitutionally mandated; consequently, 
Washington’s rule is broader, allowing an officer to make a warrantless 
misdemeanor arrest even when the offense is not committed in the 
officer’s presence. RCW 10.31.100; see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 
411, 418–21, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976). 
In Washington, an officer may make a warrantless misdemeanor 
arrest if the offense (1) involves criminal trespass, physical harm, or the 
threat of physical harm to persons or property; (2) is for possession of 
marijuana, or possession or consumption of alcohol by a minor; (3) is for 
violation of a restraining order; (4) is witnessed by another officer; or (5) 
is for one of a number of specified traffic offenses. RCW 10.31.100. When 
a suspect is arrested for a misdemeanor not committed in the officer’s 
presence, the arrest is not illegal if the arresting officer has knowledge of 
a felony for which the suspect could have been arrested. See State v. 
Stebbins, 47 Wn. App. 482, 485, 735 P.2d 1353 (1987). 
The “in the presence” requirement of RCW 10.31.100 is satisfied 
whenever the officer directly perceives facts permitting a reasonable 
inference that a misdemeanor is being committed. See Tacoma v. Harris, 
73 Wn.2d 123, 126, 436 P.2d 770 (1968). See generally 3 LaFave, supra, 
§ 5.1(c) (discussing what constitutes “in the presence”). Common issues 
include whether the officer must view all the elements of a crime and what 
types of information may be used to fill in “gaps.” See Tacoma, 73 Wn.2d 
at 126, 436 P.2d 770. The arresting officer need not, however, observe the 
events. Under Washington law, an officer may arrest a person without a 
warrant for committing a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor when the 
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offense is committed in the presence of any officer, not limited to the 
presence of only the arresting office. RCW 10.31.100. 
4.3 ARRESTS WITH WARRANTS 
4.3(a) Issuance of Arrest Warrants 
In Washington, the issuance of arrest warrants in all state criminal 
proceedings is authorized by court rules. Specifically, the authority to 
issue a warrant and the formal requirements for arrest warrants are 
governed by CrR 2.2 and CrRLJ 2.02. 
For superior court proceedings, CrR 2.2(a) requires that an arrest 
warrant be based upon an indictment or information filed by the 
prosecuting attorney pursuant to CrR 2.1. If there is an indictment or 
information filed, the court may issue an arrest warrant for a defendant. A 
warrant of arrest must be supported by an affidavit or sworn testimony 
establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant, and the court must 
determine that there is probable cause for its issuance. See CrR 2.2(b) (“A 
warrant of arrest may not issue unless the court determines that there is 
probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense 
charged.”). Similarly, in district court, CrRLJ 2.2(a) provides that the 
filing of a criminal complaint may support the issuance of an arrest 
warrant. 
The requirements of an arrest warrant are set forth by CrR 2.2(c) and 
CrRLJ 2.2(c). For supervisory court proceedings, “a warrant shall be in 
writing and in the name of the State of Washington, shall be signed by the 
clerk with the title of the office, and shall state the date when issued and 
the county where issued. It shall specify the name of the defendant, or if 
the defendant’s name is unknown, any name or description by which the 
defendant can be identified with reasonable certainty.” State v. Rollie M., 
41 Wn. App. 55, 701 P.2d 1123 (1985) (“John Doe” warrant; a warrant 
authorizing the search of unnamed and undescribed persons is too 
unspecific to be valid). The warrant must also designate the offense 
charged in statutory terms. CrR 2.2(c) (“The warrant shall specify the 
offense charged against the defendant and that the court has found that 
probable cause exists to believe the defendant has committed the offense 
charged . . . .”). 
A defendant who is in custody pursuant to a warrant or summons will 
not be released due to an irregularity in the warrant or summons. 
CrR(f)(2); CrR(f)(2). Instead, the warrant or summons may be amended 
so as to remedy any irregularity. Id. 
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4.3(b) Return of Arrest Warrants 
In Washington, “[a]t the request of the prosecuting attorney any 
unexecuted warrant shall be returned to the issuing court to be canceled.” 
CrR 2.2(e); CrRLJ 2.2(e). When a person is delivered a summons, he or 
she shall, on or before the return date, file a return with the court. Id. The 
court may also order the warrant returned to it upon reasonable cause. Id. 
4.3(c) Execution of Arrest Warrants 
An officer with a valid warrant may enter a home without permission 
to make an arrest. See State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395–97, 166 P.3d 
698 (2007) (holding that a misdemeanor warrant allowed the officers to 
enter the residence). However, Washington courts recognize “that the 
presence of an officer, which is initially lawful, can be rendered unlawful 
by his movement.” State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 820, 676 P.2d 419 
(1984). A valid arrest warrant gives police “only the limited ability to enter 
the residence, find the suspect, arrest him, and leave.” Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 
at 400, 166 P.3d 698. 
The principles governing the procurement and execution of search 
warrants generally apply to arrest warrants. See supra Chapter 3. Thus, an 
invalid warrant will not support an arrest. State v. Nall, 117 Wn. App. 647, 
651, 72 P.3d 200 (2003) (holding that an invalid Oregon warrant will not 
support arrest in Washington); see Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 
56869, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 5.1(h), at 8688 (5th ed. 2012). Even if the arrest 
is based on a mistaken “hot sheet” and is made in goodwill, the arrest is 
unlawful. State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539, 542, 918 P.2d 527 (1996). 
With a valid warrant, an arrest is lawful if the officer has reasonably 
articulable grounds to believe that the suspect is the intended arrestee 
named in the warrant. State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 45354, 688 P.2d 
146 (1984). If doubt arises as to identity, the officer is expected to 
immediately take reasonable steps to confirm or deny that the warrant 
applies to the person being held. Id. at 454, 688 P.2d 146. The initial arrest, 
however, must be based on more than the individual’s similarity to the 
general physical description set forth in the warrant. See id. (applying 
Sanders v. United States, 339 A.2d 373, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and finding 
the seizure unlawful because the defendant only fit a general description 
and the officer failed to take steps to verify the specific information). 
A person arrested under the authority of a warrant must first be read 
the warrant. See RCW 10.31.030. The rules surrounding the execution of 
an arrest warrant are ministerial, and substantial compliance with RCW 
10.31.030 is all that is required for a valid arrest. State v. Simmons, 35 Wn. 
App. 421, 423, 667 P.2d 133 (1983). After arrest, if the person wishes to 
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deposit bail, he or she must be taken without delay before a judge. RCW 
10.31.030; State v. Caldera, 84 Wn. App. 527, 528, 929 P.2d 482 (1997) 
(per curiam) (finding illegal a search of two defendants when the search 
occurred prior to them being read the warrant or being taken before a judge 
to deposit bail). However, the plain language of RCW 10.31.030 does not 
require the officer to take the defendant to the nearest detention station. 
State v. Ross, 106 Wn. App. 876, 881, 26 P.3d 298 (2001). 
4.4 ARRESTS: MISCELLANEOUS REQUIREMENTS 
Even with a warrant, an officer may not make an arrest in any manner 
that he or she chooses. There are further limitations on the use of deadly 
force, booking charges, judicial review, and custodial arrest for minor 
offenses. This section introduces these various rules in more detail. 
4.4(a) Use of Force 
An officer is permitted to use reasonable force to make an arrest, and 
an officer can use deadly force if such force reasonably appears necessary 
to prevent a suspect’s escape from a felony arrest. See Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 1315, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985). If the 
defendant does not pose a threat to the officer, the officer is restricted in 
the force he can use. Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 82631 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (taser following stop for failure to wear seat belt was excessive 
when arrestee did not pose immediate threat to officer and officer did not 
warn arrestee taser would be used). Deadly force is restricted even further 
and is appropriate only when “the officer has probable cause to believe 
that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical 
injury to the officer or others.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 3, 105 S. Ct. 1694 
(holding that police were not permitted to shoot an unarmed, fleeing 
burglary suspect). 
In Washington, the amount of force an officer may use is governed 
by statute to the extent consistent with the Garner ruling. See RCW 
10.31.050 (“If after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he or 
she either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all necessary means 
to effect the arrest.”); RCW 9A.16.040 (listing specific situations in which 
an officer is justified in using deadly force). The legislature specifically 
limited the use of deadly force under RCW 9A.16.040(1)(c) to instances 
in which the officer has “probable cause to believe that the suspect, if not 
apprehended, poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer 
or . . . others.” RCW 9A.16.040(2). The use of deadly force by a public 
officer can be justified “to overcome actual resistance to the execution of 
the legal process . . . or in the discharge of a legal duty.” RCW 
9A.16.040(1)(b). 
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In 2018, Washington voters approved Initiative 940 which imposed 
both an objective and subjective good faith standard on the use of deadly 
force by law enforcement officers. The objective good faith test is met if 
a reasonable officer, in light of all the facts and circumstances known to 
the officer at the time, would have believed that the use of deadly force 
was necessary to prevent death or serious physical harm to the officer or 
another individual. The subjective good faith test is met if the officer 
intended to use deadly force for a lawful purpose and sincerely and in good 
faith believed that the use of deadly force was warranted in the 
circumstance. RCW 9A.16.040. 
4.4(b) Significance of Booking and Crime Charged 
Courts differ about whether a suspect being booked for one offense 
may be formally charged with another offense. On the one hand, if the 
booking and formal charges do not need to be similar, police can use an 
arrest as a pretext for detaining a suspect for questioning about an 
unrelated crime for which the police lack probable cause. On the other 
hand, at the time police first establish probable cause for one crime, they 
may not possess sufficient information to establish probable cause for 
another. See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(e) 
(5th ed. 2012). 
In Washington, the formal charge may differ from the booking 
charge. See State v. Teuber, 19 Wn. App. 651, 65556, 577 P.2d 147 
(1978). The booking charge has no significance after a formal charge has 
been lodged, and booking “for investigation” is permissible provided that 
probable cause for an arrest on any charge is present. See State v. 
Thompson, 58 Wn.2d 598, 60607, 364 P.2d 527 (1961). 
4.4(c) Judicial Review 
A person arrested without a warrant is entitled to a post-arrest 
probable cause determination. Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wn.2d 277, 295, 
892 P.2d 1067 (1994); see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S. Ct. 
854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975) (“Once the suspect is in custody . . . the 
reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate’s neutral judgment 
evaporate.”). A neutral and detached magistrate must make the probable 
cause determination, but the hearing may be ex parte. See Gerstein, 420 
U.S. at 119–23, 95 S. Ct. 854. Courts have not resolved the issue of 
whether a violation of the Gerstein rule requires suppression of evidence 
seized after the arrest. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
5.1(g), at 70–76 (5th ed. 2012). 
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4.4(d) Custodial Arrests for Minor Offenses 
“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has 
committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, 
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v. 
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 35455, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 
(2001) (upholding the arrest of an individual for failing to secure herself 
and her children with safety belts).  Washington’s additional protection for 
privacy rights, however, requires the court to draw the line differently than 
the U.S. Supreme Court. State v. Pulfrey, 120 Wn. App. 270, 283, 86 P.3d 
790 (2004), aff’d, 154 Wn.2d 517, 528, 111 P.3d 1162 (2005) (affirming 
but not deciding the constitutional issue). 
Under RCW 46.64.015, custodial arrests for minor traffic violations 
are limited to situations involving specific statutory violations, a 
defendant’s refusal to sign a promise to appear, and nonresident arrestees. 
RCW 46.64.015; see State v. Radka, 120 Wn. App. 43, 48, 83 P.3d 1038 
(2004); see also State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 689, 835 P.2d 1019 
(1992). “[A]s a matter of public policy . . . custodial arrest for minor traffic 
violations is unjustified, unwarranted, and impermissible if the defendant 
signs [a] promise to appear” in court. State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 47, 
578 P.2d 527 (1978); see also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 5.2(g), at 162164 & n.149 (5th ed. 2012). In Hehman, the Supreme 
Court of Washington held that an officer was prohibited from making a 
custodial arrest for a minor traffic violation unless the officer had “other 
reasonable grounds [for the arrest] apart from the minor traffic violation 
itself.” 90 Wn.2d at 50, 578 P.2d 527. 
Custodial arrests are permissible, however, for non-minor traffic 
offenses such as reckless driving and driving with a suspended license. 
Pulfrey, 154 Wn.2d at 528, 111 P.3d 1162; State v. Carner, 28 Wn. App. 
439, 444, 624 P.2d 204 (1981) (finding arrest proper when minor tried to 
evade police on his motorcycle). Also, the officer may make a custodial 
arrest when the circumstances surrounding the arrest dictate transferring 
the violator to another location for completion of the arrest process. See 
State v. LaTourette, 49 Wn. App. 119, 125, 741 P.2d 1033 (1987) (finding 
that the officers’ decision to move arrestee to another location to complete 
arrest for reckless driving was proper when a hostile crowd gathered in 
parking lot). 
When civil proceedings are involved, custodial arrests may be 
improper. The Supreme Court of Washington has held a statute 
unconstitutional that authorized the custodial arrest of any person against 
whom a paternity complaint is filed. See State v. Klinker, 85 Wn.2d 509, 
524, 537 P.2d 268 (1975). Thus, in the absence of a contrary showing, the 
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usual summons and complaint procedure for civil cases is deemed 
adequate for securing the defendant’s presence at trial. See id.  
4.5 INTRODUCTION TO TERRY STOPS 
In some situations, police may make investigatory stops that fall 
short of arrests and are based on proof less than probable cause. See Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v. 
Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 19798, 275 P.3d 289 (2012). Although these 
brief detentions, known as “Terry stops,” fall within the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment, the public interests in crime detection and the relative 
non-intrusiveness of the stop permit a lower standard of proof. See Terry, 
392 U.S. at 2027, 88 S. Ct. 1868. Thus, the investigatory stop is tested 
against the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription of unreasonable 
searches and seizures rather than the probable cause requirement. See id. 
at 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868. 
For a seizure to be permissible, an officer must have a reasonable 
suspicion that the person stopped is engaged in criminal conduct. State v. 
Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 6263, 239 P.3d 573 (2010). The question is 
“whether the officer had ‘specific and articulable facts, which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] 
intrusion.’” State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 5, 726 P.2d 445 (1986) 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. (1868)); see also Doughty, 170 
Wn.2d at 6263, 239 P.3d 573. Under article I, section 7 of the 
Washington Constitution, reasonable suspicion requires consideration of 
the totality of the circumstances, including the officer’s subjective belief. 
See State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 35859, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). See 
generally supra § 2.9(b). For a discussion of the use of the reasonable 
suspicion standard in special environments, see infra §§ 6.1 (schools), 6.3 
(borders). See also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 9.3(b) 
(routine traffic stops), 9.7 (roadblocks), 9.8 (other brief detentions) (5th 
ed. 2012). 
Once an officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, he or she may 
forcibly stop the suspect, but the stop must be a more limited intrusion 
than an arrest. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209, 99 S. Ct. 
2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979). The stop must be limited in scope to 
“whatever reasonable suspicions legally justified the stop in the first 
place.” See State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 29394, 290 P.3d 983 (2012) 
(citing Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 350, 979 P.2d 833). Article I, section 7, 
provides more protection than the Fourth Amendment in that the 
investigative stop may not be a pretext for a search in any situation. 
Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 35859, 979 P.2d 833. See generally Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996). 
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During a Terry stop, the officer may ask a moderate number of 
questions regarding identity and the purpose of the stop without rendering 
the suspect “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda. State v. Heritage, 
152 Wn.2d 210, 219, 95 P.3d 345 (2004). Once an intrusion is substantial 
enough to constitute an arrest, probable cause is necessary. See State v. 
Rose, 175 Wn.2d 10, 1819, 282 P.3d 1087 (2012); see also infra § 6.3. 
However, reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop may ripen 
into probable cause for arrest. State v. McIntosh, 42 Wn. App. 579, 
58384, 712 P.2d 323 (1986) (holding that a suspect’s inability to give 
rational account of appearance and presence in a high burglary area late at 
night, absence of identification, and presence of what appeared to be 
burglar’s tools gave rise to probable cause to arrest). If the “suspect’s 
freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest,’” 
then a Miranda warning must be given. State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 37, 
93 P.3d 133 (2004); State v. Harris, 106 Wn.2d 784, 78990, 725 P.2d 
975 (1986) (adopting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S. Ct. 
3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984)). 
4.6 NATURE OF THE OFFENSE 
“It is generally recognized that crime prevention and crime detection 
are legitimate purposes for investigative stops or detentions.” State v. 
Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 56, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). Thus, Terry stops have 
been upheld for offenses ranging from aggravated robbery to possession 
of narcotics. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct. 675, 
83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 
32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972). In Washington, a non-traffic, civil infraction is 
insufficient to justify a Terry stop. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 175, 
43 P.3d 513 (2002) (declining to extend Terry to general, non-traffic civil 
infractions); see also State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 897, 168 P.3d 1265 
(2007) (declining to extend Terry to parking infractions). Normal traffic 
infractions, however, are sufficient to support a Terry stop. State v. Snapp, 
174 Wn.2d 177, 198, 275 P.3d 289 (2012) (failure to illuminate 
headlights). 
For arguments that Terry stops should be limited to investigations of 
serious offenses, see Adams, 407 U.S. at 15153, 92 S. Ct. 1921 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
9.2(c) (5th ed. 2012). 
4.7 SATISFYING THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD 
To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, the officer’s belief must 
be based on objective facts. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d 
594 (2003); State v. Seitz, 86 Wn. App. 865, 86970, 941 P.2d 5 (1997). 
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The facts must be specific and articulable; thus, an “inarticulate hunch[]” 
is insufficient. State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 63, 239 P.3d 573 (2010) 
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 
(1968)). Courts consider the experience of the officer when determining if 
there was reasonable suspicion. See Acrey, 148 Wn.2d at 747, 64 P.3d 594. 
Consequently, an experienced officer may be able to detect something 
suspicious where a layperson would not. See State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d 
509, 514, 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (concluding that officers’ familiarity with 
the neighborhood allowed them to lawfully detain man they did not 
recognize who claimed to live in an apartment). Generally, the level of 
suspicion required for an investigative stop of a pedestrian is the same as 
that required for a vehicle. See State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 6, 726 P.2d 
445 (1986). 
This section will examine the reasonable suspicion standard in 
greater depth. Issues include individualized suspicion, information from 
informants as the basis for the reasonable suspicion, and the standard as it 
is applied to different offenses. For a discussion of stops not requiring 
individualized suspicion, see infra §§ 6.3 (stops at or near borders), 5.18 
(vehicle spot checks). 
4.7(a) Individualized Suspicion 
An officer must have an individualized suspicion that the particular 
defendant is engaging in unlawful conduct to make a Terry stop. State v. 
Kennedy, 38 Wn. App. 41, 4546, 684 P.2d 1326 (1984); see State v. 
Penfield, 106 Wn. App. 157, 16263, 22 P.3d 293 (2001) (finding that (1) 
the officer stopped vehicle without any articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity and (2) the officer could not lawfully ask male driver to identify 
himself when basis for the stop was the license suspension of the female 
registered owner). 
When an officer does not have individual suspicion of unlawful 
conduct, the search becomes a general search. See York v. Wahkiakum Sch. 
Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 315, 178 P.3d 995 (2008). Washington, 
however, does not authorize general, exploratory searches. Id. For 
instance, under article I, section 7, sobriety checkpoints are deemed 
unconstitutional if lacking individualized suspicion. City of Seattle v. 
Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 460, 755 P.2d 775 (1988). 
There are several exceptions to this general rule. For example, a 
school official may detain and search a student with only reasonable 
suspicion and not individualized suspicion. York, 163 Wn.2d at 308–09, 
178 P.3d 995. Stops at border checkpoints may only require reasonable 
suspicion. See infra § 6.3. In such circumstances, however, an officer’s 
discretion must be limited. State v. Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 434, 441, 706 
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P.2d 225 (1985) (finding spot checks of licenses unconstitutional because 
the discretion of the officers was not checked in any way); see also State 
v. Thorp, 71 Wn. App. 175, 181–82, 856 P.2d 1123 (1993) (holding that 
officers who lack probable cause or a reasonable suspicion may not 
randomly stop moving vehicles for questioning). 
4.7(b) Information from Informants 
When Terry stops are based on information provided by informants, 
the information does not have to meet the same criteria required for 
probable cause. State v. Lee, 147 Wn. App. 912, 91617, 199 P.3d 445 
(2008) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 
L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990)). See generally supra § 2.5. However, “[a]n 
informant’s tip cannot constitutionally provide police with such a 
suspicion unless it possesses sufficient ‘indicia of reliability.’” State v. 
Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 47, 621 P.2d 1272 (1980) (quoting Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972)). To 
determine whether the informant possesses the requisite “indicia of 
reliability,” the court will consider (1) whether the informant is reliable; 
(2) whether the information was obtained in a reliable fashion; and (3) 
whether the officers can corroborate any details of the informant’s tip. 
State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 7, 726 P.2d 445 (1986); Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 
at 47, 621 P.2d 1272; State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 944, 530 P.2d 243 
(1975). 
Citizen-informants that witnessed the crime firsthand are generally 
reliable. See State v. Vandover, 63 Wn. App. 754, 759, 822 P.2d 784 
(1992). Indeed, citizen-informants are given greater credence than 
professional informants because they act with only an intent to aid the 
police. Lee, 147 Wn. App. at 918–19, 199 P.3d 445 (tip from eyewitness 
citizen-informant sufficient when corroborated by officer’s observations); 
see State v. Garcia, 125 Wn.2d 239, 242, 883 P.2d 1369 (1994) (holding 
that information provided by a citizen does not require a showing of the 
same degree of reliability as an informant because a citizen is not a 
“professional” informant); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
3.4(a), at 265–70 (5th ed. 2012). 
Surrounding circumstances may decrease the level of reliability 
required to conduct a Terry stop. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Washington has suggested that when the tip involves a serious crime or 
potential danger, less reliability is required for a stop than is required in 
other circumstances. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d at 50, 621 P.2d 1272; Lesnick, 84 
Wn.2d at 94445, 530 P.2d 243; see 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.5(i), at 80611. 
However, the informant must still be reliable either by the circumstances 
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of the tip or by police corroboration. Vandover, 63 Wn. App. at 760, 822 
P.2d 784. 
Police may also make a Terry stop based on information provided by 
other divisions or agencies. See State v. Mance, 82 Wn. App. 539, 542, 
918 P.2d 527 (1996); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 
23031, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985). The collective knowledge 
of law enforcement agencies that gives rise to a dispatch will be imputed 
to the officers who act on it. State v. O’Cain, 108 Wn. App. 542, 54445, 
31 P.3d 733 (2001). If the issuing agency lacked the authority to make a 
Terry stop on the information, however, so did the officer. State v. Gaddy, 
152 Wn.2d 64, 71, 93 P.3d 872 (2004). 
In any case, the length and intrusiveness of the detention may not 
exceed that which would have been accomplished by the police agency 
providing the information. State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459, 470, 698 
P.2d 1109 (1985) (citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 233, 105 S. Ct. 675). 
4.7(c) Situations that Satisfy or Fail to Satisfy the  
Reasonable Suspicion Standard 
The mere fact that a suspect is in a high-crime area will not justify a 
Terry stop. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 
357 (1979); State v. Seitz, 86 Wn. App. 865, 867–70, 941 P.2d 5 (1997) 
(holding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop when they saw 
occupants of a car speaking to a man on the sidewalk but did not observe 
drugs, money, or anything else change hands); State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 
Wn. App. 20, 25, 841 P.2d 1271 (1992) (stating that merely walking in the 
street in a known drug area late at night does not suggest that someone has 
committed a crime), abrogated, State v. Thorn, 129 Wn.2d 347, 917 P.2d 
108 (1996). Similarly, officers may not stop an individual merely because 
the individual is in proximity to others who are suspected of criminal 
activity. State v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838, 841, 613 P.2d 525 (1980). See 
generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9(d) (5th ed. 
2012); see also supra § 4.7(b). 
A person who simply acts suspiciously is not the proper subject of a 
stop in the absence of other circumstances implicating a crime. State v. 
Walker, 66 Wn. App. 622, 629, 834 P.2d 41 (1992) (finding that an officer 
investigating a report of suspicious behavior in a neighborhood 
inappropriately stopped a man who appeared startled when he saw the 
officer and turned onto another street to avoid him), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 647, 870 P.2d 313 (1994); State 
v. Henry, 80 Wn. App. 544, 552, 910 P.2d 1290 (1995) (nervousness is 
not sufficient for a Terry stop.). In addition, being “out of place” in a 
particular location because of race is not suspicious. State v. Barber, 118 
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Wn.2d 335, 346, 823 P.2d 1068 (1992) (holding that a person of a specific 
race being “out of place” in a particular geographic area can never amount 
to a reasonable suspicion). 
Taken together, the suspect’s actions, whether they are furtive 
gestures or flight, may satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. State v. 
Graham, 130 Wn.2d 711, 725–26, 927 P.2d 227 (1996); State v. Little, 
116 Wn.2d 488, 496, 806 P.2d 749 (1991) (flight from the police may be 
considered.). Crouching down or dropping an object upon seeing the 
officer may also give rise to reasonable suspicion. State v. Jones, 117 Wn. 
App. 721, 728, 72 P.3d 1110 (2003) (holding that suspect in an area known 
for narcotics crouching down with item consistent with the appearance of 
crack cocaine was reasonably suspicious when the suspect quickly began 
to leave the area upon noticing the presence of the officer). However, it is 
not sufficient if the officer does not see what the suspect is hiding. State v. 
Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 540, 182 P.3d 426 (2008). 
An officer’s familiarity with the location or with the narcotics 
involved, when combined with another circumstance, is considered when 
determining whether there was reasonable suspicion. State v. Garcia, 125 
Wn.2d 239, 242, 883 P.2d 1369 (1994) (per curiam). In Garcia, the Court 
determined that information given to police, combined with an officer’s 
experience in narcotics and knowledge of location as a high-crime area, 
justified investigative restraint. Id. Similarly, in State v. Little, the court 
found sufficient suspicion to conduct a Terry stop where officers were 
generally familiar with residents of a complex and did not recognize the 
suspects, and the defendant subsequently fled from the officers. 116 
Wn.2d at 497–98, 806 P.2d 749. 
4.8 DIMENSIONS OF A PERMISSIBLE STOP 
A valid Terry stop “must be temporary, lasting no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,” and “the investigative 
methods employed must be the least intrusive means reasonably available 
to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” State 
v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 738, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984) (discussing 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 
(1983)); see also State v. Smith, 115 Wn.2d 775, 784–85, 801 P.2d 975 
(1990). To determine whether the stop was valid, the court examines (1) 
the purpose of the stop; (2) the amount of physical intrusion upon the 
suspect’s liberty; and (3) the length of time the suspect is detained. State 
v. Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230, 235, 737 P.2d 1005 (1987). This section 
examines duration, investigative techniques, transporting the suspect, and 
seizure of persons in proximity to the suspect. 
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4.8(a) Duration 
The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to set an absolute limit on the 
permissible duration of a Terry stop in terms of minutes or hours. The 
duration of a stop is evaluated by asking “whether the police diligently 
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the 
[suspect].” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 
84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985); see also Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 
108082 (9th Cir. 2011) (45-minute detention permissible). If the 
“investigation should have taken no more than a few minutes,” and the 
officers unnecessarily delayed it, the stop is unlawful. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical 
Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dept., 533 F.3d 780, 795 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (the fact that officers needed a supervisor to clarify the law for 
them was not a sufficient basis to extend the stop.). 
“‘[A]n officer may briefly stop an individual based upon reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity if necessary to maintain the status quo while 
obtaining more information.’” State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172, 43 
P.3d 513 (2002) (quoting State v. Miller, 91 Wn. App. 181, 184, 955 P.2d 
810 (1998)). In Washington, the court has found a 45-minute wait 
permissible when it was caused by the defendant’s refusal to provide 
identification. State v. Cunningham, 116 Wn. App. 219, 228–29, 65 P.3d 
325 (2003). Similarly, officers may temporarily detain a suspect pending 
results of a police radio check. State v. Perea, 85 Wn. App. 339, 342, 932 
P.2d 1258 (1997). This also includes detaining a suspect in a room for 
approximately 20 minutes while the robbery victim was brought to the 
room for identification. State v. Moon, 45 Wn. App. 692, 695, 726 P.2d 
1263 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d 
626, 81 P.3d 830 (2003). 
4.8(b) Investigative Techniques 
During a Terry stop, the police may request both identification from 
the suspect and a description of the suspect’s purpose in the area. State v. 
Little, 116 Wn.2d 488, 495, 806 P.2d 749 (1991) (citing State v. White, 97 
Wn.2d 92, 105, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982)); see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 
47, 51, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979). “An officer making a 
Terry stop may ask a moderate number of questions to determine the 
identity of the suspect and to confirm or dispel the officer’s 
suspicions . . . .” State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210, 219, 95 P.3d 345 
(2004). However, the officers must use the least intrusive means 
reasonably available. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687, 105 S. 
Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985); State v. Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793, 
798–99, 690 P.2d 591 (1984) (ordering three juveniles out of the house at 
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gunpoint was not the least intrusive means possible to confirm suspicion 
of burglary). The officer may expand the stop and use greater force such 
as frisking, secluding, gun drawing, or cuffing if the officer perceives a 
reasonable threat to his or her safety. State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn. App. 143, 
14546, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995); see infra § 4.10. 
Police may not subject the suspect to custodial interrogation during 
a Terry stop. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 
60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979); Heritage, 152 Wn.2d at 219, 95 P.3d 345. The 
police also may not transport the suspect to the police station for the 
purposes of interrogation or fingerprinting, although it may be permissible 
to fingerprint the suspect in the field. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 
81618, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1985). 
4.8(c) Transporting the Suspect 
Transporting a suspect to the police station “is usually impermissible 
because it is not reasonably related to the investigation.” State v. Gardner, 
28 Wn. App. 721, 727–28, 626 P.2d 56 (1981); see also Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 200, 212–13, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979). Thus, 
if there is no probable cause to arrest, such transportation is illegal. State 
v. Gonzales, 46 Wn. App. 388, 396, 731 P.2d 1101 (1986) (handcuffing 
and transporting a suspect to a police station before probable cause to 
arrest arises constitutes an illegal arrest under the Fourth Amendment and 
article I, section 7). 
However, if the transportation is reasonably related to the 
investigative purpose of the initial detention, it may be permissible. 
Gardener, 28 Wn. App. at 728, 626 P.2d 56 (1981) (finding it lawful to 
transport the suspect a short distance to the crime scene); see also State v. 
Wheeler, 108 Wn.2d 230, 237, 737 P.2d 1005 (1987) (transporting the 
suspect a short distance for identification purposes). An unrelated 
emergency occurring nearby or other exceptional circumstances may also 
warrant transportation. See State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 232–33, 721 
P.2d 560 (1986) (stating a transport was permissible when police received 
radio call summoning officers to an apparently unrelated crime scene a 
block away and the suspect told them he was a lookout). 
4.8(d) Detention of Persons in Proximity to Suspect 
The mere fact that an individual is close in proximity to someone 
who is suspected of criminal activity is insufficient to justify a Terry stop. 
State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 398, 28 P.3d 753 (2001) (citing State v. 
Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 295, 654 P.2d 96 (1982), abrogated on other 
grounds by Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 
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L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 9.2(b) (5th ed. 2012). 
For example, a passenger must give some indication of suspicious 
activity before the police can ask the passenger for identification. See State 
v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 697, 92 P.3d 202 (2004) (citing State v. Larson, 
93 Wn.2d 638, 642, 611 P.2d 771 (1980)); Horrace, 144 Wn.2d at 394, 28 
P.3d 753 (holding reasonable suspicion existed to frisk passenger because 
the driver was making furtive gestures as if handing the passenger 
something even though the passenger did not move). In State v. Chelly, the 
court found that the fact the passenger was not wearing a safety belt 
provided the officer with the authority to detain him for a reasonable 
period of time in order to identify him. 94 Wn. App. 254, 260, 970 P.2d 
376 (1999). 
4.8(e) Pretextual Traffic Stops 
Pretextual traffic stops are impermissible under article I, section 7 
when their purpose is to conduct a warrantless investigation of crime 
unrelated to a traffic infraction. State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 353, 979 
P.2d 833 (1999). In this respect, the Washington Constitution provides 
greater protection because pretextual traffic stops have been found 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Compare Gustafson v. Florida, 
414 U.S. 260, 266, 94 S. Ct. 488, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1973) (holding search 
incident to arrest valid even though it followed an admittedly pretextual 
traffic stop); with State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 50, 578 P.2d 527 (1978) 
(declining to limit protection to that provided under federal law). For 
further discussion of the Fourth Amendment requirements concerning 
pretextual stops and a critique of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the 
matter, see generally Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without 
the Fourth Amendment, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1413 (2013). 
Under article I, section 7, “the reasonable articulable suspicion that 
a traffic infraction has occurred which justifies an exception to the [search] 
warrant requirement for an ordinary traffic stop does not justify a stop for 
criminal investigation.” State v. Myers, 117 Wn. App. 93, 98, 69 P.3d 367 
(2003) (citing Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 349, 979 P.2d 833). “A stop for a 
traffic infraction can be extended only when an officer has articulable facts 
from which the officer could reasonably suspect criminal activity.” State 
v. Lemus, 103 Wn. App. 94, 101, 11 P.3d 326 (2000) (internal quotations 
omitted). If the initial traffic stop is unlawful, “the subsequent search and 
fruits of that search are inadmissible.” State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 
542, 182 P.3d 426 (2008) (citing State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 4, 726 
P.2d 445 (1986)). See generally infra Chapter 7 (exclusionary rule). 
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When determining if a traffic stop is pretextual, courts consider the 
totality of the circumstances, including both the subjective intent of the 
officer and the objective reasonableness of the officer’s behavior. State v. 
Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 199, 275 P.3d 289 (2012); State v. Hoang, 101 
Wn. App. 732, 74243, 6 P.3d 602 (2000). In State v. Snapp, the court 
found a stop was not pretextual because the officer could not see how 
many occupants were inside the vehicle, the officer testified that he 
routinely pulled people over who did not have their headlights illuminated, 
and the car began moving in the opposite direction when his police car 
came into view. 174 Wn.2d at 199201, 275 P.3d 289. 
In contrast, in State v. Ladson, the court held that the stop was 
pretextual because the officer admitted the reason for the stop was rumored 
drug use by one of the occupants. See 138 Wn.2d at 35960, 979 P.2d 833 
(1999). Likewise, in State v. DeSantiago, the court found a stop pretextual 
because the officer believed the suspect had just bought or sold drugs and 
he deliberately followed the suspect for ten blocks looking for a reason to 
pull him over. 97 Wn. App. 446, 448, 983 P.2d 1173 (1999). 
4.8(f) Mixed-Motive Traffic Stops 
In State v. Arreola, the Washington Supreme Court distinguished 
between the impermissible pretextual traffic stops in Ladson and the 
permissible “mixed-motive” traffic stops. 176 Wn.2d at 297300, 290 
P.3d 983. A traffic stop falls under the latter category when it is based on 
both legitimate and illegitimate grounds—i.e., partially grounded on 
pretext. Id. The court held that a “mixed-motive” stop was constitutional 
under article I, section 7: 
a traffic stop is not unconstitutionally pretextual so long as 
investigation of either criminal activity or a traffic infraction (or 
multiple infractions), for which the officer has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion, is an actual, conscious, and independent cause 
of the traffic stop. In other words, despite other motivations or 
reasons for the stop, a traffic stop should not be considered pretextual 
so long as the officer actually and consciously makes an appropriate 
and independent determination that addressing the suspected traffic 
infraction (or multiple suspected infractions) is reasonably necessary 
in furtherance of traffic safety and the general welfare. 
Id. at 298, 290 P.3d 983. The ruling did not overrule Ladson, however. 
See id. According to the court, the stop in Ladson continues to be 
unconstitutional because the police officer’s reasons for stopping the car 
were entirely pretextual. See id. at 298. The police officer in that case 
recognized that reason for stopping the defendant’s vehicle was based on 
an unsubstantiated street rumor, and only then did the officer notice the 
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license plates were expired and think of pulling over the car. Id. The traffic 
infraction was not an independent cause for the traffic stop. Id. 
4.9 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON COMPELLED RESPONSES TO 
INVESTIGATORY QUESTIONS 
Even when a police officer possesses a reasonable suspicion and 
makes a valid Terry stop, the officer may not compel the suspect to answer. 
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 22 L. Ed. 2d 
676 (1969); State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 10506, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). 
A suspect’s refusal to answer an investigating officer’s questions cannot 
provide the basis for an arrest. White, 97 Wn.2d at 106, 640 P.2d 1061. 
To remedy this limitation, Washington has enacted a stop-
and-identify statute to facilitate police investigations of ongoing or 
imminent crimes. RCW 9A.76.020; State v. Lalonde, 35 Wn. App. 54, 57, 
665 P.2d 421 (1983), review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1014 (1983) (finding the 
statute constitutional as amended). The amended RCW 9A.76.020 
provides, “A person is guilty of obstructing a law enforcement officer if 
the person willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement 
officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties.” However, 
refusing to identify oneself, when viewed in isolation, is still insufficient 
to support a charge of obstructing a law enforcement officer.” State v. 
Steen, 164 Wn. App. 789, 265 P.3d 901 (2011), review denied as amended, 
173 Wn.2d 1024 (2012). 
4.10 GROUNDS FOR INITIATING A FRISK DURING A TERRY STOP 
An officer conducting a valid Terry stop may conduct a limited 
search for weapons to protect himself or herself or persons nearby from 
physical harm. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 
889 (1968); State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 250, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009) 
(citing State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 895, 168 P.3d 1265 (2007)). After 
the officer has made a valid stop supported by reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity, a frisk may then be undertaken if the officer reasonably 
believes that the “suspect is armed and ‘presently’ dangerous.” State v. 
Xiong, 164 Wn.2d 506, 51314, 191 P.3d 1278 (2008) (officers did not 
have right to frisk the defendant because he cooperated with police, made 
no attempt to flee, and could not reach his pockets). “Reasonable belief 
that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous means . . . [that there is] 
some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not 
arbitrary or harassing.” State v. Setterstrom, 163 Wn.2d 621, 626, 183 P.3d 
1075 (2008) (emphasis removed) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(finding no reasonable belief when the suspect was under the influence, 
lied about his name, and was nervous and fidgety). Once the officer dispels 
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his belief that the suspect is armed, the frisk must end. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 
at 25455, 207 P.3d 1266 (officer exceeded the scope of the search when 
he continued to squeeze the defendant’s pocket after concluding there was 
no weapon). 
Washington requires the following for a valid frisk: (1) the initial 
stop is legitimate; (2) there is a reasonable safety concern justifying a 
protective frisk for weapons; and (3) the scope of the frisk is limited to 
protective purposes. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 172, 43 P.3d 513 
(2002). The fact that a detention occurs in a high-crime area is not in itself 
sufficient to justify a search. See State v. Smith, 102 Wn.2d 449, 45253, 
688 P.2d 146 (1984) (holding that the inquiry must focus on the defendant 
and his actions, not the area where he was found). Thus, police may not 
frisk when they cannot articulate a reason for believing that a suspect is 
dangerous other than that the suspect was seen leaving in his car from the 
scene of a possible burglary. State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 74041, 
689 P.2d 1065 (1984). The most common situation is where the suspect 
makes a furtive gesture or appears to be concealing something. State v. 
Chang, 147 Wn. App. 490, 496, 195 P.3d 1008 (2008) (holding the search 
of the passenger compartment of the car was valid when the suspect 
appeared to be concealing something when police approached). 
For certain crimes in which the offender is likely to be armed, the 
right to conduct a protective search is much more accepted, but for other 
crimes, such as possession of marijuana, additional circumstances must be 
present. See United States v. Flatter, 456 F.3d 1154, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 
2006) (absent other circumstances, a frisk was not proper for a postal 
employee suspected of mail theft because it “is not a crime that is 
frequently associated with weapons”); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 9.6(a), at 85262 (5th ed. 2012). Consequently, in State v. 
Guzman-Cuellar, an officer was justified in initiating a frisk where the 
suspect matched the description of a murder suspect. 47 Wn. App. 326, 
332, 734 P.2d 966 (1987). Likewise, in State v. Harvey, a frisk was 
justified when the crime under investigation was burglary because it is 
well known that burglars often carry weapons. 41 Wn. App. 870, 875, 707 
P.2d 146 (1985). 
The time of day can also contribute to the reasonableness of a 
protective search. State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 398–99, 28 P.3d 753 
(2001) (considering “early morning darkness” as a factor justifying a 
protective search). Not only does “[t]he darkness ma[k]e it more difficult 
for [the officer] to get a clear view into the car,” but “an individual who 
has been stopped may be more willing to commit violence against a police 
officer at a time when few people are likely to be present to witness it.” 
State v. Collins, 121 Wn.2d 168, 174–75, 847 P.2d 919 (1993). 
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Under certain circumstances, officers may seize evidence pursuant 
to a Terry stop even in the absence of grounds for believing that the suspect 
is armed and dangerous. For example, a police officer may seize property 
from a suspect if the suspect’s actions give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
that evidence of a crime is in danger of being destroyed. State v. Pressley, 
64 Wn. App. 591, 598, 825 P.2d 749 (1992) (holding that officer asking 
the suspect to remove her hand from her pocket after seeing a bag in the 
suspect’s palm was proper given his experience with disposal of narcotics 
and her furtive gesture); see also State v. Dorsey, 40 Wn. App. 459, 472, 
698 P.2d 1109 (1985). However, some courts have expressly rejected this 
rationale for a search. State v. Rodriguez–Torres, 77 Wn. App. 687, 693, 
893 P.2d 650 (1995) (rejecting Pressley and stating that a Terry frisk may 
be conducted only based on protective purposes). 
4.10(a) Scope of a Permissible Frisk 
A frisk must be justified in its inception and scope. State v. Hudson, 
124 Wn.2d 107, 112, 874 P.2d 160 (1994). The scope of a valid frisk is 
strictly limited to protective purposes. State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 
250, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009); see also State v. Alcantara, 79 Wn. App. 362, 
366, 901 P.2d 1087 (1995) (holding that a search exceeded the scope of a 
Terry stop because the officer gave no indication that the search was based 
on concerns for the officer’s safety). Thus, the officer may only conduct a 
search of the suspect’s outer clothing for weapons that might be used to 
harm the officer or others nearby. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 2930, 88 S. 
Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at 112, 874 P.2d 
160. However, a frisk need not conform to the conventional pat down. 
Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at 112, 874 P.2d 160 (if pat down is inconclusive, the 
officer may reach into the clothing); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 
143, 14749, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972) (finding an officer 
was justified in reaching through a window and removing a revolver from 
the suspect’s waistband when officer knew that the suspect carried a gun 
in his waistband and he refused to step out of the car). See generally 4 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 9.5(b)9.6(b) (5th ed. 2012).  
When in the course of a frisk an officer feels what may be a weapon, 
the officer may only take such action as is necessary to examine the object. 
Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at 113, 874 P.2d 160 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 
S. Ct. 1868). See generally 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.6(c). Once police 
ascertain that no weapon is involved, their authority to conduct even a 
limited search ends. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 254, 207 P.3d 1266 (continuing 
squeeze of pocket after the officer determined no weapon was present was 
not permissible under the “plain feel” doctrine); Hudson, 124 Wn.2d at 
113, 874 P.2d 160. 
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4.10(b) Frisks of Persons in Proximity to Suspect 
Police may not frisk persons merely because they are present on the 
premises of a place being lawfully searched. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 
U.S. 85, 94, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979); see also supra § 
3.8(a). Thus, a passenger frisk is justified “only [when] the officer is able 
to point to specific, articulable facts giving rise to an objectively 
reasonable belief that the passenger [may] be armed and dangerous.” State 
v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 399400, 28 P.3d 753 (2001); State v. Parker, 
139 Wn.2d 486, 489, 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (officers may not search purse 
of passenger); see also State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 64142, 611 P.2d 
771 (1980). In other words, whether an officer has a reasonable 
apprehension of danger, depending on the nature of the crime, the time and 
place of the arrest, the number of officers and suspects, and whether the 
companion has made any threatening movements. See 4 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6(a), at 87173 (5th ed. 2012). 
4.10(c) Protective Measures Other Than Frisks 
An officer may take self-protective measures other than a frisk. For 
instance, a police officer may order a driver who has been validly stopped 
to get out of his or her car, regardless of whether the driver is suspected of 
being armed or dangerous or whether the offense under investigation is 
serious. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. 
Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (noting that intrusion is de minimis while risks 
confronting an officer are substantial); State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 12, 
726 P.2d 445 (1986). The Supreme Court of Washington, however, has 
declined to extend Mimms to passengers of the vehicle under article I, 
section 7, unless the officer has an objective reason based on safety 
concerns. State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 220, 970 P.2d 722 (1999) 
(declining to follow Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S. Ct. 882, 
137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997)), abrogated in part on other grounds by Brendlin 
v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007); 
see 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6(a), at 885 n.192 (5th 
ed. 2012). 
If the officer is merely controlling the scene and not detaining the 
passenger for investigatory reasons, he must meet the standard set out in 
Mendez. Namely, he must be “able to articulate an objective rationale 
predicated specifically on safety concerns . . . for ordering a passenger to 
stay in the vehicle or to exit the vehicle.” Mendez, 137 Wn.2d at 220, 970 
P.2d 722. However, if the purpose of the officer’s interaction with the 
passenger is investigatory, then the interaction must meet the standard set 
out in Terry, and the officer must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. State v. Horrace, 144 Wn.2d 386, 393, 28 P.3d 753 (2001). 
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4.10(d) Search of Area: Measures Beyond Frisks 
Officers may extend a Terry search for weapons to the passenger 
compartment of a detained person’s vehicle “‘if there is a reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect is dangerous and may gain access to a weapon 
in the vehicle.’” State v. Glossbrener, 146 Wn.2d 670, 680–81, 49 P.3d 
128 (2002) (quoting State v. Terrazas, 71 Wn. App. 873, 879, 863 P.2d 75 
(1993)) (officer did not have concern for safety when he allowed suspect 
to sit in the car while he checked for warrants and search was an 
afterthought); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 104950, 103 S. 
Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). The search must be confined to the 
area within the suspect’s immediate control. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 
1, 12, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). However, that includes immediate control 
once the suspect has returned to the vehicle. Thus, the officer may still 
search the compartment if both occupants of the vehicle are outside the car 
and do not have access to the passenger compartment so long as the officer 
intends to return them to the car following the stop. State v. Chang, 147 
Wn. App. 490, 496, 195 P.3d 1008 (2008). 
In State v. Kennedy, the court upheld a search where the officer 
observed the suspect leaning forward as if to place something under his 
seat while the officer was stopping the suspect’s vehicle for investigation 
of a possible drug buy. 107 Wn.2d at 12, 726 P.2d 445. Likewise, in State 
v. McIntosh, the search of the passenger compartment was lawful when 
the driver of a vehicle was armed with a knife and a weapon-like object 
was visibly protruding from under the passenger seat. 42 Wn. App. 579, 
58284, 712 P.2d 323 (1986). 
A police officer may also search a container carried by a suspect who 
is detained for questioning if the officer reasonably believes that the 
suspect possesses a weapon. State v. Miller, 91 Wn. App. 181, 18586, 
955 P.2d 810 (1998) (officer could search a tin found with defendant that 
was capable of holding a gun after officer found knife on the defendant); 
State v. Franklin, 41 Wn. App. 409, 415, 704 P.2d 666 (1985) (finding 
search of backpack proper when the defendant told the officer it contained 
a firearm). For a discussion of whether an officer may search items carried 
by a suspect, see generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 





Warrantless Searches and Seizures:  
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless justified by a 
limited set of carefully drawn exceptions. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 
187–88, 275 P.3d 289 (2012); State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 171, 43 
P.3d 513 (2002). Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution 
not only “prohibits unreasonable searches, but also provides no quarter for 
ones that, in the context of the Fourth Amendment, would be deemed 
reasonable [warrantless] searches and thus constitutional.” State v. Valdez, 
167 Wn.2d 761, 772, 224 P.3d 751 (2009). “This creates ‘an almost 
absolute bar to warrantless arrests, searches, and seizures.’” Id. (quoting 
State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 690, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983)). 
The State bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search or 
seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. State 
v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 746, 64 P.3d 594 (2003). Even when a search or 
seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, the 
search or seizure may be invalid if it infringes upon other rights. See 
generally State v. Reep, 161 Wn.2d 808, 167 P.3d 1156 (2007) (holding 
that search warrants for documents protected under the First Amendment 
must have a higher standard of particularity). 
The following sections examine the various exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, including searches incident to a lawful arrest, the plain view 
and open view doctrines, consent, exigent circumstances, Terry stops, and 
inventory searches. 
5.1 SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
Generally, police may conduct a warrantless search incident to a 
lawful arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 76263, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 
23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). Under article I, section 7, a custodial arrest 
provides the necessary “authority of law” to search, so long as the arrest is 
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lawful. State v. Grande, 164 Wn.2d 135, 139, 187 P.3d 248 (2008); State 
v. Moore, 161 Wn.2d 880, 885, 169 P.3d 469 (2007). The rationale behind 
this rule is to ensure officer safety and to prevent the concealment or 
destruction of evidence. State v. MacDicken, 171 Wn. App. 169, 174–75, 
286 P.3d 413 (2012). The search, however, may only extend to the area 
within the arrestee’s “immediate control”—the area in which an arrestee 
may be able to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 
76263, 89 S. Ct. 2034. Thus, “searching any room other than that in 
which an arrest occurs” or “searching through all the desk drawers or other 
closed or concealed areas in that room itself” is not justified absent a 
search warrant. Id. at 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034. 
This exception to the warrant requirement applies, however, only 
when (1) there was a lawful arrest, and (2) the search incident to the arrest 
was “restricted in time and place in relation to the arrestee and the arrest,” 
as opposed to being “a wide-ranging exploratory, rummaging, ransacking” 
search. State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 135, 559 P.2d 970 (1977). For a 
discussion of automobile searches incident to arrest, see infra § 5.1(c). 
As the following sections demonstrate, while Washington’s search 
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is similar to the 
federal exception, it is subject to a different analysis under the Washington 
Constitution. 
5.1(a) Lawful Arrest 
Chapter 4 discusses the criteria for a lawful arrest. If the arrest is 
invalid, then the search incident to the arrest is invalid as well. State v. 
Moore, 161 Wn.2d 880, 885–86, 169 P.3d 469 (2007); State v. Hehman, 
90 Wn.2d 45, 50, 578 P.2d 527 (1978); State v. Terrazas, 71 Wn. App. 
873, 878, 863 P.2d 75 (1993). If an arrest is lawful, then a search incident 
to that arrest may be permissible. State v. Pulfrey, 154 Wn.2d 517, 522–
23, 111 P.3d 1162 (2005). 
In Washington, however, even when an arrest is valid, a search is not 
properly “incident” to the arrest if the arrest is merely a pretext for 
conducting a search to obtain evidence of a different offense. State v. 
Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 353, 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (declining to interpret 
article I, section 7 according to federal law, under which pretextual traffic 
stops did not violate the Fourth Amendment, because the Washington 
State constitution “requires we look beyond the formal justification for the 
stop to the actual one”). Furthermore, additional searches of the same 
individual made in retaliation for the defendant’s previous criminal 
behavior are unreasonable. State v. Carner, 28 Wn. App. 439, 445–46, 624 
P.2d 204 (1981). For discussion of the need for the search to be 
contemporaneous with the arrest, see infra § 5.3. 
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The search incident to arrest exception requires a custodial arrest. See 
State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 587, 62 P.3d 489 (2003); State v. Radka, 
120 Wn. App. 43, 50, 83 P.3d 1038 (2004) (search of vehicle not valid as 
incidental to arrest because driver’s detention at a traffic stop was 
noncustodial); see also State v. McKenna, 91 Wn. App. 554, 564, 958 P.2d 
1017 (1998) (search unreasonable because noncustodial arrest had ended). 
Under article I, section 7, a custodial arrest provides the “authority of law” 
for the search. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 585, 62 P.3d 489. In Washington, a 
custodial arrest for minor traffic violations is generally not permitted. See 
RCW 46.64.015; State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 68990, 835 P.2d 1019 
(1992). Rather, officers are required to cite and release motorists stopped 
for minor traffic offenses if the motorist gives a signed promise to appear 
in court. See RCW 46.64.015; Reding, 119 Wn.2d at 689–90, 835 P.2d 
1019. Moreover, officers explicitly lack authority to arrest after witnessing 
only a minor traffic infraction. RCW 46.63.020. Thus, a search is generally 
unlawful if it is incident to a stop for a minor traffic violation. See 
Terrazas, 71 Wn. App. at 876–78, 863 P.2d 75. 
Police officers are authorized to make a custodial arrest for a traffic 
violation if (1) the violation is one of the “nonminor” traffic violations 
specifically designated in RCW 10.31.100, or (2) the motorist is a 
nonresident. See RCW 46.64.015(1)–(2). Absent either of these 
conditions, police need other reasonable grounds to arrest and conduct a 
valid search incident to arrest if a motorist is stopped for a “minor” traffic 
violation. See Reding, 119 Wn.2d at 691–92, 835 P.2d 1019 (upholding 
custodial arrest for the nonminor offense of reckless driving); Terrazas, 
71 Wn. App. at 875–78, 863 P.2d 75 (an officer may arrest a defendant for 
driving without a valid driver’s license only if facts suggest the defendant 
will not appear in court if cited and released). 
Property seized incident to a lawful arrest may be used to prosecute 
the arrested person for a crime other than the one for which the person was 
initially arrested so long as the initial arrest was not merely a pretext to 
conduct a search for evidence of some other offense. State v. Cormier, 100 
Wn. App. 457, 463, 997 P.2d 950 (2000) (evidence from a search of the 
defendant was admissible after the defendant’s lawful arrest for assaulting 
an officer, even though the defendant assaulted the officer after being 
illegally stopped). In State v. Smith, after police lawfully arrested the 
defendant for consuming liquor in public, the court held that the drug 
paraphernalia found in the defendant’s fanny pack was admissible. State 
v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 684, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992); see also State v. 
Gammon, 61 Wn. App. 858, 863, 812 P.2d 885 (1991); State v. 
LaTourette, 49 Wn. App. 119, 127–29, 741 P.2d 1033 (1987); State v. 
White, 44 Wn. App. 276, 278, 722 P.2d 118 (1986). 
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5.1(b) “Immediate Control” 
There is no hard and fast rule for determining whether the area 
searched or the object seized was within the “immediate control” of the 
defendant under the Fourth Amendment. The court has considered various 
factors, including (1) whether the arrestee was physically restrained; (2) 
the position of the officer in relation to the defendant and the place 
searched; (3) the difficulty of gaining access into the container or 
enclosure searched; and (4) the number of officers present as compared 
with the number of arrestees or other persons. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 6.3(c), at 46275 (5th ed. 2012); see also id. § 7.1(b), 
at 676–79. For the purposes of a search incident to an arrest, an object or 
container is considered within the control of an arrestee if the object was 
within the arrestee’s reach immediately prior to arrest or at the moment of 
arrest. State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 681, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992) 
(upholding search of a fanny pack that was within one or two steps of the 
defendant at the time of the arrest); see also United States v. Turner, 926 
F.2d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 1991) (plastic baggies under arrestee’s pillow were 
within immediate control of arrestee who was on the bed when he was 
arrested); United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450, 1455–56 (9th Cir. 
1987) (closed suitcase on the bed next to arrestee was searchable incident 
to arrest “as long as the search of the suitcase occurred at about the same 
time of the arrest”). 
Article I, section 7 places greater restraints on a search incident to 
arrest in someone’s home, compared to the Fourth Amendment. Entry into 
rooms beyond the immediate control of the suspect requires that police 
have a reasonable fear for their safety or a reasonable belief that the 
arrestee is about to destroy evidence or escape. State v. Chrisman, 100 
Wn.2d 814, 815, 821, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); see also State v. Boyer, 124 
Wn. App. 593, 602, 102 P.3d 833 (2004) (warrantless protective sweep of 
basement rooms that belonged to an upstairs apartment not justified when 
search was done incident to execution of a search warrant for a basement 
apartment); 3 LaFave, supra §§ 6.3(c), at 468, 6.4(a)(c), at 476510, 
7.1(b), at 693. 
Conversely, under the Fourth Amendment, and in certain limited 
situations, some courts have permitted police to extend a search incident 
to an arrest in the home into an area that is beyond the arrestee’s immediate 
control. If the police permit an arrestee to move into other rooms to gather 
clothing, for example, the police may accompany the arrestee and search 
the rooms and any areas, such as closets or bureau drawers, where the 
arrestee has been. See id. § 6.4(a), at 47780. Federal courts have also 
permitted police to search premises to determine whether accomplices 
who could aid the arrestee are present, see id. § 6.4(b), at 484, and to 
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conduct a protective sweep of the premises when the officers fear that third 
parties may offer resistance, id. § 6.4(c), at 488–90. See also Maryland v. 
Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333–36, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990). 
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may search an arrestee in 
custody even when the officer does not believe that the arrestee is armed 
or in possession of evidence of the crime for which the suspect was 
arrested. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 
L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973). The lawful arrest establishes the authority to search 
the arrestee; the arresting officer need not have a subjective fear that an 
arrestee is armed or will destroy evidence. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 
260, 263–64, 94 S. Ct. 488, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1973). The rule applies even 
when the custodial arrest follows a stop for a minor traffic violation, unless 
such an arrest would be illegal. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 94 S. Ct. 467; 
see State v. Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 69192, 835 P.2d 1019 (1992). 
However, if a police officer merely cites a driver for speeding without 
making an arrest, a search is impermissible. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 
113, 11819, 119 S. Ct. 484, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998). 
Under article I, section 7, an arrestee’s diminished expectation of 
privacy permits an officer to search an arrestee’s clothing, including small 
containers found on the arrestee. See, e.g., Smith, 119 Wn.2d at 68182, 
835 P.2d 1025 (upholding search of fanny pack following lawful arrest); 
State v. Gammon, 61 Wn. App. 858, 864, 812 P.2d 885 (1991) (upholding 
search of prescription pill bottle found on defendant following lawful 
arrest); State v. White, 44 Wn. App. 276, 278–79, 722 P.2d 118 (1986) 
(upholding police examination of cosmetic case found in arrestee’s coat 
pocket). In addition, an arrestee does not have to be in actual physical 
possession of a container at the time of the search so long as the container 
is within the arrestee’s reach. Smith, 119 Wn.2d at 681, 835 P.2d 1025. 
Further, evidence seized pursuant to the search of an arrestee’s person does 
not need to relate to the crime for which the defendant was arrested, nor 
must the grounds for the initial search encompass the evidence seized. See 
id. (allowing admission of drug paraphernalia found in a fanny pack during 
a search subsequent to a lawful arrest for consuming liquor in public); see 
also Gammon, 61 Wn. App. at 863, 812 P.2d 885; State v. LaTourette, 49 
Wn. App. 119, 12728, 741 P.2d 1033 (1987); White, 44 Wn. App. at 278, 
722 P.2d 118. A greater expectation of privacy is extended, however, to 
possessions that are not closely related to the person’s clothing, such as 
“purses, briefcases or luggage,” and some additional reason must be 
present to justify the search of those items. White, 44 Wn. App. at 279, 
722 P.2d 118; see also State v. Kealey, 80 Wn. App. 162, 170, 907 P.2d 
319 (1995) (stating that “a purse is inevitably associated with an 
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expectation of privacy”). For a discussion of the search of purses in 
conjunction with automobile searches, see infra § 5.3(b). 
An intrusion into a suspect’s body, such as a draw of blood samples, 
is a search and seizure under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth 
Amendment. State v. Dunivin, 65 Wn. App. 501, 507, 828 P.2d 1150 
(1992). It may be justified under the exigent circumstances exception 
rather than the search incident to arrest exception. Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 77071, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); 
see 3 LaFave, supra § 5.3(c), at 215. See generally infra § 5.13(b) and 
supra § 3.13(b). For example, in Washington, bodily intrusions are 
authorized by statute in order to allow police to take blood samples of 
motorists arrested for certain serious traffic violations. See RCW 
46.20.308(4). If the suspect is attempting to swallow apparent contraband, 
less intrusive physical measures, such as a choke-hold, are permissible. 
See State v. Taplin, 36 Wn. App. 664, 66667, 676 P.2d 504 (1984); State 
v. Williams, 16 Wn. App. 868, 87172, 560 P.2d 1160 (1977). Officers 
attempting to prevent a suspect from swallowing evidence may not, 
however, prevent the suspect from breathing or obstruct the suspect’s 
blood supply to the head, although they may pinch his nose shut. Williams, 
16 Wn. App. at 872, 560 P.2d 1160. For a brief discussion of post-
detention body searches, see infra § 6.2(c). 
5.1(c) Vehicles and Containers 
Under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, police 
may not search the passenger compartment of an automobile as a search 
incident to the arrest of the occupant except in certain circumstances. 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 
(2009); State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197, 275 P.3d 289 (2012). 
However, Washington’s application of the search incident to arrest 
exception in the context of vehicles is much narrower than the Fourth 
Amendment application. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d at 192, 275 P.3d 289 
(declining to adopt federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment for 
article I, section 7). In Washington, an officer may search the vehicle only 
when there are (1) concerns for officer safety, or (2) concerns for 
destruction of the evidence. Id. passim; State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 
772, 224 P.3d 751 (2009); State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 395, 219 P.3d 
651 (2009). Once the defendant is in custody, fears for officer safety or 
destruction of the evidence evaporate. Patton, 167 Wn.2d at 395, 219 P.3d 
651. Thus, once a defendant is handcuffed, removed from the vehicle, or 
placed in a police vehicle, there can be no vehicle search. Id. In contrast, 
under the more expansive exception to the Fourth Amendment, an officer 
may search if the officer believes that evidence relevant to the crime of 
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arrest will be found in the vehicle. Gant, 556 U.S. at 355, 129 S. Ct. 1710. 
For a more detailed explanation of vehicle searches, see infra § 5.15. 
5.2 PRE-ARREST SEARCH 
If a warrantless search is closely related in time and place to a lawful 
arrest, the search may be considered incidental to the arrest and valid as 
long as probable cause to arrest exists at the time of the search, even if the 
search occurs before the arrest. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 
100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980); State v. Harrel, 83 Wn. App. 
393, 400, 923 P.2d 698 (1996). If probable cause does not exist at the time 
of the search, a search that provides probable cause is not considered a 
valid search incidental to the arrest. Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 543, 110 
S. Ct. 1288, 108 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1990) (warrantless search of the 
defendant’s paper bag could not be justified as a search incidental to arrest 
when the bag contained drug paraphernalia and the search was followed 
by the arrest of the defendant for drug abuse). See generally 3 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(a) (5th ed. 2012). 
Under limited circumstances, pre-arrest searches are permitted even 
when the arrest does not closely follow the search. See generally 3 LaFave, 
supra § 5.4(b). A search may be considered incidental to the arrest of a 
suspect in the following circumstances: (1) the police have probable cause; 
(2) the police believe the suspect is in the process of destroying highly 
evanescent evidence; and (3) the evidence can be preserved by a limited 
search. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 36 L. Ed. 2d 
900 (1973). See generally 3 LaFave, supra § 5.4(b). Pre-arrest searches 
are Terry searches, see supra § 2.9(b), and should be subject to the same 
standard applied and discussed in sections 4.5 through 4.9. 
5.3 POST-DETENTION SEARCHES: SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST AND 
INVENTORY SEARCHES 
5.3(a) Post-Detention Searches Incident to Arrest 
The search incident to arrest exception can apply to a search at both 
the place of detention as well as the place of arrest. See generally 3 Wayne 
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3(a) (5th ed. 2012). However, a 
significant delay between the arrest and the search may render the search 
unreasonable if the search is no longer contemporaneous with the arrest. 
State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 683, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992) (delay of 17 
minutes between arrest and search of a fanny pack was not unreasonable 
under the circumstances). Whether a delay is sufficient to render a search 
unreasonable under the search incident to arrest exception depends on the 
facts of the individual case. Id. at 683 n.4, 835 P.2d 1025; see State v. 
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Boursaw, 94 Wn. App. 629, 635, 976 P.2d 130 (1999) (a 10-minute delay 
between arrest and arrival of dog to complete search by sniffing behind 
vehicle’s ashtray was reasonable). Likewise, any post-arrest search is 
unlawful if probable cause to arrest dissipates by the time the suspect is 
taken into custody. State v. Lemus, 103 Wn. App. 94, 105, 11 P.3d 326 
(2000) (search of vehicle was invalid because no probable cause existed 
to arrest driver prior to police performing a positive field test for cocaine 
powder found from vehicle search). 
Under article I, section 7, when an arrestee is searched upon booking, 
officers may later conduct a warrantless “second look” into the arrestee’s 
belongings. State v. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d 626, 642, 81 P.3d 830 (2003); 
see also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805, 94 S. Ct. 1234, 39 
L. Ed. 2d 771 (1974) (a search of the defendant’s clothing long after the 
defendant had been searched and placed in a jail cell was a permissible 
search incident to an arrest). An arrestee no longer has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his personal items once state officials have 
viewed them during a valid inventory search. Cheatam, 150 Wn.2d at 642, 
81 P.3d 830. The same is true for a pretrial detainee transferred to a 
hospital for a competency evaluation. State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wn.2d 515, 
523, 192 P.3d 360 (2008). Additionally, the police do not need a warrant 
when comparing an individual’s DNA profile already in the State’s 
possession with evidence from a new crime scene. State v. Gregory, 158 
Wn.2d 759, 828, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wn.2d 757, 760, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014). 
A difficult question arises when police detain a suspect only because 
the police have failed to comply with laws allowing release. See generally 
3 LaFave, supra § 5.3(d). A search conducted after police have decided to 
release a suspect is improper when there is no probability that the suspect 
possesses relevant evidence or weapons. State v. Carner, 28 Wn. App. 
439, 445, 624 P.2d 204 (1981). Similarly, a search based on consent from 
someone who was illegally detained is invalid. State v. Avila–Avina, 99 
Wn. App. 9, 1415, 991 P.2d 720 (2000), abrogated, State v. 
Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009); State v. O’Day, 91 
Wn. App. 244, 253, 955 P.2d 860 (1998) (search was invalid where “the 
illegality and the consent were contemporaneous”). 
5.3(b) Post-Detention Inventory Search 
Under article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, police officers 
may search containers or packages as part of an inventory of the arrestee’s 
possessions prior to storing the items for safekeeping. Illinois v. Lafayette, 
462 U.S. 640, 64348, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1983); State v. 
Smith, 76 Wn. App. 9, 16, 882 P.2d 190 (1994). However, an inventory 
search that is “a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover 
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incriminating evidence” is unreasonable. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 
110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990); State v. Mireles, 73 Wn. App. 
605, 871 P.2d 162 (1994). 
Consistent with the greater protection provided under article I, 
section 7, inventory searches in Washington must be conducted “‘in good 
faith for the purposes of (1) finding, listing, and securing from loss during 
detention property belonging to a detained person; (2) protecting police 
from liability due to dishonest claims of theft; and (3) protecting temporary 
storage bailees against false charges.’” Smith, 76 Wn. App. at 16, 882 P.2d 
190 (quoting State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424, 428, 518 P.2d 703 (1974)). 
Thus, it is reasonable for police, as part of routine procedure before 
incarcerating an arrestee, to search any container or article in the arrestee’s 
possession according to inventory procedures. Id. (upholding the search of 
defendant’s purse upon arrival to jail). But see State v. Smith, 56 Wn. App. 
145, 15052, 783 P.2d 95 (1989) (holding that a booking search of an 
arrestee’s purse was unlawful because she was not given timely 
opportunity to post bail, and police were not concerned that she was 
carrying weapons). Officers may also conduct an inventory search of a 
validly impounded automobile and its containers. See Colorado v. Bertine, 
479 U.S. 367, 37475, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987); State v. 
McFadden, 63 Wn. App. 441, 448, 820 P.2d 53 (1991), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 640, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998); see 
also infra § 5.19. 
Inventory searches, however, are not unlimited in scope, and “must 
be restricted to effectuating the purposes that justify their exception to the 
Fourth Amendment.” State v. Dugas, 109 Wn. App. 592, 597–98, 36 P.3d 
577 (2001) (holding that while police could inventory arrestee’s jacket, 
they could not search the closed container within the jacket when there 
was no indication of dangerous contents or illegal drugs). See generally 3 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(b) (5th ed. 2012). 
5.4 SEARCHES CONDUCTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT PURPOSE OF 
FINDING EVIDENCE: COMMUNITY CARETAKING AND  
MEDICAL EMERGENCY 
The police also do not need a warrant to assist persons who are 
seriously injured or threatened with such injury. Brigham City v. Stuart, 
547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006); State v. 
Guevara, 172 Wn. App. 184, 288 P.3d 1167 (2012). This “community 
caretaking” exception is “totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a 
criminal statute,” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 
37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973), and is distinct from the “exigent circumstances” 
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exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Leupp, 96 Wn. App. 324, 
330, 980 P.2d 765 (1999). Both exceptions involve instances “in which 
the police must act immediately, but for distinctly different purposes.” 
State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 387 n.39, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). Unlike the 
exigent circumstances exception, “community caretaking” arises from a 
police officer’s responsibility to come to the aid of persons in danger. Id. 
Additionally, if officers undertake a search as part of their “community 
caretaking” function, any evidence discovered may be admissible. See 
State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 80203, 92 P.3d 228 (2004) 
(community caretaking function does not include simply retrieving a 
guest’s jacket from defendant’s home). 
Whether a search or seizure made for such “noncriminal 
noninvestigatory purposes is reasonable depends on a balancing of the 
individual’s interest in freedom from police interference against the 
public’s interest in having the police perform this ‘community caretaking 
function.’” Kalmas v. Wagner, 133 Wn.2d 210, 21617, 943 P.2d 1369 
(1997). Thus, even when police lack probable cause to believe a crime has 
been committed, they may conduct a warrantless search of the premises 
when the premises contains any of the following: (1) persons in imminent 
danger of death or harm; (2) objects likely to burn, explode, or otherwise 
cause harm; or (3) information that will disclose the location of a 
threatened victim or the existence of such a threat. State v. Downey, 53 
Wn. App. 543, 545, 768 P.2d 502 (1989); see also State v. Menz, 75 Wn. 
App. 351, 35356, 880 P.2d 48 (1994) (police entry was justified in 
response to a domestic violence call). 
The “community caretaking” exception, however, must be motivated 
by a need to render assistance, and cannot be used as simply a “pretext for 
conducting an evidentiary search.” State v. Schlieker, 115 Wn. App. 264, 
270, 62 P.3d 520 (2003) (held search invalid when officers failed to 
inquire about the defendants’ safety and proceeded to search for drugs). 
See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(d) (5th ed. 
2012). Consequently, the officer must be able to articulate specific facts 
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that justify the warrantless 
entry. State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 420, 937 P.2d 1110 (1997) (entry 
was proper when, after check-out time, the motel occupant did not respond 
to repeated telephone calls and knocks at the door). Finally, however, no 
court has yet fully articulated the precise contours of this exception, 
including whether and to what extent it applies to a search of a home. See 
Feis v. King County Sheriff’s Dep’t., 165 Wn. App. 525, 545−47, 267 P.3d 
1022 (2011). 
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5.4(a) Minors 
The community caretaking exception may apply when officers are 
attempting to protect children. State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 64 P.3d 594 
(2003). When determining whether police have exceeded their scope of 
authority in trying to protect children under community caretaking, courts 
consider various circumstances, including whether a minor is found late at 
night, unaccompanied by a parent. See State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 5 
P.3d 668 (2000). In Kinzy, police physically detained a 16-year-old girl 
after seeing her walking in downtown Seattle at 10 p.m. on a weeknight 
with an adult male known to be involved with narcotics. Id. at 378, 5 P.3d 
668. The court held that under the community caretaking exception, police 
could approach Kinzy and ask if she needed help, but without articulable 
suspicion that she had committed a criminal offense, police could not 
physically detain her. Id. at 395, 5 P.3d 668. In contrast, in Acrey, the court 
upheld the detention of a 12-year-old, whom the officers found while 
responding to a 911 call on a weeknight, after midnight, in an isolated area, 
and with no adult supervision. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d at 74243, 64 P.3d 594. 
Police contacted the mother, who asked police to give the boy a ride home. 
Id. at 743, 64 P.3d 594. Before transporting the boy in the police car, police 
conducted a pat-down frisk for safety purposes and found drugs. Id. The 
court held that the police acted reasonably in this instance because there 
was a heightened concern that Acrey may be engaging in conduct that 
could bring harm to himself or others. Id. at 751, 64 P.3d 594. The court 
found persuasive the young age of the defendant, the late hour, and his 
presence in an isolated area without adults. Id. at 752, 64 P.3d 594. Most 
importantly, the officers had initially made a Terry stop of the defendant 
to investigate a possible crime. Id. 
5.4(b) Rendering Aid to Victims 
Courts of appeal have recognized that police may make a warrantless 
entry into a residence in response to a report of ongoing domestic violence. 
State v. Menz, 75 Wn. App. 351, 35356, 880 P.2d 48 (1994). “Police 
officers responding to a domestic violence report have a duty to ensure the 
present and continued safety and wellbeing of the occupants” of a 
residence. State v. Raines, 55 Wn. App. 459, 465, 778 P.2d 538 (1989). In 
deciding whether police entry was lawful, the court can consider the 
specific instance and likelihood of domestic violence as it relates to the 
requirements of the emergency-aid exception. State v. Schultz, 170 Wn.2d 
746, 750, 248 P.3d 484 (2011) (a report of a couple yelling, the presence 
of “loud voices,” and an agitated woman answering the door was not 
enough to uphold a warrantless entry). 
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When the medical emergency is a homicide, officers may enter to aid 
the victim and make a quick check to see if the perpetrator or other victims 
are present. See Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14, 120 S. Ct. 7, 145 
L. Ed. 2d 16 (1999) (noting that, while officers may enter a murder scene 
to aid victims or to see if the perpetrator is present, there is no general 
“murder scene” warrant exception). Thus, the police may seize any 
evidence observed in plain view during the course of legitimate police 
emergency activities. State v. Stevenson, 55 Wn. App. 725, 729–30, 780 
P.2d 873 (1989); see infra § 5.5. Any such search must be brief; a general 
exploratory search lasting several hours is not permissible. Thompson v. 
Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21, 105 S. Ct. 409, 83 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1984). 
In the course of rendering aid, police may conduct a warrantless 
search of a victim’s personal effects so long as the search is motivated by 
a need to render assistance. State v. Loewen, 97 Wn.2d 562, 568, 647 P.2d 
489 (1982) (the search of the defendant’s tote bag for identification was 
improper when the defendant regained consciousness prior to the search). 
The scope of the search must remain limited to whatever is reasonable to 
conduct the community caretaking function, and the necessity must exist 
at the time of the search. Id. at 568, 647 P.2d 489; State v. Schroeder, 109 
Wn. App. 30, 45, 32 P.3d 1022 (2001) (searching coat pocket for 
identification of suicide victim was beyond scope of community 
caretaking function because the deceased no longer needed emergency 
medical attention, and the object of the search was not in plain view); State 
v. Dempsey, 88 Wn. App. 918, 922, 947 P.2d 265 (1997), abrogated on 
other grounds by State v. Neeley, 113 Wn. App. 100, 52 P.3d 539 (2002). 
5.4(c) Property Damage 
Similarly, police may make a warrantless entry to protect property, 
and in doing so, may seize evidence in plain view. State v. Bakke, 44 Wn. 
App. 830, 83941, 723 P.2d 534 (1986). Firefighters may enter a house to 
extinguish a fire and immediately thereafter conduct a limited warrantless 
investigation to determine the fire’s cause. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 
499, 510, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1978). Once a fire has been 
extinguished, however, a warrant is required for arson investigators to 
search the premises to investigate a possible criminal cause of the fire. 
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 29495, 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 
477 (1984); Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511, 98 S. Ct. 1942. 
5.4(d) Second Entry 
Police officers may enter a private residence without a warrant when 
officials of another government agency have validly entered the residence 
and discovered contraband. State v. Bell, 108 Wn.2d 193, 201, 737 P.2d 
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254 (1987) (marijuana-growing operation discovered in plain view by 
firefighters justified a warrantless entry and seizure by police), abrogated 
on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 
110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990). However, the entry of the initial party must be 
valid. State v. Browning, 67 Wn. App. 93, 97, 834 P.2d 84 (1992) 
(contraband sighted during building inspector’s entry could not be used as 
the basis for later police entry under warrant because inspector’s initial 
entry was unlawful). 
5.5 THE “OPEN VIEW” AND “PLAIN VIEW” DOCTRINES DISTINGUISHED 
Courts have used the “plain view” and “open view” doctrines 
interchangeably to describe a variety of situations, but the two doctrines 
are distinct. See State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 901–02, 632 P.2d 44 
(1981); State v. Barnes, 158 Wn. App. 602, 612, 243 P.3d 165 (2010). 
“Open view” often describes one of two situations: (1) a search in which 
an officer observes an item that is exposed to public view in a public place 
or in a location that is not constitutionally protected; or (2) a search in 
which an officer, standing in an unprotected area, observes an object that 
is located inside a constitutionally protected area. Barnes, 158 Wn. App. 
at 612, 243 P.3d 165; State v. Perez, 41 Wn. App. 481, 483, 704 P.2d 625 
(1985); see also State v. O’Herron, 153 N.J. Super. 570, 579, 380 A.2d 
728 (1977) (discussing the “chameleon-like quality of the phrase ‘plain 
view’”) (quoting Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 606, 292 A.2d 762 
(1972)); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2(a), at 59697 (5th 
ed. 2012). The “open view” doctrine is characterized by the defendant’s 
lower expectation of privacy because in both cases the officer views the 
contraband from an unprotected place. See supra § 1.3. The plain view 
doctrine, as opposed to the open view doctrine, may justify the seizure of 
objects without a warrant. See generally LaFave, supra § 2.2(a). This 
doctrine usually applies to the discovery and seizure of an object after 
entry into a constitutionally protected area. See generally id. 
5.6 “OPEN VIEW” 
In the first situation, the discovery of an object in a public place or in 
a location that is not constitutionally protected is not a true search because 
the defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in objects exposed 
to public view. State v. Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280 (1996). 
Thus, this situation is referred to as “open view” and not “plain view.” 
State v. Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. 186, 191 n.4, 926 P.2d 929 (1996); see 
supra § 1.3. 
Likewise, in the second instance, an officer viewing contraband in a 
protected area while standing in an unprotected place also constitutes an 
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“open view” situation. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 312, 4 P.3d 130 
(2000). This is because a search does not occur when an object located in 
a protected area is merely observed from a location in an unprotected area. 
See id. at 312–13, 4 P.3d 130. However, even if observations from an 
unprotected vantage point do not constitute a search, privacy rights are 
implicated when police enter a constitutionally protected area to seize an 
object. See State v. Dyreson, 104 Wn. App. 703, 71314, 17 P.3d 668 
(2001). In other words, “[w]herever the eye may go, the body of the 
policeman may not necessarily follow.” Charles E. Moylan, Jr., The Plain 
View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great “Search Incident” 
Geography Battle, 26 Mercer L. Rev. 1047, 1096 (1975); see also Dykstra, 
84 Wn. App. at 19293, 926 P.2d 929. 
Therefore, although the “open view” doctrine may justify observing 
an object located in a constitutionally protected area, it will not justify 
seizing the object but may serve as the basis for a search warrant. See 
Dykstra, 84 Wn. App. at 191, 926 P.2d 929; State v. Mierz, 72 Wn. App. 
783, 791, 866 P.2d 65 (1994), aff’d, 127 Wn.2d 460, 901 P.2d 286 (1995) 
(view of prohibited coyote pups from legal vantage point outside of the 
defendant’s fence did not justify an officer’s warrantless entry onto 
property); State v. Ferro, 64 Wn. App. 181, 182, 824 P.2d 500 (1992). 
In limited instances, seizure of an object may be permissible under 
the “open view” doctrine if an officer is reasonably certain that a container 
holds contraband based on the container’s appearance. State v. Courcy, 48 
Wn. App. 326, 330, 739 P.2d 98 (1987) (a paper “bindle” containing 
cocaine was observed by an officer during a lawful investigative stop). 
This is because “‘some containers . . . by their very nature cannot support 
any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be 
inferred from their outward appearance.’” Id. (quoting Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979)). 
Consequently, the suspect does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy that would prevent opening the container or field-testing its 
contents. Courcy, 48 Wn. App. at 330, 739 P.2d 98. 
 
5.7 CRITERIA FOR FALLING WITHIN THE “PLAIN VIEW” EXCEPTION 
5.7(a) Discovery of Object in Plain View Following Entry into 
 a Constitutionally Protected Area: Requirements 
In contrast to “open view,” “plain view” often involves an officer 
lawfully entering a constitutionally protected area and unexpectedly 
discovering incriminating evidence. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971); 
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State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App. 409, 416, 828 P.2d 636 (1992). For a 
warrantless seizure to fall within this “plain view” exception, the following 
two requirements must be met: (1) the police must have a prior 
justification for the intrusion into the constitutionally protected area; and 
(2) the police must immediately realize that the object they observe is 
evidence—the incriminating character of the evidence must be 
immediately apparent. State v. Hatchie, 161 Wn.2d 390, 395, 166 P.3d 698 
(2007); see also State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 683, 879 P.2d 971 
(1994) (shotgun did not come within the plain view doctrine when it was 
not immediately apparent to FBI officers that the gun was evidence of a 
crime). Previously, courts imposed a third requirement: the discovery of 
the incriminating evidence must be inadvertent. See Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 
at 683, 879 P.2d 971. However, neither article I, section 7, nor the Fourth 
Amendment still require inadvertent discovery to justify a seizure under 
the plain view exception. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130, 110 
S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990); State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 
114 n.1, 874 P.2d 160 (1994) (noting the Horton revision to the plain view 
test). 
5.7(a)(1) Prior Justification for Intrusion 
The plain view doctrine applies only when police are lawfully 
occupying the position from which they observe the illegal object or 
activity. State v. McKague, 143 Wn. App. 531, 539, 178 P.3d 1035 (2008). 
Thus, if an initial entry into a residence or onto property is illegal, 
confiscation of evidence will constitute an illegal seizure. Id.; see also 
State v. Kull, 155 Wn.2d 80, 85, 118 P.3d 307 (2005). Similarly, when the 
initial stop of a vehicle is unlawful—the police therefore having no right 
to be in a position to observe the vehicle’s interior—the observation of 
contraband within the vehicle constitutes an unlawful search. State v. 
Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 94243, 530 P.2d 243 (1975); see also 
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9, 102 S. Ct. 812, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778 
(1982), on remand, 100 Wn.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984). 
Because the plain view exception to the warrant requirement rests on 
the lawfulness of the officer’s presence, plain view cases will have 
different outcomes under the federal and state constitutions when the two 
constitutions differ as to the underlying lawfulness. For example, when the 
arresting officer follows the arrestee into his or her home, the inspection 
of objects within the room may be lawful under the Fourth Amendment, 
yet unlawful under article I, section 7. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 9, 102 S. Ct. 
812 (determining that Fourth Amendment permits officer to accompany 
arrestee wherever arrestee goes), on remand, 100 Wn.2d at 822 
(concluding that article I, section 7 prohibits an officer from entering 
1410 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:1277 
misdemeanor arrestee’s home unless the officer can demonstrate threat to 
own safety, possibility of destruction of evidence of misdemeanor 
charged, or strong likelihood of escape). Essentially, any application of the 
plain view exception in confluence with article I, section 7 requires “a 
close examination of the facts and not a bright line rule” for determining 
when officers exceed their lawful presence. Id. at 820, 102 S. Ct. 812; see 
State v. Link, 136 Wn. App. 685, 697, 150 P.3d 610 (2007). 
5.7(a)(2) Immediate Knowledge: Incriminating Character  
Immediately Apparent 
The plain view exception applies only when the police immediately 
recognize the incriminating nature of the object seized. State v. Cotten, 75 
Wn. App. 669, 683, 879 P.2d 971 (1994) (seizure of shotgun not valid 
under the plain view doctrine because it was not immediately apparent to 
the FBI officers that it was evidence of a crime). Although the officer need 
not have absolute knowledge that the object is related to a crime, the 
officer cannot tamper with the evidence in order to come to this belief, and 
the object must have a nexus to the crime under investigation or lead to an 
arrest. Id. 
It is sufficient that an officer has probable cause to believe that the 
object is evidence of a crime. State v. Sistrunk, 57 Wn. App. 210, 214, 787 
P.2d 937 (1990). For example, in State v. Gonzales, a clear vial of capsules 
and pills, “viewed in context” of other items of drug paraphernalia, was 
properly seized. State v. Gonzales, 46 Wn. App. 388, 40001, 731 P.2d 
1101 (1986). On the other hand, a closed paper bag containing marijuana 
was improperly seized because the marijuana was clearly not visible. Id. 
at 400, 731 P.2d 1101; see also Sistrunk, 57 Wn. App. at 214, 787 P.2d 
937 (no probable cause to seize empty beer cans when the condition of 
cans was consistent with driver’s explanation that they had been picked up 
for recycling). 
If an object is moved or tampered with in any way to determine 
whether it is evidence of a crime, the “immediately apparent” prong of the 
plain view test will fail. State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 622 n.31, 949 
P.3d 856 (1998) (citing State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 527 P.2d 1303 
(1974)). Police officers must connect items to a crime based solely on what 
is exposed to their view; they cannot move the object even a few inches. 
Murray, 84 Wn.2d at 527, 527 P.2d 1303 (holding that the police may not 
move a television to view the serial number). 
Officers may seize objects only if the objects are connected with the 
crime under investigation or will lead to an arrest. State v. Terrovona, 105 
Wn.2d 632, 648, 716 P.2d 295 (1986) (officers may only seize evidence 
that is not described in the warrant if “it will aid in a particular 
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apprehension or conviction, or if it has a sufficient nexus with the crime 
under investigation”). This nexus may include documents providing the 
motive for a crime or evidence of the crime itself. See State v. Stenson, 
132 Wn.2d 668, 695, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997) (insurance documents were 
“related to the crime” because they could provide a motive for the murder), 
post-conviction relief granted, In re Stenson, 174 Wn.2d 474, 476, 276 
P.3d 286 (2012)). 
An officer’s knowledge and experience are also relevant to 
determining whether an object is legally seized under the plain view 
doctrine. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 13, 726 P.2d 445 (1986) (the 
police officer “could immediately conclude, based on his own prior 
experience investigating narcotics and the information he had about the 
Smith household and about Kennedy, that the bag contained contraband”). 
Baggies may be considered evidence of a crime if other factors are present, 
such as the baggies’ appearance of having contained illicit substances or 
presence in an area of high drug crime. State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 185 
n.3, 196 P.3d 658 (2008). 
Article I, section 7 provides the same protection as the Fourth 
Amendment in this respect. State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 582, 62 P.3d 
489 (2003). Under the Fourth Amendment, officers must also immediately 
recognize the illicit nature of the object. See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 4.11(d) (5th ed. 2012). But they may not move the 
object to uncover its illicit nature. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443, 466, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 
U.S. 321, 328, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1987) (the scope of plain 
view was exceeded when police lifted stereo components to read serial 
numbers). Officers may also, however, be informed in their determination 
by their expertise. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 483, 96 S. Ct. 
2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976) (use of specially trained investigators 
supported the seizure of business records). 
5.8 EXTENSIONS OF THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE 
5.8(a) Plain Hearing 
Some circuit courts have recognized a “plain hearing” analog to the 
plain view doctrine based on the premise that defendants have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations that are overheard with 
unaided ears. See United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 105152 (5th 
Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th 
Cir. 1990) (inadvertently intercepted nontelephonic conversations were 
authorized under “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement). Use 
of hearing enhancement devices may “raise very different and far more 
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serious questions” from visual enhancement devices when determining the 
reasonable expectation of the privacy of defendants and, consequently, 
when determining whether a warrant is required. Dow Chem. Co. v. United 
States, 476 U.S. 227, 23839, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1986). 
In Washington, eavesdropping by means of an electronic device or 
the interception of private telephone, telegraph, radio, or other electronic 
communications is governed by Washington’s Violating Right of Privacy 
Act. RCW ch. 9.73. Tape recordings made by federal agents pursuant to 
the federal wiretap statute are inadmissible in state court when the 
recordings are made in violation of the Washington statute. State v. 
Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980). Police testimony 
about such recorded conversation is also inadmissible. See infra § 7.3(a) 
(discussing the use of illegally obtained evidence at probable cause 
hearings); see also Tara McGraw Swaminatha, The Fourth Amendment 
Unplugged: Electronic Evidence Issues & Wireless Defenses, 7 Yale J.L. 
& Tech. 51 (2005). 
5.8(b) Plain Smell 
Courts have generally accepted the “plain smell” exception as a 
branch of the plain view doctrine. See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 2.2(a), at 59697 (5th ed. 2012). Thus, police 
officers have used odor to justify warrantless entries and seizures so long 
as the officer was lawfully in the location where the odor was detected. 
See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 
842 (2005) (warrantless search of car trunk valid when dog sniff of 
exterior of car detected drugs inside trunk and when police lawfully pulled 
car over for traffic stop). But see Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 12–13, 
133 S. Ct. 1409, 1418, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) 
(Drug-detection dogs are “super-sensitive instrument[s], . . . deployed to 
detect things inside that [police] could not perceive unassisted. . . . They 
are to the poodle down the street as high-powered binoculars are to a piece 
of plain glass. Like the binoculars, a drug-detection dog is a specialized 
device for discovering objects not in plain view (or plain smell).”) 
(majority opinion found search unconstitutional as an intrusion into the 
home, grounded in property law). 
Washington has permitted the warrantless seizure of an object based 
on its odor when the odor established probable cause or when the odor was 
in “open view.” See State v. Myers, 117 Wn.2d 332, 345, 815 P.2d 761 
(1991) (odor of marijuana was in “open view”); State v. Huckaby, 15 Wn. 
App. 280, 29091, 549 P.2d 35 (1976). Odor can also support a 
warrantless entry and can serve as probable cause for a search warrant. See 
State v. Gave, 77 Wn. App. 333, 336, 890 P.2d 1088 (1995) (odor of 
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marijuana supported warrant probable cause requirement); State v. 
Gocken, 71 Wn. App. 267, 278, 857 P.2d 1074 (1993) (odor of decaying 
flesh justified warrantless entry at homicide scene). 
5.8(c) Plain Feel 
The court has recognized the “plain feel” or “plain touch” doctrine 
as a corollary of the plain view doctrine. Under the plain touch exception 
to the warrant requirement, police may seize nonthreatening contraband 
detected through the officer’s sense of touch during a legitimate pat down 
search. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 37576, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 
124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993); State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 251, 207 P.3d 
1266 (2009). The object will be admissible only if its “contour or mass 
makes its identity immediately apparent.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 36576, 
113 S. Ct. 2130; State v. Hudson, 124 Wn.2d 107, 115, 874 P.2d 160 
(1994). Any “squeezing, sliding or [otherwise] manipulating” the object 
extends the search beyond the scope of Terry, thus rendering the search 
constitutionally invalid. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 248–50, 207 P.3d 1266 
(excluding evidence when officer continued to squeeze defendant’s pocket 
after feeling no weapon); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 
33739, 120 S. Ct. 1462, 146 L. Ed. 2d 365 (2000) (border patrol agent’s 
exploratory manipulation of bus passenger’s opaque bag violated the 
Fourth Amendment). 
5.9 INTRODUCTION TO CONSENSUAL SEARCHES  
A warrantless search is constitutional when valid consent is granted. 
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 910, 102 S. Ct. 812, 70 L. Ed. 2d 
778 (1982), on remand, 100 Wn.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); State v. 
Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 187, 875 P.2d 1208 (1994). A valid consensual 
search requires that (1) the consent be “voluntary”; (2) the consent be 
granted by a party having the authority to consent; and (3) the search be 
limited to the scope of the consent granted. State v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d 
229, 234, 830 P.2d 658 (1992). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 8.1 (5th ed. 2012). Furthermore, while the Fourth 
Amendment does not require targets of searches to be told they have the 
right to refuse the search, article I, section 7 provides heightened 
protection against unreasonable searches. United States v. Drayton, 536 
U.S. 194, 207, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002). Thus, “where 
the State seeks to justify a search on the basis of consent it has the burden 
of showing that the consent was voluntary, an essential element of which 
is knowledge of the right to refuse consent.” State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 
103, 116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) (quoting State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 
35354, 346 A.2d 66 (1975)). 
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The State has the burden of proving that consent to a search was 
voluntary. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d at 116, 960 P.2d 927 (citing State v. Smith, 
115 Wn.2d 775, 789, 801 P.2d 975 (1990)). The level of proof required is 
“clear and convincing evidence.” Smith, 115 Wn.2d at 789, 801 P.2d 975. 
For a discussion of the distinctions between voluntary consent and waiver 
of constitutional rights, see generally 4 LaFave, supra § 8.1(a), at 1017. 
5.9(a) Factors Considered in Determining Voluntariness 
The court analyzes the validity or voluntariness of consent to a search 
in a similar manner as the voluntariness of a confession. See Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 24849, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 
(1973). However, consent to search is distinguishable from testimonial 
admissions since the former is consistent with innocence. State v. 
Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 471, 755 P.2d 797 (1988). In Washington, the 
issue “is clearly an interest of local concern . . . due to ‘[t]he heightened 
protection afforded state citizens against unlawful intrusion into private 
dwellings [that] places an onerous burden upon the government to show a 
compelling need to act outside our warrant requirement.’” State v. Ferrier, 
136 Wn.2d 103, 114, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) (quoting Washington v. 
Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 822, 676 P.2d 419 (1984)). 
In Washington, if the police officers conduct a “knock and talk” for 
the purpose of gaining consent, they must “inform the person[s] from 
whom consent is sought that [they] may lawfully refuse to consent to the 
search and that they can revoke, at any time, the consent that they give, 
and can limit the scope of the consent to certain areas of the home.” 
Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d at 11819, 960 P.2d 927; see supra § 3.7. Failure to 
do so vitiates any consent given afterwards. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d at 11819, 
960 P.2d 927. The Washington Supreme Court has declined to extend the 
Ferrier rule to situations where police seek entry to (1) question a resident 
in the course of investigating a crime, State v. Khounvichai, 149 Wn.2d 
557, 559, 69 P.3d 862 (2003); (2) execute arrest warrants, State v. Thang, 
145 Wn.2d 630, 636−37, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002); and (3) identify residents 
of the home, State v. Williams, 142 Wn.2d 17, 27, 11 P.3d 714 (2000). In 
other words, police need not give a Ferrier warning when the purpose of 
the visit is something other than searching for contraband or evidence of a 
crime. Thus, in State v. Tagas, the court concluded that under article I, 
section 7, the validity of defendant’s consent to the search of her purse did 
not depend on the officer advising her of her right to refuse consent to 
search. 121 Wn. App. 872, 878, 90 P.3d 1088 (2004). 
A prior voluntary confession or other type of cooperation with the 
police will weigh in favor of a finding that the consent to search was 
voluntary. See State v. Raines, 55 Wn. App. 459, 462, 778 P.2d 538 
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(1989). A prior refusal to consent to a search will suggest that a subsequent 
consent was not voluntary. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 8.2(f) (5th ed. 2012). 
A suspect’s behavior may also indicate consent even when verbal 
consent is withheld. See Raines, 55 Wn. App. at 462, 778 P.2d 538 (failure 
to expressly object after police requested permission to enter “to look 
around” amounted to implied waiver of right to exclude them); State v. 
Sabbot, 16 Wn. App. 929, 938, 561 P.2d 212 (1977) (although the 
undercover investigator followed the defendant into the defendant’s home 
after the defendant had told him to wait outside, the investigator’s presence 
in house was with the defendant’s tacit acquiescence). 
5.9(b) Police Claim of Authority to Search 
An express or implied claim by the police that they will proceed 
immediately to conduct the search even without the individual’s consent 
is likely to indicate that the subsequent consent was involuntary. See 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 20 L. Ed. 
2d 797 (1968); State v. Browning, 67 Wn. App. 93, 9798, 834 P.2d 84 
(1992) (acquiescence to a claim of authority is not equivalent to free and 
voluntary consent to a search). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 8.2(a) (5th ed. 2012). 
A threat to seek a warrant if the person refuses to allow a search does 
not, however, automatically invalidate consent. See State v. Smith, 115 
Wn.2d 775, 790, 801 P.2d 975 (1990) (no coercion where the defendant 
was told officers would seek a search warrant if consent was not given to 
search the trunk of car). See generally 4 LaFave, supra § 8.2(c). On the 
other hand, police misrepresentation regarding the existence of a search 
warrant may invalidate consent to a search or seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548, 88 S. Ct. 1788; Rental Owners 
Ass’n v. Thurston Cty., 85 Wn. App. 171, 183, 931 P.2d 208 (1997) 
(“threats to obtain a search warrant may invalidate consent when grounds 
for obtaining a warrant do not exist”), superseded by statute on other 
grounds as stated in Potala Vill. Kirkland, LLC v. Kirkland, 183 Wn. App. 
191, 198, 334 P.3d 1143 (2014); State v. McCrorey, 70 Wn. App. 103, 112 
n.8, 851 P.2d 1234 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Head, 
136 Wn.2d 619, 964 P.2d 1187 (1998). 
5.9(c) Coercive Surroundings 
If the officers make a show of force while seeking consent, or if the 
surroundings are coercive in other respects, the consent will generally not 
be considered voluntary. See McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wn.2d 530, 537, 398 
P.2d 732 (1965), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 
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641, 870 P.2d 313 (1994); State v. Dresker, 39 Wn. App. 136, 139, 692 
P.2d 846 (1984). For example, where officers placed a defendant under 
physical restraint, searched her home illegally without consent, and had 
searched her home illegally without consent two days prior, the defendant 
did not voluntarily consent. State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530, 53536, 571 
P.2d 941 (1977); see supra § 1.4(a). However, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that surroundings were not coercive when police officers boarded a 
bus and obtained permission to search where “[t]here was no application 
of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no 
brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, 
[and] not even an authoritative tone of voice.” United States v. Drayton, 
536 U.S. 194, 20304, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002). See 
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(b) (5th ed. 2012). 
Coercive effects can, however, “be mitigated by requiring officers who 
conduct [knock and talk searches] to warn home dwellers of their right to 
refuse consent to a warrantless search.” State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 
116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998). 
The fact that a defendant is in custody when he consents to a search 
does not by itself establish coercion or involuntary consent. McNear, 65 
Wn.2d at 538, 398 P.2d 732; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 
96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976). Custodial restraint is, however, a 
significant factor in assessing voluntariness. See State v. Avila-Avina, 99 
Wn. App. 9, 1415, 991 P.2d 720 (2000), abrogated on other grounds by 
State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 634–35, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009) (en 
banc). In Avila-Avina, the court concluded that consent was invalid where 
the defendant was illegally detained and held in a patrol car for four hours 
after the initial purpose of the detainment was satisfied. Id. at 16, 991 P.2d 
720; see also Werth, 18 Wn. App. at 53536, 571 P.2d 941; State v. 
Rodriguez, 20 Wn. App. 876, 881, 582 P.2d 904 (1978). 
Consent is likely voluntary even if, after arrest, the officers will not 
allow the defendant to return inside his dwelling unaccompanied to 
retrieve necessary belongings. In State v. Nelson, the court held the 
consent was voluntary and uncoerced where the defendant, arrested on the 
porch of his home in midwinter wearing only pants and a t-shirt, consented 
to officers accompanying him into his home; the arresting officers had 
given the defendant the alternative of proceeding to the police station as 
he was, but indicated that if he returned inside, they would have to 
accompany him. State v. Nelson, 47 Wn. App. 157, 16364, 734 P.2d 516 
(1987). There, the court did not consider the defendant’s fear that his 
behavior might appear “crazy” if he accepted arrest without his jacket and 
keys equal to coercion. Id. at 163, 734 P.2d 516. 
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5.9(d) Awareness of the Constitutional Right to Withhold Consent 
Although courts consider an individual’s knowledge of the right to 
refuse a search when determining whether consent is voluntary, the State 
may prove that consent was voluntary without establishing such 
knowledge. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 
2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); State v. Shoemaker 85 Wn.2d 207, 212, 
533 P.2d 123 (1975); State v. Rodriguez, 20 Wn. App. 876, 880−81, 582 
P.2d 904 (1978) (consent was voluntary despite the defendant’s assertion 
that he was not told and did not know of the right to refuse consent). See 
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(i) (5th ed. 2012). 
Where police seek to justify a warrantless search of a private home, 
however, knowledge of the right to refuse consent is an essential element. 
State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) (“the only sure 
way to give such a protection substance is to require a warning of its 
existence”). But informing occupants of their right to refuse might not be 
required when the officers are simply providing backup for another 
investigatory agency. State v. Bustamante-Davila, 138 Wn.2d 964, 984, 
983 P.2d 590 (1999) (no Ferrier warning required when officers were 
simply providing backup to a requesting INS agent and suspect permitted 
agent and officers into home in which officers saw rifle in plain sight). 
5.9(e) Prior Illegal Police Action 
A prior illegal act by the police may suggest that the defendant’s 
consent was involuntary. See, e.g., State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530, 535, 
571 P.2d 941 (1977) (“In view of the additional circumstance that [two] 
days before, Werth’s home had been searched illegally without her 
consent, it is apparent that overall, the situation was rife with coercion.”). 
See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d) (5th ed. 
2012). Thus, a prior illegal search or arrest may taint the subsequent 
consent and thereby render the consent invalid. See State v. McCrorey, 70 
Wn. App. 103, 111−12, 851 P.2d 1234 (1993) (prior illegal police activity 
is one factor when considering the totality of the circumstances), 
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Head, 136 Wn.2d 619, 964 P.2d 
1187 (1998). See generally 4 LaFave, supra § 8.2(d). 
The State has the burden of proving that consent was not obtained by 
the exploitation of a prior illegal search. State v. Bustamante-Davila, 138 
Wn.2d 964, 981, 983 P.2d 590 (1999). In State v. Jensen, the court found 
that the State had met this burden when it showed that although only two 
hours intervened between the search and the consent, the consent was valid 
because, in the intervening period, the defendant was advised of his right 
to refuse consent, had verbally consented twice, was allowed to call his 
sister, and there was no evidence that police did anything to frighten or 
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intimidate defendant. State v. Jensen, 44 Wn. App. 485, 488–89, 723 P.2d 
443 (1986); see also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S. Ct. 
2664, 73 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1982); State v. Tijerina, 61 Wn. App. 626, 629, 
811 P.2d 241 (1991). 
5.9(f) Maturity, Sophistication, and Mental or Emotional State 
In assessing the voluntariness of consent, the court always considers 
the sophistication and the emotional state of the defendant. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973) 
(“The traditional definition of voluntariness we accept today has always 
taken into account evidence of minimal schooling [and] low 
intelligence.”); State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123 
(1975) (determination of voluntariness should include consideration of 
“the degree of education and intelligence of the consenting person”); see 
also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 
L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 8.2(e) (5th ed. 2012). While the mental condition of a defendant 
is a significant factor in determining voluntariness, the presence of mental 
illness itself is insufficient to render a consent to search invalid. See State 
v. Sondergaard, 86 Wn. App. 656, 662, 938 P.2d 351 (1997); see also 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 
(1986) (voices directing the defendant to confess to murder were not the 
result of police coercion). 
5.9(g) Police Deception as to Identity or Purpose 
The use of deception by a police officer does not necessarily affect 
the voluntariness of consent to a search. Police may use a ruse to gain entry 
to a residence to conduct a criminal investigation if they have a justifiable 
and reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity within the residence. State 
v. Hastings, 119 Wn.2d 229, 233, 830 P.2d 658 (1992) (the defendant had 
no constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in the residence where 
undercover officers had purchased cocaine); State v. Hashman, 46 Wn. 
App. 211, 216, 729 P.2d 651 (1986) (a police officer disguised as a 
building contractor gained entry into a residence after another officer, who 
had lawfully been within the residence, reported evidence of a marijuana-
growing operation). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 8.2(m)–(n) (5th ed. 2012).  
5.10 SCOPE OF CONSENT 
A consensual search must be limited to the area covered by the 
authority given by the consenting party. State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 
2019] Chapter 5: Warrantless Searches and Seizures 1419 
126, 133, 101 P.3d 80 (2004); State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 423, 937 
P.2d 1110 (1997). The consenting party, expressly or implicitly, may limit 
the scope of consent by only consenting to a search with reduced duration, 
area, or intensity. Davis, 86 Wn. App. at 423, 937 P.2d 1110. Any search 
exceeding the scope of consent is invalid because exceeding the scope of 
consent is comparable to exceeding the scope of a search warrant. Id. at 
423–24, 937 P.2d 1110. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 8.1(a) (5th ed. 2012). 
“A general and unqualified consent to search an area for a particular 
type of material permits a search of personal property within the area in 
which the material could be concealed.” State v. Mueller, 63 Wn. App. 
720, 722, 821 P.2d 1267 (1992). For example, in State v. Jensen, the 
defendant consented to a “complete” search of his vehicle for materials of 
any evidentiary value. State v. Jensen, 44 Wn. App. 485, 486, 723 P.2d 
443 (1986). Officers conducting the search found cocaine in the pocket of 
a jacket in the back seat of the defendant’s car. Id. at 487–88, 723 P.2d 
443. The court held that the officers had not exceeded the scope of consent 
since the defendant did not expressly or implicitly limit his consent. Id. at 
492, 723 P.2d 443. Furthermore, the defendant consented to the search for 
evidence that could have reasonably been kept in a jacket pocket. Id. A 
consensual search is not invalidated if it results in the discovery of 
evidence that the consenting party did not expect to be discovered. State 
v. Johnson, 40 Wn. App. 371, 382–83, 699 P.2d 221 (1985). A general, 
unqualified consent does not extend to locked containers, which have 
additional privacy expectations under article I, section 7. State v. 
Monaghan, 165 Wn. App. 782, 791, 266 P.3d 222 (2012) (citing State v. 
Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986)) (finding that the search of a 
locked container in the trunk of defendant’s car was without warrant or the 
defendant’s consent and was therefore without the authority of law 
required in Washington). 
To determine whether consent to one search is extended to a later 
search, courts consider (1) whether the search is conducted by the same 
officers; (2) whether the second search has the same objectives; and (3) 
whether the time elapsed between the two searches suggests an 
abandonment or completion of the initial search. State v. Koepke, 47 Wn. 
App. 897, 90506, 738 P.2d 295 (1987) (citing State v. Gallo, 20 Wn. 
App. 717, 725, 582 P.2d 558 (1978)). 
Lastly, consent to a search or seizure may be implied by statute. For 
example, drivers of motor vehicles in Washington give implied consent to 
a breath test if, at the time of arrest, the arresting officer reasonably 
believes the person had been driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor or drugs. RCW 46.20.308(1).  
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5.11 CONSENT BY THIRD PARTIES 
In some situations, third parties may give consent for searches, and 
evidence discovered as a result of such searches may be used against a 
non-consenting defendant. See State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 543, 688 
P.2d 859 (1984). The relationship between the defendant and the third 
party, among other considerations, affects the validity of third-party 
consent. 
Under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, third-
party consent may be valid under the “common authority” or actual 
authority standard articulated in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 
170, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d. 242 (1974). See also Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 
at 543, 688 P.2d 859. Actual authority requires a sufficient relationship to, 
or mutual use of, property by people with joint access or control. State v. 
Rison, 116 Wn. App. 955, 961, 69 P.3d 362 (2003). Under this standard, 
if the non-consenting party is absent, (1) the consenting party must be able 
to permit the search in her own right, and (2) it must be reasonable to find 
that the defendant had assumed the risk that a person with joint control 
might permit a search. State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 80304, 92 
P.3d 228 (2004); Mathe, 102 Wn.2d at 54344, 688 P.2d 859. 
Under article I, section 7, if the person only appears to have authority 
to consent and in fact does not, the search is invalid. See State v. Eisfeldt, 
163 Wn.2d 628, 63839, 185 P.3d 580 (2008) (repairman lacked actual 
authority to consent to search of home, and police officers’ reasonable 
belief that he did was irrelevant). The Fourth Amendment imposes a lesser 
standard, which is satisfied when consent is given by one who only 
appears to have authority to consent, and so long as the police reasonably 
believe that the individual has this authority. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 
U.S. 177, 186, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990). This “apparent 
authority” doctrine is grounded in the reasonableness of the search 
whereas the “common” or “actual authority” doctrine is grounded in 
reasonable expectations of privacy and the appropriate scope of the 
consent. State v. Morse, 156 Wn.2d 1, 8, 123 P.3d 832 (2005). See 
generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.3(g) (5th ed. 2012).  
The following sections discuss the relationships between a defendant 
and a third party that may give rise to third-party consent, including family 
members, co-tenants, landlords, employers, bailees, and guests. 
5.11(a) Defendant’s Spouse 
Washington cases involving spousal consent are consistent with the 
“common authority” approach of State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 543, 688 
P.2d 859 (1984). For example, a defendant’s spouse, having an equal right 
to use an object or occupy the property, may consent to a search of the 
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object or premises, regardless of whether the area is kept for the exclusive 
use of the non-consenting spouse. See State v. Gillespie, 18 Wn. App. 313, 
317, 569 P.2d 1174 (1977). However, also consistent with the “common 
authority” standard, the consent of a spouse is only valid against the non-
consenting spouse if the non-consenting spouse is not present at the time 
of the search. State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 678, 679, 965 P.2d 1079 (1998). 
When police request entry pursuant to “knock and talk” in conducting a 
search pursuant to a warrant, either spouse may validly allow police entry. 
State v. Hartnell, 15 Wn. App. 410, 41718, 550 P.2d 63 (1976); see supra 
§ 3.7. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.4(a) (5th 
ed. 2012). 
5.11(b) Defendant’s Parents 
A parent has authority over all rooms in his or her home and 
consequently can consent to a search of a dependent child’s room 
regardless of whether the child is a minor. State v. Summers, 52 Wn. App. 
767, 772, 764 P.2d 250 (1988); see also State v. Cotten, 75 Wn. App. 669, 
685, 879 P.2d 971 (1994) (finding that the defendant’s mother could give 
valid consent to seizure of a shotgun found in defendant’s bedroom). 
Furthermore, an adult child living rent-free with his parents does not create 
the type of relationship that would prevent his parents from consenting to 
a search. State v. Thompson, 151 Wn.2d 793, 807, 92 P.3d 228 (2004) 
(finding that police did not need defendant’s consent to search his parents’ 
boathouse, which he used while living with his parents rent-free). 
However, when the child pays rent and the status of the parent is similar 
to that of a landlord rather than a custodial parent, the relationship is more 
akin to a landlord and tenant relationship, leaving the parent without 
authority to consent to a search of the child’s room. Summers, 52 Wn. App. 
at 77173, 764 P.2d 250. 
5.11(c) Defendant’s Child 
The defendant’s child, in appropriate circumstances, may consent to 
police entry of the parent’s home but not to police search of the home. See, 
e.g., State v. Jones, 22 Wn. App. 447, 45152, 591 P.2d 796 (1979) 
(reasoning that a minor child may consent to entry but declining to rule on 
the legal question of consent to search). For a general discussion of the 
scope and limitations of a child’s consent to a search of the parent’s house, 
see generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.4(c) (5th ed. 
2012).  
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5.11(d) Co-Tenant or Joint Occupant 
A co-tenant or joint occupant of the defendant’s dwelling with 
common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or 
effects sought to be inspected may give valid consent to a search of the 
premises or effects. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S. Ct. 
988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974); see State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 543, 
688 P.2d 859 (1984); see also State v. Jeffries, 105 Wn.2d 398, 414, 717 
P.2d 722 (1986) (common authority rule applicable to validate consent to 
search a homeless encampment located outside the city of Wenatchee). 
See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.5(c) (5th ed. 
2012). But when the non-consenting cohabitant is actually present on the 
premises, Washington courts have held that a cohabitant cannot give 
consent if the non-consenting cohabitant has equal or greater control over 
the premises. State v. Morse, 156 Wn.2d 1, 13, 123 P.3d 832 (2005) 
(“‘[T]hat consent remains valid against a cohabitant, who also possesses 
equal control, only while the cohabitant is absent.’”) (quoting State v. 
Leach, 113 Wn.2d 735, 744, 782 P.2d 1035 (1989)); State v. Floreck, 111 
Wn. App. 135, 14243, 43 P.3d 1264 (2002); see also Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 
at 541, 688 P.2d 859. Although a cohabitant cannot give valid consent to 
bedrooms or private areas when a non-consenting cohabitant is present, a 
cohabitant can give valid consent to police officers to enter the living room 
or an area that customarily receives visitors. State v. Hoggatt, 108 Wn. 
App. 257, 269, 30 P.3d 488 (2001); see Leach, 113 Wn.2d at 744, 782 P.2d 
1035. 
Courts have not extended the dual consent rule for cohabitants to the 
common authority shared by a driver and passenger in an automobile. 
State v. Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 192, 875 P.2d 1208 (1994) (passenger’s 
consent to search automobile was sufficient to support warrantless search 
even though the defendant driver did not consent to the search; the court 
noted that a situation where a co-occupant overtly objected to search was 
not before the court). 
5.11(e) Landlord, Lessor, or Manager 
A landlord lacks authority to consent to a search when a tenant has 
the sole or undisputed possession of leased premises. State v. Birdsong, 66 
Wn. App. 534, 53739, 832 P.2d 533 (1992). This rule also applies to 
limited rental arrangements such as those found in motels, boarding 
homes, and room rentals. State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 544, 688 P.2d 
859 (1984); see also George L. Blum, Annotation, Admissibility of 
Evidence Discovered in Warrantless Search of Rental Property 
Authorized by Lessor of Such Property—State Cases, 61 A.L.R. 5th 1, 124 
(1998). However, the lessor or manager of an apartment building may 
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consent to a search of an area that is not within the lessee’s exclusive 
possession. State v. Talley, 14 Wn. App. 484, 487, 543 P.2d 348 (1975) 
(finding the common areas of a property were not under exclusive control 
of the lessee-defendant); see also State v. Kreck, 86 Wn.2d 112, 123, 542 
P.2d 782 (1975) (finding that the rental manager could consent to a search 
of an unrented half of a garage). Upon expiration of the tenancy, a tenant 
abandons his or her interest in the property and, likewise, an expectation 
of privacy. State v. Christian, 95 Wn.2d 655, 659, 628 P.2d 806 (1981). 
See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.5(a), at 27980 
(5th ed. 2012). 
Tenants, conversely, may consent to searches of common areas under 
the “common authority” rule, even over the objection of the landlord. 
Cranwell v. Mesec, 77 Wn. App. 90, 10304, 890 P.2d 491 (1995). For 
additional discussion of consent by a lessee, see generally 4 LaFave, supra 
§ 8.5(b). 
5.11(f) Bailee 
A bailee may consent to a search of the bailor’s belongings when the 
bailee has a sufficient relationship to or a degree of control over the chattel. 
See State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 13940, 559 P.2d 970 (1977) (when 
hospital had joint control over patient-defendant’s clothing, hospital ward 
clerk could consent to police seizure of the clothing); see also State v. 
Bobic, 140 Wn.2d 250, 259, 996 P.2d 610 (2000) (manager of storage units 
facility could give police permission to enter; officers subsequently 
viewed contraband through existing hole in container). See generally 4 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.6(a) (5th ed. 2012). For a 
discussion of consent by a bailor, see generally id. § 8.6(b). 
5.11(g) Employee and Employer 
An employer may consent to a search of the place of employment, 
even when the search would affect the belongings of an employee. Thus, 
under the common authority rule analysis, see supra § 5.11, an employer 
may validly consent to a search of that portion of the employer’s premises 
used by an employee for personal purposes. State v. Kendrick, 47 Wn. 
App. 620, 63233, 736 P.2d 1079 (1987) (finding that the defendant 
shared the area but knew that his employer had greater authority and 
access to the area, decreasing his expectation of privacy). Further, under 
some circumstances, an employee may give consent to a search of an 
employer’s premises. For a discussion of the rules governing consent 
within the employer–employee relationship, see 4 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 8.6(c)(d) (5th ed. 2012).  
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5.11(h) Hotel Employee 
A hotel or motel employee may not grant valid consent to a search 
of a guest’s room because a motel guest generally has the same expectation 
of privacy during his or her tenancy as the renter of a private residence. 
State v. Davis, 86 Wn. App. 414, 419, 937 P.2d 1110 (1997). However, 
the hotel guest’s expectation of privacy generally expires at checkout time. 
See id. at 419, 937 P.2d 1110 (finding that a motel guest loses expectation 
of privacy at the expiration of tenancy, unless late payment has been 
accepted by the motel or the motel has tolerated previous overtime stays). 
In Washington, courts require particularized suspicion to search a hotel 
registry, even if the hotel employee consents to such a search. See State v. 
Jorden, 160 Wn.2d 121, 130, 156 P.3d 893 (2007); supra § 1.3; see also 
In re Nichols, 171 Wn.2d 370, 376, 256 P.3d 1131 (2010). 
5.11(i) Host and Guest 
Generally, a host has the authority to consent to a search of a guest’s 
bedroom and any other room occupied by the guest. See State v. 
Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App. 409, 41415, 828 P.2d 636 (1992); State v. 
Koepke, 47 Wn. App. 897, 90304, 738 P.2d 295 (1987) (host–guest 
relationship found between lessee and defendant temporarily using one of 
lessee’s rooms such that lessee’s consent to search the room was valid). 
However, when numerous guests are present and police do not inquire 
about ownership of property, a host’s consent to search may not be valid 
against guests’ personal property. See State v. Rison, 116 Wn. App. 955, 
962, 69 P.3d 362 (2003), review denied, 151 Wn.2d 1008, 87 P.3d 1184 
(2004). For additional discussion, see 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 8.5(e) (5th ed. 2012). See also supra § 5.11 (common authority 
rule). 
5.12 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES: INTRODUCTION 
The exigent circumstances exception justifies a warrantless search 
when law enforcement officers establish probable cause but have a 
pressing need for an immediate search or seizure that would be delayed by 
securing a warrant. See State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 40506, 47 
P.3d 127 (2002); State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 101, 804 P.2d 577 
(1991). Washington courts use the following six factors as a guide in 
determining whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry and 
search: 
(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the 
suspect is to be charged; 
(2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; 
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(3) whether there is reasonably trustworthy information that the 
suspect is guilty; 
(4) [whether] there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is 
on the premises; 
(5) a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly 
apprehended; and 
(6) [whether] the entry is made peaceably. 
Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 406, 47 P.3d 127 (citing State v. Terrovona, 105 
Wn.2d 632, 644, 716 P.2d 295 (1986)); see Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 101, 
804 P.2d 577 (same factors used in determining justification of warrantless 
home arrest). Not every factor must be present to find that exigent 
circumstances justified the officer’s entry, only those factors necessary to 
show that the officer needed to act quickly. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d at 408, 
47 P.3d 127; see, e.g., State v. Patterson, 112 Wn.2d 731, 736, 774 P.2d 
10 (1989) (no single factor is conclusive; weight varies with 
circumstances); State v. Flowers, 57 Wn. App. 636, 644, 789 P.2d 333 
(1990) (the fact that some factors are not present is not controlling). 
The courts have identified five situations in which exigent 
circumstances support a departure from the warrant requirement: “(1) hot 
pursuit; (2) fleeing suspect; (3) danger to arresting officer or to the public; 
(4) mobility of the vehicle; and (5) mobility or destruction of the 
evidence.” State v. Counts, 99 Wn.2d 54, 60, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983) 
(internal citations omitted); see State v. Pressley, 64 Wn. App. 591, 598, 
825 P.2d 749 (1992) (police may seize evidence without a warrant if 
probable cause exists and the actions of the detainee give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that evidence is in danger of loss or destruction); 
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.1(b), at 566–73 (5th ed. 
2012); see also State v. Carter, 151 Wn.2d 118, 128, 85 P.3d 887 (2004) 
(no warrant needed to seize a gun placed in open view because of exigent 
circumstances); Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d at 644–45, 716 P.2d 295. 
However, exigent circumstances are not created merely because a serious 
offense has been committed. See State v. Stevenson, 55 Wn. App. 725, 
732, 780 P.2d 873 (1989); see also Counts, 99 Wn.2d at 5961, 825 P.2d 
749. 
When a crime is committed in an officer’s presence after the officer 
has been admitted into a residence, exigent circumstances need not exist 
in order for the officer to lawfully make a warrantless arrest in the 
residence. See State v. Dalton, 43 Wn. App. 279, 28687, 716 P.2d 940 
(1986). In Dalton, an officer who obtained entry into a student’s college 
dormitory room under the pretense of buying drugs, but with the actual 
intent of making an arrest, could make an arrest under RCW 10.31.100, 
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which permits an arrest without a warrant where the police officer has 
reasonable cause to believe a felony was or is being committed. Id. at 286, 
716 P.2d 940. 
5.13 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING WARRANTLESS  
ENTRY INTO THE HOME 
An arrest on the street does not create an exigent circumstance 
justifying a warrantless search of an arrestee’s house. See Vale v. 
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1970). Both 
the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 draw a firm line at the 
entrance of the house and maintain “that threshold may not reasonably be 
crossed without a warrant.” State v. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d 426, 429, 693 
P.2d 89 (1985) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S. 
Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980)). Police may, however, make a 
warrantless entry into a home under the following circumstances: (1) when 
they attempt to arrest the suspect in a public place and the suspect retreats 
into the home; and (2) when the police reasonably fear that delay will 
result in the suspect’s escape, in injury to the officers or to the public, or 
in the destruction of evidence. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–
99, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); United States v. Weaklem, 
517 F.2d 70, 72 (9th Cir. 1975) (injury); United States v. Bustamante-
Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 89 (9th Cir. 1973) (escape; destruction of evidence). 
While police are on the premises, the scope of the intrusion is limited to 
its purpose; if the purpose is to prevent escape or harm, for example, the 
search is limited to finding the suspect or weapons that could be used 
against the police. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 299, 87 S. Ct. 1642. 
Washington courts hold that the location of the arrestee, not the 
location of the arresting officer, is critical in determining whether an arrest 
takes place in a home. Holeman, 103 Wn.2d at 429, 693 P.2d 89. 
Accordingly, absent exigent circumstances such as hot pursuit, an officer 
may not arrest a suspect without a warrant—and, subsequently, conduct a 
warrantless search incident to arrest—if the suspect is standing in the 
doorway to his or her home. Id.; see also supra § 3.7 (knock and announce 
rule). The unenclosed front porch of a home, however, is a public place 
for purposes of arrest once probable cause has been established. State v. 
Solberg, 122 Wn.2d 688, 699–702, 861 P.2d 460 (1993). A police officer 
can arrest a suspect who voluntarily exits his or her home onto the 
unenclosed porch, even in the absence of exigent circumstances. See id. at 
700, 861 P.2d 460; see also State v. Bockman, 37 Wn. App. 474, 481, 682 
P.2d 925 (1984). 
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5.13(a) Hot Pursuit 
In determining whether a warrantless entry into a home is justified 
by the exigent circumstance of hot pursuit, courts have focused on the 
immediate need to continue a promising criminal investigation in addition 
to the factors listed in Cardenas. State v. Patterson, 112 Wn.2d 731, 736, 
774 P.2d 10 (1989); see supra § 5.13; see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 752–53, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984) (no hot pursuit 
when police did not engage in immediate or continuous pursuit of 
defendant from the scene of the crime); State v. Counts, 99 Wn.2d 54, 60, 
659 P.2d 1087 (1983) (no hot pursuit when police stood outside 
defendant’s home for one hour after defendant retreated therein). Other 
Washington cases involving hot pursuit include State v. Bessette, 105 Wn. 
App. 793, 21 P.3d 318 (2001); State v. Griffith, 61 Wn. App. 35, 808 P.2d 
1171 (1991) (escape, destruction of evidence); State v. Hendricks, 25 Wn. 
App. 775, 610 P.2d 940 (1980) (escape); State v. Gallo, 20 Wn. App. 717, 
582 P.2d 558 (1978) (intent to kill). 
5.13(b) Imminent Arrest 
Even when a suspect has not been arrested, police officers may make 
a warrantless entry into a home when they reasonably believe that the 
suspect has been alerted to his or her imminent arrest and is likely to 
destroy evidence or escape. United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 
1356 (9th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). The exception also applies 
when the police reasonably believe that the suspect is either armed or 
sought in connection with a violent crime. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 
294, 298–300, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); see State v. 
Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 412, 47 P.3d 127 (2002) (holding that officers 
were excused from complying with knock and announce statute where 
officers suspected defendants were dangerous, the evidence could be 
easily destroyed, and officers observed defendants rushing toward back of 
the motel room following their knock). In addition, police officers may 
make a warrantless entry when they believe a suspect has alerted another 
accomplice of the arrest and the crime was one of violence. State v. Reid, 
38 Wn. App. 203, 20910, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). Police may not, however, 
make a warrantless entry when the likelihood of escape is slight, the 
offense is minor, and the police do not believe that the suspect is armed. 
State v. Dresker, 39 Wn. App. 136, 13940, 692 P.2d 846 (1984). 
Probable cause to believe a home contains contraband does not 
constitute an exigent circumstance justifying the absence of a warrant; 
police must have reason to believe the contraband will be destroyed before 
they are able to obtain a warrant. See State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 840, 
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904 P.3d 290 (1995) (exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry of 
motel room where there was a risk of drugs being destroyed if persons in 
motel room were alerted to police presence by noises and scuffle in 
hallway). “A belief that contraband will be destroyed must be based upon 
sounds or activities observed at the scene or specific prior knowledge that 
a particular suspect has a propensity to destroy contraband”; mere 
presence of easily disposable drugs does not by itself constitute an 
exigency. State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362, 634 P.2d 312 (1981). 
Police may enter a home without a warrant in response to an 
emergency (including the imminent destruction of evidence) so long as 
they do not themselves create the exigency through conduct that violates 
the Fourth Amendment. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464–466, 131 S. 
Ct. 1849, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011) (officers do not create an exigency by 
conducting a knock and talk instead of obtaining a warrant even when it is 
reasonably foreseeable that their investigative tactics would “lead a drug 
suspect to destroy evidence”); see State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wn. App. 592, 
596–97, 675 P.2d 631 (1984) (exigent circumstances existed when police 
observed occupants in the process of inhaling what police reasonably 
believed to be cocaine); see also supra § 3.7 (knock and announce rule). 
5.13(c) Less Intrusive Alternatives 
Courts have held warrantless home entries illegal when police 
officers could have kept the residence under surveillance until they 
obtained a warrant. State v. Bessette, 105 Wn. App. 793, 799800, 21 P.3d 
318 (2001). For example, exigent circumstances do not justify entry into a 
home when there is no threat to the health, safety, and welfare of citizens, 
or no risk of escape by a suspect once the suspect enters his or her home. 
State v. Werth, 18 Wn. App. 530, 53637, 571 P.2d 941 (1977); State v. 
Peele, 10 Wn. App. 58, 63–64, 516 P.2d 788 (1973) (search warrant 
necessary when the suspect was not fleeing, but might be expected to hide 
out on the premises until morning). See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 6.5(c) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing the impoundment 
alternative). 
Similarly, police officers are sometimes required to keep the 
occupants of a home under surveillance, instead of searching them, until 
they procure a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789, 
791 (9th Cir. 1976); State v. Lewis, 19 Wn. App. 35, 40, 573 P.2d 1347 
(1978). Police may use methods that do not involve a search in order to 
secure premises in which they are legally present while awaiting the 
issuance of a search warrant. Non-search activity may include brief 
detention of a defendant while awaiting a warrant if there is sufficient 
probable cause and a risk that potential evidence would be destroyed. 
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Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 33133, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148 L. Ed. 2d 
838 (2001); see also State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 64546, 716 P.2d 
295 (1986) (prior warrantless entry and arrest of defendant in his residence 
was justified by exigent circumstances; nothing observed by the police 
contributed to the issuance of the search warrant, nor was anything in 
“plain view” used as evidence). 
5.14 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING WARRANTLESS SEARCH  
AND SEIZURE OF THE PERSON 
Warrantless searches and seizures of persons may be justified by the 
exigent circumstances exception when police reasonably fear injury to 
themselves or the public, flight, or the destruction of evidence. With regard 
to the officer and public safety exception, a pat-down search is 
unconstitutional absent a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and 
currently dangerous. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 9293, 100 S. Ct. 338, 
62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979); see, e.g., State v. Smith, 165 Wn.2d 511, 199 P.3d 
386 (2009) (finding exigencies to justify detaining suspect upon exiting 
home because of the grave and imminent safety risk posed by a tanker 
truck filled with a dangerous chemical parked next to a house in which a 
rifle had been seen). In addition, “even without probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, it is reasonable for an officer 
executing a search warrant at a residence to briefly detain occupants of 
that residence, to ensure officer safety and an orderly completion of the 
search.” State v. King, 89 Wn. App. 612, 61819, 949 P.3d 856 (1998). 
Regarding the destruction-of-evidence exception, the brief seizure of 
a person outside his home is permissible when police have probable cause 
to believe that the home contains illegal drugs and a reasonable belief that 
the person could destroy evidence before police could obtain a search 
warrant. See State v. Carter, 127 Wn.2d 836, 840, 904 P.3d 290 (1995); 
see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 33133, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148 
L. Ed. 2d 838 (2001). For a definition of what constitutes a seizure, see 
supra § 1.4. As explained in section 5.12(b), the officers must have 
concrete facts to back up their belief that the evidence is in fact in danger. 
State v. Jeter, 30 Wn. App. 360, 362, 634 P.2d 312 (1981). 
As the following sections discuss, exigent circumstances are used to 
justify the following three kinds of warrantless searches of persons: (1) 
fresh pursuit of a suspect fleeing from police; (2) searches that penetrate 
the body, such as blood tests and other invasive medical procedures; and 
(3) searches of persons located on the premises being searched. 
1430 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:1277 
5.14(a) Hot Pursuit 
In Wenatchee v. Durham, 43 Wn. App. 547, 718 P.2d 819 (1986), 
the court identified the five criteria to be used when analyzing hot pursuit: 
(1) a felony must have occurred in the area; (2) the suspect must be 
attempting to flee or know that he is being pursued; (3) the police must 
pursue the suspect without delay; (4) the pursuit must be continuous; and 
(5) there must be a relationship between the time the crime was committed, 
the beginning of the pursuit, and the apprehension of the suspect. Id. at 
55051, 718 P.2d 819. Although the statutory definition of hot pursuit, or 
“fresh pursuit,” relies in part on the common law, Tacoma v. Durham, 95 
Wn. App. 876, 881, 978 P.2d 514 (1999), “courts are not limited by the 
common law definition, but may consider the Legislature’s overall intent 
to use practical considerations in deciding whether a particular arrest 
across jurisdictional lines was reasonable.” Vance v. Dep’t of Licensing, 
116 Wn. App. 412, 416, 65 P.3d 668 (2003), review denied, 150 Wn.2d 
1004, 77 P.3d 651 (2003). 
Police officers in Washington may engage in pursuit of anyone “who 
is reasonably believed to have committed a violation of traffic or criminal 
laws.” RCW 10.93.070(6), 10.93.120. However, barring the presence of 
exceptional circumstances, a passenger may walk away from or stay at the 
traffic stop scene. State v. Rehn, 117 Wn. App. 142, 149, 69 P.3d 379 
(2003). 
5.14(b) Warrantless Searches Involving Intrusion into the Body 
A medical procedure performed without a warrant under exigent 
circumstances must be reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner. 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767−68, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 
2d 908 (1966); see 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3(c), at 
21516 (5th ed. 2012). In addition, the state must show more than probable 
cause because of the intrusive nature of the search. Schmerber, 384 U.S. 
at 77072, 86 S. Ct. 1826. The fact that evidence is likely to be destroyed 
will not automatically justify an intrusive medical procedure; the evidence 
must be essential to a conviction. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 
76566, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1985) (no need to retrieve 
bullet from defendant’s body where other substantial evidence was 
available to convict him). 
Where a serious crime involving intoxication is at issue, the natural 
dissipation of alcohol in the blood of a suspect may be an exigent 
circumstance justifying the nonconsensual extraction of a blood sample to 
determine the suspect’s blood alcohol level. See State v. Curran, 116 
Wn.2d 174, 185, 804 P.2d 558 (1991); see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 
77071, 86 S. Ct. 1826. But see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145, 
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133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) (dissipation of blood alcohol 
not sufficient per se to conduct a warrantless blood draw); see also State 
v. Baird, 187 Wn.2d 210, 221, 386 P.3d 239 (2016) (nor is dissipation of 
alcohol sufficient per se to conduct a less invasive breath test). Blood tests 
without a warrant have been upheld as reasonable searches under both the 
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 as long as a trained medic 
performs the test in a reasonable manner. Curran, 116 Wn.2d at 185, 804 
P.2d 558. 
In Washington, blood tests for alcohol intoxication are also justified 
by implied consent under RCW 46.20.308(4). Curran, 116 Wn.2d at 185, 
804 P.2d 558 (no violation of article I, section 7 when a blood sample is 
taken pursuant to RCW 46.20.308(4)); see also State v. Baldwin, 109 Wn. 
App. 516, 518, 37 P.3d 1220 (2001). Notably, the lawful arrest of a 
motorist is a prerequisite for operation of the implied consent statute; 
otherwise, express consent is required for the blood test of a motorist who 
is not under arrest. State v. Wetherell, 82 Wn.2d 865, 87071, 514 P.2d 
1069 (1973). The exigent circumstance of dissipation of blood alcohol has 
also been used to justify a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a 
residence to arrest a suspect and seize a blood sample. State v. Komoto, 40 
Wn. App. 200, 21113, 697 P.2d 1025 (1985) (officer used a passkey to 
enter an apartment and arrest suspect following felony hit and run). But, 
as stated above, the natural dissipation of blood alcohol does not provide 
an exigency per se in every case. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 145, 133 S. Ct. 
1552; Baird, 187 Wn.2d at 221, 386 P.3d 239. 
In order to deter recidivism and identify persons who commit crimes, 
no warrant is required under the Fourth Amendment to collect a DNA 
sample from every adult or juvenile convicted of a felony, harassment, 
stalking, or communication with a minor for immoral purposes, or 
adjudicated guilty of an equivalent juvenile offense. See RCW 
43.43.754(1); State v. Surge, 122 Wn. App. 448, 450, 94 P.3d 345 (2004) 
(holding that State v. Olivas, 122 Wn.2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993), is 
controlling on this issue); see also Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466, 
133 S. Ct. 1958, 186 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013). 
5.14(c) Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Persons Located on 
Premises Being Searched 
In limited instances, police may conduct a search of a person on the 
premises but not named in the warrant. State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 
301, 654 P.2d 96 (1982), abrogated on other grounds by Minnesota v. 
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993). To 
detain or search an individual other than the occupant, there must be 
“presence plus.” See id. In other words, the officers must have “reasonable 
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cause” to believe that the person is concealing evidence sought and 
immediate seizure is necessary to prevent its destruction. State v. 
Halverson, 21 Wn. App. 35, 38, 584 P.2d 408 (1978) (although a specific 
warrant to search premises cannot automatically be converted into a 
general one to search individuals, “defendant’s suspicious conduct gave 
the police reasonable cause to search his person”). “Reasonable cause” 
requires that the person engage in some type of suspicious activity. 
Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d at 301, 654 P.2d 96. Officers may also conduct a 
limited search for weapons to protect themselves during the execution of 
the warrant. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 
2d 238 (1979); State v. Allen, 93 Wn.2d 170, 172, 606 P.2d 1235 (1980). 
For a more complete discussion of when occupants may be searched 
during the execution of a premises search warrant, see supra § 3.7(b). 
5.15 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF MOTOR VEHICLES: 
INTRODUCTION 
The court treats automobiles and other motor vehicles as a special 
category in search and seizure law for two reasons. First, the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a vehicle is less than that in a home or an article 
on a person. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 
L. Ed. 2d 843 (2004) (“The Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist’s 
car as his castle.”). Second, the mobility of a vehicle may make obtaining 
a warrant prior to a search or seizure impractical. See id.; State v. Johnson, 
128 Wn.2d 431, 449, 45354, 909 P.2d 293 (1996). Under both article I, 
section 7 and the Fourth Amendment, the fact that it is possible to sleep in 
a vehicle does not give rise to the same privacy rights that attach to fixed 
dwellings. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. 
Ed. 2d. 406 (1985); Johnson, 128 Wn.2d at 449, 909 P.2d 293 (lessened 
privacy interest for sleeper compartment of a tractor-trailer rig); State v. 
Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d 183, 190, 875 P.2d 1208 (1994). The reasonable 
expectation of privacy in motor vehicles is discussed in section 1.3(e). See 
also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.2(b), at 73149 (5th ed. 
2012). 
A vehicle may be the subject of a warrantless search when the 
circumstances of the search are consistent with other exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, such as the search incident to arrest or the Terry stop-
and-frisk exceptions. See 3 LaFave, supra § 7.1(b), at 673–96; see also 2 
LaFave, supra § 4.9(d) (discussing the Terry stop-and-frisk search). Courts 
have also held that police may enter a vehicle to aid a person in distress or 
to seek information about a person in distress, United States v. Haley, 581 
F.2d 723, 72526 (8th Cir. 1978), but no Washington case has directly 
addressed the issue. 
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The search of a motor vehicle and its contents are treated differently 
under the Fourth Amendment than they are under article I, section 7. 
Compare Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 
2d 485 (2009) (police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s 
arrest to obtain evidence of the crime of arrest), with State v. Valdez, 167 
Wn.2d 761, 779, 224 P.3d 751 (2009) (only preservation of evidence and 
officer safety are valid reasons to search a vehicle incident to arrest). The 
next sections set forth the standards under article I, section 7 and the 
Fourth Amendment. Then, the general principles governing automobile 
impoundment and inventory searches are addressed. 
5.16 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF A VEHICLE UNDER THE WASHINGTON 
STATE CONSTITUTION 
The warrantless search of a vehicle is much more restricted under 
article I, section 7 than it is under the Fourth Amendment. First, 
Washington does not allow warrantless searches of vehicles on probable 
cause grounds—the “automobile exception” applied in federal court. State 
v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379, 394–95, 219 P.3d 651 (2009). Second, exigent 
circumstances will be found only where obtaining a warrant is not practical 
because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise 
officer safety, facilitate escape, or permit the destruction of evidence. State 
v. Tibbles, 169 Wn.2d 364, 373, 236 P.3d 885 (2010). Lastly, search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest is only proper if there are concerns for officer 
safety or destruction of the evidence. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197, 
275 P.3d 289 (2012); State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 779, 224 P.3d 751 
(2009); State v. Glenn, 140 Wn. App. 627, 636, 166 P.3d 1235 (2007) 
(vehicle search justified under the officer safety exception by credible 
report that a gun had been displayed from the vehicle). 
Once the immediate danger of harm to police or destruction of 
evidence is removed by arrest and police control of the vehicle, police 
must obtain a warrant or have another exception to search the vehicle. 
State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 179, 233 P.3d 879 (2010) (the search of a 
vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant is unlawful absent a 
reasonable basis to believe that the arrestee poses a safety risk). In Snapp, 
the court held there could be no concerns for officer safety because the 
defendant was in custody and removed from the vehicle; therefore, the 
officers exceeded the scope of the search incident to arrest when they 
searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d at 
197, 275 P.3d 289. 
Even if the officers may properly search the passenger compartment, 
they may not open locked containers. State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 152, 
720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 
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761, 224 P.3d 751. This contrasts with the federal standard, which permits 
the warrantless search incident to arrest of both locked and unlocked 
containers. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), at 
697707 (5th ed. 2012). “The rationale for this departure from the federal 
standard is that use of a lock demonstrates the individual’s expectation of 
privacy and the presence of a lock minimizes the danger of an arrestee 
gaining access to the contents of the container.” State v. Johnson, 77 Wn. 
App. 441, 446, 892 P.2d 106 (1995), aff’d, 128 Wn.2d 431, 909 P.2d 293 
(1996) (discussing Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436). Therefore, 
police in Washington must obtain a search warrant prior to searching any 
locked glove compartment or other locked container. 
Police officers may make a limited entry and investigation into a 
vehicle that they have probable cause to believe has been the subject of a 
burglary, tampering, or theft. State v. Lynch, 84 Wn. App. 467, 47778, 
929 P.2d 460 (1996). Officers may search those areas they reasonably 
believe to have been affected and those areas reasonably believed to 
contain some evidence of ownership. Id. at 47778, 929 P.2d 460. Officers 
may also make a warrantless entry into a vehicle to look in places where 
registration papers might be kept if the driver has fled the vehicle and the 
officer reasonably believed the vehicle had been stolen. State v. Orcut, 22 
Wn. App. 730, 73435, 591 P.2d 872 (1979). 
5.17 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF A VEHICLE UNDER  
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
In contrast to article I, section 7, the Fourth Amendment includes the 
“automobile exception,” which allows officers to search a vehicle without 
a warrant so long as they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle 
contains contraband. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 483, 105 S. Ct. 
881, 83 L. Ed. 2d 890 (1985) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 149, 162, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925)); United States v. Ross, 
456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982). A warrant is 
not required because “the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality 
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” Carroll, 267 U.S. at 
153, 45 S. Ct. 280. Because the vehicle itself presents an exigency, the 
officers do not need a separate exigency to perform a warrantless search. 
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 
(1999) (no need for a separate finding of exigency in addition to probable 
cause); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 5152, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. 
Ed. 2d 419 (1970) (actual exigent circumstances not necessary to justify 
warrantless probable cause search). But see Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 
1663, 1671, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2018) (automobile exception does not justify 
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a warrantless intrusion into the curtilage of a home to reach a parked 
motorcycle). 
A search may extend to a vehicle in its entirety, including any of the 
vehicle’s contents, both locked and unlocked. Ross, 456 U.S. at 821, 825, 
102 S. Ct. 2157; California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 
114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 
125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 842 (2005) (warrantless search of car trunk 
valid where narcotics-detection dog alerted on trunk when police lawfully 
pulled the car over for a traffic stop). Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that, even prior to arrest, police officers with probable cause to 
search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are 
capable of concealing the object of the search. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 
U.S. 295, 307, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999). The scope of 
the permissible search is limited to the size and shape of the items sought, 
and police may only search where it is reasonable to believe the items 
sought may be hidden. See id. 
The police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle even after 
they have taken the vehicle into custody and its contents are in no danger 
of removal or disturbance. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 15354, 45 S. Ct. 280; 
Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 382, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 80 L. Ed. 2d 381 
(1984). The rationale is that the initial justification for the warrantless 
search does not disappear after impoundment. Johns, 469 U.S. at 484, 105 
S. Ct. 881. The vehicle, however, must have been mobile at the time of 
impoundment for the Carroll rule to apply. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 460–62, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971) (a warrant 
was required when defendant was arrested in his home and had no access 
to a vehicle after arrest),  overruled in part on other grounds by Horton v. 
California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990); see 
also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–91, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. 
Ed. 2d. 406 (1985). As discussed in section 5.15, Washington State has 
rejected the “automobile exception.” 
Under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, officers may 
also search a vehicle absent probable cause incident to the lawful arrest of 
an occupant. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. 
Ed. 2d 485 (2009). However, the difference between the Fourth 
Amendment’s application and article I, section 7 is in the scope of the 
exception. Under the Fourth Amendment, officers may search the vehicle 
when there are concerns for officer safety, when there are concerns for 
destruction of the evidence, and when it is reasonable to believe that 
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest will be found in the vehicle. Id. 
The first two instances apply when the arrestee is unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment. Id. Thus, these two 
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instances will rarely justify a search. The third prong, allowing officers to 
search when evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the 
vehicle, is permissible only under the Fourth Amendment, not under 
article I, section 7. State v. Snapp, 174 Wn.2d 177, 197, 275 P.3d 289 
(2012) (allowing search incident to arrest only under the “unrestrained” 
exceptions). 
5.18 WARRANTLESS VEHICLE SEARCHES BASED ON GENERALIZED 
SUSPICION: SPOT CHECKS OF MOTORISTS 
Under the Fourth Amendment, a reasonable vehicle roadblock, or 
spot check, may be another exception to the warrant requirement. See 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 
(1979); see also Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 44950, 
110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 55556, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976). 
To determine the reasonableness of spot checks or vehicle checkpoints, 
the court will weigh the government’s interest in the checkpoints, the 
extent to which the program advances the government’s goals, and the 
amount of intrusion on the individual motorist. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 
419, 427, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2004). For police to institute 
general spot check procedures, the procedures must constitute “a 
sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion.” State v. 
Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 434, 437, 706 P.2d 225 (1985). In addition, the spot 
check procedures must be such that “the exercise of discretion by law 
enforcement officials [is] sufficiently constrained.” Id. at 438, 706 P.2d 
225. 
Article I, section 7 prohibits sobriety checkpoints that impose no 
statutory constraints on officers’ discretion to conduct intrusive searches 
involving extensive invasions of privacy, such as smelling suspect’s 
breath, visual inspections of automobile, and tests of physical dexterity. 
City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 459–60, 755 P.2d 775 (1988); 
see also Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L. 
Ed. 2d 333 (2000) (a highway drug checkpoint is unconstitutional where 
officers and drug-detecting canine would examine, through open view, a 
predetermined number of drivers). Lastly, roadblocks randomly enforced 
or implemented to detect ordinary criminal wrongdoing are unreasonable. 
Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 41, 121 S. Ct. 447. In the absence of a valid spot 
check program, police officers may stop a motor vehicle to check for valid 
registration or possible automobile violations only when they have a 
reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 999 S. 
Ct. 1391 (randomly stopping drivers to check registration violated the 
Fourth Amendment). 
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The Washington Supreme Court has held sobriety checkpoint 
programs unconstitutional under both article I, section 7 and the Fourth 
Amendment. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d at 458, 460, 755 P.2d 775. Relying on 
article I, section 7’s explicit recognition of the privacy rights of the state’s 
citizens and requirements that all searches be conducted under “authority 
of law,” the Mesiani court rejected Seattle’s argument that the stops fell 
within an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 457–58, 755 P.2d 
775. In one of the cases relied upon by the city, State v. Silvernail, 25 Wn. 
App. 185, 605 P.2d 1279 (1980), the court permitted a warrantless search 
when there was information that a serious felony had recently been 
committed. Id. at 190, 605 P.2d 1279. The Mesiani court distinguished 
Silvernail, stating notice that a felony had recently been committed “is far 
different from an inference from statistics that there are inebriated drivers 
in the area.” Id. at 458 n.1, 755 P.2d 775. This differs from the Fourth 
Amendment, which permits sobriety checkpoints if all vehicles passing 
through are detained. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481. 
5.19 FORFEITURE OR LEVY 
Courts in Washington, while recognizing that “[s]earches and 
seizures of motor vehicles used in drug transactions are an everyday 
occurrence,” have held that warrantless inventory searches of vehicles 
forfeited under drug laws are permitted under article I, section 7. State v. 
McFadden, 63 Wn. App. 441, 449, 820 P.2d 53 (1991), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998). In Lowery 
v. Nelson, 43 Wn. App. 747, 750, 719 P.2d 594 (1986), the court held that, 
under the Fourth Amendment, police are not required to obtain a search 
warrant before exercising the authority granted by the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act to seize a vehicle used to transport a controlled substance. 
Id. at 750, 719 P.2d 594 (discussing RCW 69.50.505(1)(d)); see also 
Rozner v. Bellevue, 116 Wn.2d 342, 350, 804 P.2d 24 (1991); State v. 
Gwinner, 59 Wn. App. 119, 123, 796 P.2d 728 (1990) (upholding seizure 
under Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
1970, 21 U.S.C. § 881). Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, 
section 7, police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle seized 
pursuant to the forfeiture statute on the theory that the search is a valid 
inventory or evidentiary search. McFadden, 63 Wn. App. at 449, 820 P.2d 
53; see 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.5(c), at 89298 (5th 
ed. 2012). 
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5.20 IMPOUNDMENT 
“Impoundment is a seizure because it involves the governmental 
taking of a vehicle into its exclusive custody.” State v. Coss, 87 Wn. App. 
891, 898, 943 P.2d 1126 (1997). The facts of each case determine the 
reasonableness of each particular impoundment. Id. A vehicle may be 
impounded without a warrant in three circumstances: (1) when the vehicle 
itself is evidence of a crime; (2) when the removal of the vehicle is 
necessary as part of “community caretaking”; and (3) when the driver has 
committed one of the traffic infractions that authorizes impoundment. 
State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 189, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); see also State 
v. Lynch, 84 Wn. App. 467, 47778, 929 P.2d 460 (1996). Officers do not 
need the defendant’s consent to conduct an inventory search of an 
impounded vehicle. State v. Tyler, 177 Wn.2d 690, 711, 302 P.3d 165 
(2013). 
A vehicle lawfully parked at one’s home or even on a public street 
may not be impounded simply because its owner has been arrested. 
Miranda v. Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 86466 (9th Cir. 2005). Similarly, 
impoundment is improper when the arrestee’s release is imminent, and the 
vehicle does not pose a safety hazard. See State v. Bales, 15 Wn. App. 834, 
836, 552 P.2d 688 (1976). Also, when police conduct warrantless 
impoundments and subsequent inventory searches, the searches may not 
form a pretext for a search that the police otherwise could not have made. 
State v. White, 83 Wn. App. 770, 77475, 924 P.2d 55 (1996), rev’d on 
other grounds, 135 Wn.2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998). See generally 3 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.5(e) (5th ed. 2012). 
5.20(a) Evidence of Crime 
“A car may be lawfully impounded as evidence of a crime if an 
officer has probable cause to believe that it was stolen or used in the 
commission of a felony.” State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 647, 716 
P.2d 295 (1986). In Terrovona, the Washington Supreme Court held that 
police properly impounded a vehicle that they had probable cause to 
believe was used in the commission of a felony, where the defendant had 
lured the victim to the murder site by telephoning him and asking him to 
bring gasoline to the defendant’s empty vehicle. Id. at 64748, 716 P.2d 
295. Furthermore, an officer who has probable cause to believe a vehicle 
contains contraband or evidence of a crime may seize and hold the car for 
the reasonable time needed to obtain a search warrant, and the car may be 
towed to an impound yard during seizure. State v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641, 
653, 826 P.2d 698 (1992). 
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5.20(b) Community Caretaking Function 
The “community caretaking function” permits impoundment when 
an abandoned vehicle impedes traffic, poses a threat to public safety and 
convenience, or is itself threatened by vandalism or theft of its contents. 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 36869, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. 
Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 236, 721 P.2d 560 
(1986). For example, Sweet held that impoundment was proper under the 
community caretaking exception when the arrestee was unconscious, 
items of value were visible inside the vehicle, and the vehicle was in a 
high-crime area. 44 Wn. App. at 23637, 721 P.2d 560. 
Under the community caretaking exception, police do not need to 
have a reasonable belief that the vehicle is connected with criminal 
activity. See State v. Chisholm, 39 Wn. App. 864, 86667, 696 P.2d 41 
(1985). However, police should first make an inquiry as to the availability 
of the owner or the owner’s spouse or friends to move the vehicle. See 
State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 743, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984); State v. 
Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 153, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980). Police should also 
consider the alternative of parking and locking the car. Williams, 102 
Wn.2d at 743, 689 P.2d 1065. 
5.20(c) Enforcement of Traffic Regulations 
Officers may impound a vehicle as part of enforcing traffic 
regulations only when constitutionally reasonable and necessary to 
prevent a continuing violation of a traffic offense for which the legislature 
has specifically authorized impoundment. See State v. Hill, 68 Wn. App. 
300, 305, 842 P.2d 996 (1993). Impoundment is unreasonable and 
improper if a reasonable alternative to impoundment exists, such as when 
the owner of the vehicle, or a passenger in the vehicle, is available to 
transport it. Id. at 306, 842 P.2d 996. Police officers are to use discretion 
when deciding to impound a vehicle and, while an officer need not exhaust 
all possibilities, the officer must at least consider alternatives to 
impoundment. State v. Coss, 87 Wn. App. 891, 899, 943 P.2d 1126 (1997) 
(impoundment improper where officer failed to consider alternatives to 
impoundment; a validly licensed passenger could have driven vehicle 
from scene of traffic stop); see also State v. Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. 113, 
119, 702 P.2d 1222 (1985). 
5.20(d) Warrantless Detention 
Officers may make a warrantless detention of a vehicle by deflating 
its tires during the time when officers are in pursuit of a suspect. State v. 
Burgess, 43 Wn. App. 253, 259, 716 P.2d 948 (1986). In Burgess, the court 
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held that, because the detention was unaccompanied by an exploratory 
search, the detention was reasonably restricted in time and place and was 
necessary to prevent the suspect’s flight from the scene. Id. 
5.21 INVENTORY SEARCHES OF IMPOUNDED VEHICLES 
When a vehicle is lawfully impounded, police are permitted to 
conduct a warrantless inventory search. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 
371, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987) (inventory searches are a 
well-defined exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Morales, 154 
Wn. App. 26, 48, 225 P.3d 311 (2010), rev’d in part on other grounds, 
173 Wn.2d 560, 269 P.3d 263 (2012); State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 
76667, 958 P.2d 982 (1998) (scope of inventory search limited to those 
areas necessary to fulfill its purpose). Routine inventory searches are 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when police follow standard 
practices and the search is not a pretext for obtaining evidence the police 
would not be able to obtain otherwise. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364, 375, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); State v. White, 
83 Wn. App. 770, 775, 958 P.2d 982 (1996), rev’d on other grounds, 135 
Wn.2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998). Police do not need to obtain a 
defendant’s consent before performing an inventory search. State v. Tyler, 
177 Wn.2d 690, 711, 302 P.3d 165, 176 (2013). 
Washington courts have long held that a non-investigatory inventory 
search of an automobile is proper when conducted in good faith for the 
purposes of (1) finding, listing, and securing property belonging to the 
detainee from loss during detention, and (2) protecting police and 
temporary storage bailees from liability due to dishonest claims of theft. 
State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 154, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980); White, 83 Wn. 
App. at 777, 958 P.2d 982. An inventory search does not violate the 
owner’s Fourth Amendment rights when the search follows written, 
standardized inventory procedures. State v. Mireles, 73 Wn. App. 605, 
61213, 871 P.2d 162 (1994). 
The scope of an inventory search is “limited to those areas necessary 
to fulfill its purpose”—that is, “limited to protecting against substantial 
risks to property.” Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 155, 622 P.2d 1218. For example, 
police in Washington may not open and examine a locked trunk “absent a 
manifest necessity for conducting such a search.” Id. at 156, 622 P.2d 1218 
(no great danger of theft to property left in trunk); White, 135 Wn.2d at 
76567, 958 P.2d 982 (police may not search a locked trunk, despite the 
fact that the trunk could be opened by a switch located inside the passenger 
compartment). Police also may not open luggage located in an impounded 
vehicle absent consent or exigent circumstances. Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 158, 
622 P.2d 1218. 
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In State v. Williams, the court suggested that police must obtain the 
owner’s consent before conducting an inventory search of an impounded 
vehicle pursuant to the community caretaking exception. 102 Wn.2d 733, 
743, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984). However, an inventory search of a vehicle 
impounded pursuant to the community caretaking exception without the 
owner’s consent was held to be valid in State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 
721 P.2d 560 (1986). In Sweet, the owner was unconscious and unable to 
either give or withhold his consent; there was also no evidence suggesting 
that the search was conducted in bad faith or that it was a mere pretext for 
an investigatory search. Id. at 237, 721 P.2d 560; see also State v. Tyler, 
177 Wn.2d 690, 711, 302 P.3d 165 (2013) (consent not required as a 
condition precedent to an inventory search).  
5.22 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES IN SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS 
The court has permitted warrantless searches in special environments 
when the danger to the public is severe and the degree of intrusion small. 
For example, the court permitted warrantless magnetometer (metal 
detector) searches at airports to prevent hijackings and bombings. United 
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007). Conversely, the 
Washington Supreme Court has rejected as unconstitutional the 
warrantless pat down of patrons at rock concerts. Jacobsen v. City of 
Seattle, 98 Wn.2d 668, 67374, 658 P.2d 653 (1983). The Jacobsen court 
concluded there is a greater risk of danger at airports and courthouses than 
at rock concerts, and pat-down searches constitute a higher degree of 
intrusion than magnetometer and typical courthouse searches. Id., 658 
P.2d 653. For a discussion of warrantless searches in other special 
environments, see infra § 6. 
5.23 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF OBJECTS IN THE  
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MAILS 
Law enforcement officers may seize first-class mail and packages 
transported by private carriers when they have probable cause to believe 
that the mail or packages contain contraband. See United States v. Van 
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 25152, 90 S. Ct. 1029, 25 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1970); 
see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 12122, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984). The contents of such mail or packages may not be 
examined without a warrant, however, unless the reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the contents no longer exists or the examination consists of a 
test that will only disclose the presence of the contraband. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. at 12122, 104 S. Ct. 1652; see also State v. Wolohan, 23 Wn. App. 
813, 820, 598 P.2d 421 (1979). A canine sniff may be used to establish 
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probable cause that a package lawfully held by police contains contraband. 






This chapter first discusses the differences in reasonable expectations 
of privacy, burdens of proof, and warrant requirements in three special 
environments: (1) public schools, (2) detention and correctional facilities, 
and (3) international borders. Next, it discusses special considerations in 
administrative searches. 
6.1 SCHOOLS 
A student’s legitimate expectation of privacy must be balanced 
against the school’s legitimate need to provide an environment conducive 
to learning. Consequently, schools are considered a special environment 
in which the usual burdens of proof and warrant requirements are slightly 
relaxed. Section 6.1(a) discusses how this balance permits a school official 
to search a student without a warrant, or even probable cause, so long as a 
reasonable suspicion exists. Section 6.1(b) discusses this standard in the 
context of drug-testing programs for athletes. 
6.1(a) Burden of Proof and Warrant Requirements 
Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, school 
authorities may conduct a warrantless search of a student without probable 
cause if, under the totality of the circumstances, the school official has a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 341, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985); State v. Meneese, 174 
Wn.2d 937, 943, 282 P.3d 83 (2012). School officials may search a student 
with less than probable cause because their “primary duty [is] to maintain 
order and discipline at school, not discover and prevent crime like a police 
officer.” Meneese, 174 Wn.2d at 943, 282 P.3d 83. However, if the search 
is conducted by a police officer and not a school official, the school 
exception does not apply and the officer must have a warrant. Id. (finding 
search of student’s backpack by officer on school grounds unconstitutional 
without warrant or other exception). Of course, the school official still 
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must have particularized suspicion with respect to each individual 
searched. Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 103 Wn.2d 594, 599, 694 
P.2d 1078 (1985) (individualized suspicion required for search of school 
band members’ luggage). See generally 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 10.11(b), at 597629 (5th ed. 2012). 
A search is reasonable if (1) it is justified at its inception, and (2) it 
is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first place. State v. B.A.S., 103 Wn. App. 549, 553, 13 
P.3d 244 (2000) (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S. Ct. 733). 
Additionally, there must be a nexus between the item sought and the 
infraction being investigated. Id. at 554, 105 S. Ct. 733 (holding that no 
connection existed between the school’s closed campus policy that 
provided for searches of students found violating the policy and the 
likelihood that a student was bringing contraband onto school property). 
A search is unconstitutional if it exceeds the scope of initial reasonable 
suspicion. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375, 
129 S. Ct. 2633, 174 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2009) (holding that a strip search of a 
13-year-old student suspected of possessing illegal drugs was excessively 
intrusive).   
Although Washington allows for school searches on less than 
probable cause, the Washington Supreme Court has not adopted a “special 
needs” exception as appears under the Fourth Amendment. Compare York 
v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 312, 178 P.3d 995 
(2008) (no general special needs exception under article I, section 7), with 
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709 
(1987), and Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 
1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989) (drug testing under special needs 
exception). Thus, the court has “not created a general special needs 
exception or adopted a strict scrutiny type analysis that would allow the 
State to depart from the warrant requirement whenever it could articulate 
a special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” York, 163 
Wn.2d at 314, 178 P.3d 995. Thus, a school cannot conduct a general, 
suspicionless search. Id. 
6.1(b) Drug Testing of Student Athletes 
The Washington Supreme Court has held that random and 
suspicionless drug testing of student athletes is not permissible under 
article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. York v. Wahkiakum 
Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 310, 178 P.3d 995 (2008). Conversely, 
the Fourth Amendment allows random drug testing without individualized 
suspicion. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 66465, 115 S. 
Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995); see also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. 
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Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 153 L. Ed. 2d 
735 (2002) (holding mandatory drug testing as a condition of participating 
in extracurricular sports is constitutional).   
Specifically, the Washington Supreme Court held that a student 
athlete’s fundamental privacy interest in controlling his or her bodily 
functions required school officials to meet a “reasonableness” or 
“individualized” suspicion standard. York, 163 Wn.2d at 308, 178 P.3d 
995 (citing State v. McKinnon, 88 Wn.2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977) (holding 
school officials must have some “reasonable” or “individualized” 
suspicion to protect students from unreasonable searches)). In McKinnon, 
the court set forth several factors for determining the reasonableness of a 
search: “the child’s age, history, and school record, the prevalence and 
seriousness of the problem in the school to which the search was directed, 
the exigency to make the search without delay, and the probative value 
and reliability of the information used as a justification for the search.” 
McKinnon, 88 Wn.2d at 81, 558 P.2d 781 (citations omitted). Because 
Washington has not adopted any general special needs exception, a search 
without reasonable and individualized suspicion is unconstitutional. York, 
163 Wn.2d at 308, 178 P.3d 995. 
6.2 PRISONS, CUSTODIAL DETENTION, AND POST-CONVICTION  
ALTERNATIVES TO PRISON 
Incarceration affects all aspects of an individual’s search and seizure 
protections: the reasonable expectation of privacy, the levels of proof 
required for intrusions, and warrant requirements. This section provides a 
sampling of some of the ways incarceration, or even conviction alone, 
alters search and seizure protections. 
6.2(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Prisoners are not accorded the same expectations of privacy in their 
cells and effects that citizens generally enjoy in their homes and effects. 
Matter of Personal Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 909, 952 P.2d 116 
(1998) (holding convicted “prisoners have no legitimate expectation of 
privacy and . . . the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable 
searches does not apply [to] prison cells”) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 
U.S. 517, 530, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984))). Pretrial 
detainees, like prisoners, may be subjected to unannounced searches of 
their living areas. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 58991, 104 S. Ct. 
3227, 82 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 55557, 99 
S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979). Additionally, jailed suspects have no 
expectation of privacy in property located in the property room at the 
prison. State v. Cheatam, 112 Wn. App. 778, 78587, 51 P.3d 138 (2002), 
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aff’d, 150 Wn.2d 626, 81 P.3d 830 (2003). This holds true when the 
defendant is transferred to a hospital along with his or her personal effects. 
State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wn.2d 515, 52324, 192 P.3d 360 (2008) (no 
privacy interest in personal effects when transferred to mental institution). 
A convicted sex offender has a minimal expectation of privacy in 
personal body fluids; thus, the State may remove blood for testing without 
a defendant’s consent. In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wn.2d 80, 9293, 
96, 847 P.2d 455 (1993) (upholding constitutionality of RCW 70.24.340, 
which mandates HIV testing for adults and juveniles who have been 
convicted of a sexual offense under RCW ch. 9A.44). Additionally, under 
RCW 43.43.754, the state may obtain blood samples and perform DNA 
tests without the defendant’s consent following conviction. State v. Olivas, 
122 Wn.2d 73, 98, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993) (upholding the statute’s 
constitutionality under Fourth Amendment). 
After a defendant has been convicted of an offense and released, his 
or her privacy interests remain diminished. For example, the warrantless 
search of the home of a convict released pending appeal does not violate 
constitutional protections. State v. Lucas, 56 Wn. App. 236, 24041, 783 
P.2d 121 (1989) (“one released pending appeal . . . should expect close 
scrutiny.”). And, as discussed below, police may search a parolee’s vehicle 
based on a “well-founded” suspicion of criminal activity. State v. 
Coahran, 27 Wn. App. 664, 666, 620 P.2d 116 (1980). 
6.2(b) Warrantless Searches and Seizures 
Warrants are not required for searches of prisoners or pretrial 
detainees. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 591, 104 S. Ct. 3227, 82 
L. Ed. 2d 438 (1984); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S. Ct. 
3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984). Probable cause and individualized 
suspicion are also not required for such searches. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 55560, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (pretrial 
detainees); State v. Baker, 28 Wn. App. 423, 42425, 623 P.2d 1172 
(1981) (prisoners). Permitting routine and warrantless searches of 
inmates’ cells is reasonable because security interests of the correctional 
institution outweigh the minimal intrusion into inmates’ privacy. State v. 
Rainford, 86 Wn. App. 431, 438, 936 P.2d 1210 (1997) (“Washington 
courts have held that an inmate’s expectation of privacy is necessarily 
lowered while in custody and that warrantless searches may be conducted 
if reasonable.”).  
Warrants are also not required for searches of parolees, probationers, 
work release inmates, and convicts released pending appeal, or for any of 
these groups’ homes and effects. See generally United States v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001) (discussing 
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whether a parole condition permitting the search of the “person, property, 
place of residence, vehicle, [and] personal effects . . . with or without a 
search warrant” satisfies the Fourth Amendment); see also Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 857, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006) 
(neither probable cause nor warrant required for search of parolee stopped 
by police officer in public); State v. Campbell, 103 Wn.2d 1, 22–23, 691 
P.2d 929 (1984); State v. Lucas, 56 Wn. App. 236, 24344, 783 P.2d 121 
(1989). Furthermore, persons residing with prisoners who are released to 
a home-detention program are required to sign consent forms that allow 
for warrantless searches and seizures of the property where the person and 
the prisoner reside. State v. Cole, 122 Wn. App. 319, 323, 93 P.3d 209 
(2004). 
6.2(c) Strip and Body Cavity Searches of Arrestees and Detainees 
In Washington, routine strip searches are governed by statute and 
administrative regulation. See RCW 10.79.060170; WAC §§ 289-02-
020, 289-02-100, 289-02-200. A defendant’s state protections from a strip 
search under article I, section 7 are coextensive with the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Audley, 77 Wn. App. 897, 904, 908, 
894 P.2d 1359 (1995) (holding that RCW 10.79.130(1)(a) is constitutional 
under article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment and that such searches 
are permissible where they are supported by reasonable suspicion that an 
arrestee is concealing contraband that poses a threat to jail security). Only 
a reasonable suspicion is required to conduct a “dry cell search” of a 
prisoner. State v. Rainford, 86 Wn. App. 431, 433, 435 n.1, 936 P.2d 1210 
(1997) (“dry cell search” typically involves placing prisoner in private 
room under 24-hour observation until prisoner has undergone three bowel 
movements and then examining the feces for signs of drug use). 
For strip and body cavity searches conducted prior to a detainee’s 
first court appearance, probable cause and a warrant are required unless 
(1) the detainee is charged with a violent offense; (2) the detainee is 
charged with an offense involving escape, burglary, use of a deadly 
weapon, or contraband; or (3) police have a reasonable suspicion that the 
detainee is concealing contraband, weapons, or fruits or instrumentalities 
of crime on his or her person. WAC §§ 289-16-100 to -200; cf. State v. 
Hartzog, 96 Wn.2d 383, 39697, 635 P.2d 694 (1981) (visual and body 
cavity searches of prisoners leaving penal institution for court appearance 
are permissible); State v. Brown, 33 Wn. App. 843, 848, 658 P.2d 44 
(1983) (reasonable suspicion for strip search of prisoner found after 
prisoner had personal contact with visitor). 
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6.3 INTERNATIONAL BORDERS 
Searches and seizures of travelers at or near the international borders 
fall within the scope of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, but 
courts generally do not require such intrusions to meet the strict levels of 
proof and warrant requirements of ordinary searches and seizures. This 
section briefly describes some of the situations in which traditional proof 
and warrant requirements have been relaxed. 
6.3(a) Permanent Border Checkpoints 
Customs officials may search persons and vehicles crossing the 
border at permanent checkpoints into the United States under 19 U.S.C. § 
1467. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154, 124 S. Ct. 
1582, 158 L. Ed. 2d 311 (2004) (“[A]utomobiles seeking entry into this 
country may be searched.”); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U.S. 543, 566, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976) (“[S]tops for 
brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by 
warrant.”); York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 345, 
178 P.3d 995 (2008) (recognizing border exception). Although border 
agents do not need a warrant to conduct a search at a border crossing, the 
statute does not obviate the requirement that a particular search or seizure 
be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 37 L. Ed. 2d 
596 (1973) (holding that although a statute authorizes customs searches 
without probable cause or mere suspicion, no act of Congress can 
authorize a violation of the Constitution). Race or color is not a sufficient 
basis for making an investigatory stop by border patrol agents. See State 
v. Almanza-Guzman, 94 Wn. App. 563, 567, 972 P.2d 468 (1999). 
The scope of a Terry stop at the border may be relatively intrusive 
when border patrol agents suspect individuals are smuggling narcotics. See 
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544, 105 S. Ct. 
3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1985) (individual fitting courier profile of 
alimentary canal smuggler may be detained for 16 hours pending bowel 
movement). But if the search is intrusive—as intrusive as a body cavity 
search—the Ninth Circuit requires a showing of “a real suspicion, directed 
specifically to that person,” supported by specific and articulable facts 
before the officials may search the suspect. United States v. Guadalupe-
Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970); Henderson v. United States, 390 
F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). If agents have only reasonable suspicion, 
they may not hold the suspect for an unreasonable amount of time. Florida 
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 50203, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983) 
(officers who had only reasonable suspicion that airport traveler was 
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smuggling narcotics could not detain traveler in a special room and seize 
his tickets and luggage); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 70910, 
103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1983) (90-minute detention of luggage 
at international airport unreasonable when law enforcement officers had 
only reasonable suspicion of smuggling). 
6.3(b) Roving Patrols: Illegal Aliens and Searches Away from the Border 
To stop a vehicle, officers conducting roving patrols near borders 
must have a reasonable suspicion, based on “specific articulable facts,” 
that the vehicle contains illegal aliens. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975). Washington 
has declined to follow the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on this 
matter, allowing a search away from a border only with probable cause. 
See York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 163 Wn.2d 297, 312 n.19, 178 
P.3d 995 (2008) (discussing State v. Quick, 59 Wn. App. 228, 232, 796 
P.2d 764 (1990), and its deviation from the Brignoni–Ponce federal 
standard). 
6.4 ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES 
The Fourth Amendment governs searches conducted for 
administrative purposes, regardless of whether criminal prosecution is 
anticipated. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 29193, 104 S. 
Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984) (determining that the Fourth Amendment 
applies to inspection of home that was partially damaged by fire, even 
when purpose of inspection is to determine fire’s origin and not criminal 
conduct); Bosteder v. Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 35, 117 P.3d 316 (2005) 
(superseded by statute on other grounds); Dodge City Saloon, Inc. v. 
Washington State Liquor Control Bd., 168 Wn. App. 388, 288 P.3d 343 
(2012), review denied, 290 P.3d 994 (2012). 
The following sections examine a subject’s reasonable expectations 
of privacy during a warrantless search, the warrant requirements in 
administrative searches, and the various level of proof requirements. 
6.4(a) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
An individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not affected by 
the fact that a search is part of an administrative or regulatory program or 
has a purpose other than criminal prosecution. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 53233, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967) (search of 
home for housing code violations); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 
54546, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967) (search of commercial 
premises for fire code violations). As with other searches, if there is no 
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expectation of privacy in the area searched, the search does not fall under 
Fourth Amendment protections. Centimark Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor & 
Indus., 129 Wn. App. 368, 375, 119 P.3d 865 (2005) (no expectation of 
privacy in roofing job site when inspector could readily see that the 
workers were not wearing fall protection). An administrative search does 
not fall under constitutional protections if those conducting the search are 
not state actors. See Pasco v. Shaw, 161 Wn.2d 450, 166 P.3d 1157 (2007) 
(finding that neither the Fourth Amendment nor article I, section 7 is 
violated when a landlord and a privately engaged inspector inspect a rental 
property for code violations that impact health and safety). 
Although some pervasively regulated industries are denied 
reasonable expectations of privacy, the Fourth Amendment protects 
against civil and criminal searches of commercial as well as residential 
premises. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313, 98 S. Ct. 
1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (except for particular industries, such as 
those involving liquor and firearms where no reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 
administrative searches of commercial premises); see also Michigan v. 
Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291, 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984). If 
the industry is granted only a limited expectation of privacy, that interest 
must be balanced against the need for a particular administrative search. 
See Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App. 297, 313, 62 P.3d 533 (2003) (holding 
a patient has a limited expectation of privacy in prescription records that 
is outweighed by the government’s statutorily mandated interest in 
monitoring the flow of drugs from pharmacies to patients). However, there 
is no general “heavily regulated industry” exception in Washington. See 
State v. Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 248–51, 156 P.3d 864 (2007); see also 
Bosteder v. Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 29, 117 P.3d 316 (2005). 
Finally, certain government employees have a reduced expectation 
of privacy given the special needs and legitimate workplace purpose. See 
Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 177 L. Ed. 2d 216 (2010) 
(holding that a police officer’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated 
when a supervisor read his personal text messages on a department-issued 
pager). 
6.4(b) Warrant Requirements 
Generally, warrants are required for administrative searches of 
private and commercial premises. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 
523, 53233, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967). However, when the 
traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement apply, a warrant is 
unnecessary. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 29495, 104 S. Ct. 
641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984) (warrant not required for entry onto premises 
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when consent given or exigent circumstances present because “evidence 
of criminal activity . . . discovered during the course of a valid 
administrative search . . . may be seized under the ‘plain view’ doctrine”) 
(citation omitted). 
Warrants are not required in certain limited situations when law 
enforcement makes searches pursuant to comprehensive and predictable 
legislative schemes. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 59899, 101 
S. Ct. 2534, 69 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1981). Such situations are characterized by 
a substantial governmental interest in inspection, as in the case of 
hazardous industries, and by the necessity of a warrantless inspection to 
enforce the legislative purpose. See id. at 59899, 101 S. Ct. 2534 
(congressional scheme authorizing warrantless inspections of mines found 
constitutional); see also Murphy v. State, 115 Wn. App. 297, 30708, 62 
P.3d 533 (2003) (state statute requiring pharmacies to keep records of 
dispensed prescriptions and to make them available for inspection by state 
pharmacy board or other law enforcement officer does not violate search 
and seizure provisions of state or federal constitutions). In addition, the 
scheme must prove to be an adequate substitute for a warrant by imposing 
certainty and regularity in the inspections and by accommodating special 
privacy concerns. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S. Ct. 2534. 
In Washington, there is no general administrative search warrant 
exception for “heavily regulated industries.” Any administrative exception 
must be expressly stated in an applicable law or regulation. See State v. 
Miles, 160 Wn.2d 236, 248–51, 156 P.3d 864 (2007); see also Bosteder v. 
Renton, 155 Wn.2d 18, 29, 117 P.3d 316 (2006) (holding that 
administrative warrants are not constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment except when made pursuant to an authorizing statute or rule). 
Warrants are also not always required for license, registration, and 
equipment spot checks of vehicles. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 
U.S. 444, 455, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) (holding that a 
non-random highway sobriety checkpoint program did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment). However, some random spot checks require warrants 
if the officer has discretion over which vehicles to stop. Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979). 
Importantly, Washington has held sobriety checkpoints to be 
unconstitutional. City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 456, 755 P.2d 
775 (1988). Additionally, Washington courts found a statute 
unconstitutional because it allowed state patrol officers to stop any motor 
vehicle and require the driver to display his or her driver’s license and 
submit the vehicle to an inspection to ascertain whether the vehicle 
complied with minimum requirements. State v. Marchand, 104 Wn.2d 
434, 441, 706 P.2d 225 (1985). 
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6.4(c) Level of Proof Requirements 
To obtain an administrative warrant to search commercial or 
residential premises, law enforcement officers must offer specific proof of 
a violation, or show that “reasonable legislative or administrative 
standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a 
particular [establishment].” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 
32021, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (brackets in original) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538, 87 
S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967)). However, when fire officials seek 
an administrative warrant to determine the recent cause of a fire, “fire 
officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has occurred 
on the premises, that the scope of the proposed search is reasonable and 
will not intrude unnecessarily on the fire victim’s privacy, and that the 
search will be executed at a reasonable and convenient time.” Michigan v. 
Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294, 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984). 
When officers seek a warrant based on a general administrative 
program, they must set forth sufficient details of the program to enable the 
magistrate to determine whether the program is reasonable. City of Seattle 
v. Leach, 29 Wn. App. 81, 85, 627 P.2d 159 (1981). Conclusory statements 





The Exclusionary Rule 
Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of a 
person’s constitutional rights must be suppressed in a defendant’s criminal 
trial. State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. 
Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 393, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). The exclusionary rule 
applies both to federal and state violations of the Fourth Amendment, 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), 
as well as violations of article I, section 7, State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 
620, 633, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009) (the general rule is that “violation of a 
constitutional immunity automatically implies exclusion of the evidence 
seized”) (quoting State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990)). 
This chapter addresses five topics: first, general considerations of the 
exclusionary rule; second, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule; third, the rule’s operation in non-trial settings; fourth, searches by 
private individuals; and finally, exclusion of evidence as fruit of the 
poisonous tree and various exceptions to the rule. 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
As stated above, the exclusionary rule operates to suppress any 
evidence found through unconstitutional government action. State v. 
Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 (2002). The exclusionary rule 
prohibits the use of “derivative evidence,” real or testimonial, that is the 
“fruit,” or product, of the illegally obtained evidence. Murray v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 533, 536, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988); State 
v. Smith, 165 Wn. App. 296, 309, 266 P.3d 250 (2011), aff’d on other 
grounds, 177 Wn.2d 533, 303 P.3d 1047 (2013); see, e.g., State v. Samalia, 
186 Wn.2d 262, 279, 375 P.3d 1082 (2016); State v. Hinton, 179 Wn.2d 
862, 869 n.2, 319 P.3d 9 (2014); State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476, 488, 910 
P.2d 447 (1996); State v. Salinas, 121 Wn.2d 689, 697, 853 P.2d 439 
(1993). However, if the evidence will be used only as impeachment 
evidence and not in the government’s case-in-chief, the evidence may be 
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admissible for the limited purpose of impeachment. Walder v. United 
States, 347 U.S. 62, 64–65, 74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503 (1954); State v. 
Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 179–80, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); see also United 
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627–28, 100 S. Ct. 1912, 64 L. Ed. 2d 559 
(1980) (defendant’s statements in cross-examination also subject to 
impeachment by illegally obtained evidence that is inadmissible as 
substantive evidence of guilt). 
Although most of the discussion in this section centers upon the 
exclusion of evidence when compelled by the federal or state constitutions, 
statutory law can also provide the basis for exclusion of evidence. See, 
e.g., State v. Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980) 
(recordings made in violation of Washington privacy statute, although 
permitted under federal wiretap statute, are inadmissible in state court 
proceedings); see 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.5(b) (5th 
ed. 2012) (state may compel exclusion of illegally seized evidence even 
when the federal constitution does not require such exclusion). 
7.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This section first explores the standing requirements under article I, 
section 7. Next, it examines the broad differences between the application 
of the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment and the rule under 
article I, section 7. Lastly, the section discusses the criticisms of a broad-
reaching exclusionary rule. 
7.1(a) Standing 
A defendant must have standing to object to a search or seizure, but, 
while the U.S. Supreme Court has abandoned the automatic standing 
doctrine, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 
2d 619 (1980), a Washington defendant may rely on automatic standing if 
the challenged police action produced the adverse evidence. See State v. 
Jones, 146 Wn.2d 328, 331–35, 45 P.3d 1062 (2002); State v. Williams, 
142 Wn.2d 17, 21–23, 11 P.3d 714 (2000). Still, a defendant asserting 
automatic standing must assert his or her own rights, not those of a third-
party. State v. Libero, 168 Wn. App. 612, 619, 277 P.3d 708 (2012) 
(holding that while a defendant could challenge the legality of a search 
through asserting automatic standing, he still must show a violation of his 
own rights to suppress the challenged evidence); see State v. Hinton, 179 
Wn.2d 862, 869 n.2, 319 P.3d 9 (2014) (a defendant has standing to 
challenge a search upon showing it infringed upon his privacy rights). For 
a general discussion of standing, see 1 LaFave, supra § 1.6. 
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To invoke the exclusionary rule, a defendant must make a timely 
objection. State v. Valladares, 31 Wn. App. 63, 76, 639 P.2d 813 (1982), 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 99 Wn.2d 663, 664 P.2d 508 (1983). 
7.1(b) Difference in Purpose Between the Fourth Amendment and  
Article I, Section 7 
The differences between the federal and state exclusionary rules are 
largely based on the difference in wording and intent between the Fourth 
Amendment and article I, section 7. Historically, the exclusionary rule 
served (1) to deter unreasonable searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 656, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961); (2) to preserve 
judicial integrity by preventing courts from becoming accomplices to the 
willful disobedience of the Constitution, id. at 659, 81 S. Ct. 1684; and (3) 
to sustain the public’s belief that the government will not profit from 
lawless behavior, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357, 94 S. Ct. 
613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The U.S. Supreme 
Court considers deterrence of police misconduct to be the most important 
justification to the rule. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 91618, 104 
S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). 
Conversely, the primary purpose of article I, section 7 underlying the 
exclusionary rule is the protection of individual privacy interests against 
unreasonable governmental intrusions. See State v. Winterstein, 167 
Wn.2d 620, 631−32, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009); see also State v. Afana, 169 
Wn.2d 169, 180, 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 
176–77, 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Rife, 133 Wn.2d 140, 148, 943 P.2d 
266 (1997). As a secondary concern, the rule also deters unlawful police 
activity and preserves the integrity of the judiciary by excluding evidence 
obtained through illegal means. See Afana, 169 Wn.2d at 180, 233 P.3d 
879; Rife, 133 Wn.2d at 148, 943 P.2d 266. Thus, while the Fourth 
Amendment is primarily concerned with deterrence of police conduct, 
article I, section 7 is more concerned with individual privacy. Compare 
State v. Crawley, 61 Wn. App. 29, 35, 808 P.2d 773 (1991), and State v. 
White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 109–12, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982), with Leon, 468 U.S. 
at 91618, 104 S. Ct. 3405. 
7.1(c) Criticism of the Exclusionary Rule 
A number of judges and legal scholars have opposed a broad-
reaching exclusionary rule. See generally 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 1.2(a) (5th ed. 2004). First, commentators argue that the rule 
impedes the police by handicapping the detection and prosecution of 
crime. Id. § 1.2(a), at 32–33. On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment 
itself, not the rule, has that effect. Id. This very argument was rejected 
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when the Amendment was adopted. See id. at 33. In fact, commentators 
suggest that illegally issued warrants cause the loss of only a negligible 
portion of felony arrests. See id. § 1.3(c), at 75. 
Second, commentators argue that the rule only aids the guilty and 
does not deter illegal police action. Id. § 1.2(b), at 3639. After the rule’s 
creation, however, there was a dramatic increase in the number of warrant 
applications and the number of police academy classes offering instruction 
on obtaining evidence in a manner that does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 
2d 1067 (1976). As a result of the rule’s deterrent effect, innocent persons 
are spared intrusive, illegal police procedures. 1 LaFave, supra § 1.2(a), at 
32–33. Suggested alternatives to the exclusionary rule include providing 
civil damages as the sole remedy, limiting the rule to knowing violations, 
or limiting the rule to minor crimes. See generally id. § 1.2(a)(f), at 31–
67; see also Samuel Estreicher & Daniel P. Weick, Opting for a 
Legislative Alternative to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 78 
UMKC L. REV. 949 (2010) (proposing legislation providing for 
comprehensive overview by the Department of Justice of agency-by-
agency constitutional compliance programs); L. Timothy Perrin, If It’s 
Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 
669 (1998) (providing an empirical study of the exclusionary rule and 
suggesting a civil administrative remedy to partially replace the rule); 
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363 (1999) (suggesting an administrative damages 
regime wherein Fourth Amendment violations could be brought directly 
against police). 
7.2 UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES CONDUCTED IN GOOD FAITH 
While federal courts have adopted a good-faith-reliance exception to 
the exclusionary rule, Washington courts have rejected such an exception. 
See State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 184, 233 P.3d 879 (2010); State v. 
Huft, 106 Wn.2d 206, 212, 720 P.2d 838 (1986) (declining to apply “good 
faith” exception under the Washington constitution). This distinction 
stems from the fact that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 7 
of the Washington State Constitution “clearly recognizes an individual’s 
right to privacy with no express limitations.” Afana, 169 Wn.2d at 180, 
233 P.3d 879 (quoting State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 110, 640 P.2d 1061 
(1982)). Thus, even if an officer acts in good faith reliance on an invalid 
warrant, the evidence must be suppressed. State v. Crawley, 61 Wn. App. 
29, 35, 808 P.2d 773 (1991). 
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Under the federal good-faith exception, the exclusionary rule does 
not apply when evidence is seized in reasonable, good faith reliance on a 
search warrant that the court later finds to be unsupported by probable 
cause. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–21, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 
82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). This good-faith exception applies because “the 
marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence 
obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated 
search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Id. at 922, 
104 S. Ct. 3405. Likewise, if the warrant is technically invalid, the 
evidence may be admitted when the police reasonably believed that the 
search was valid. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987–88, 104 
S. Ct. 3424, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737 (1984). Moreover, when police mistakes are 
the result of negligence rather than systemic error or reckless disregard, 
the exclusionary rule does not dictate suppression. Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009). 
7.3 APPLICATIONS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CRIMINAL  
PROCEEDINGS OTHER THAN TRIALS 
During a trial, the exclusionary rule applies in full force. State v. 
Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513 (2002); State v. Kinzy, 141 
Wn.2d 373, 393, 5 P.3d 668 (2000). The rule, however, is not likely to 
apply in other portions of the trial process. The following sections discuss 
applications of the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings other than 
trials.  
7.3(a) Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Pre-Trial Matters 
A person testifying before a grand jury may not refuse to answer 
questions on the ground that the questions are based on evidence derived 
from an illegal search. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349–50, 
94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974). The exclusionary rule is not applied 
to grand jury proceedings because its application would have only a 
marginal deterrent effect. Id. at 351–52, 94 S. Ct. 613. In determining 
whether to employ the rule, courts weigh the deterrent value of applying 
the rule against the costs of excluding the type of evidence in question. Id. 
at 349, 94 S. Ct. 613. 
The exclusionary rule does not apply to indictments based on 
illegally obtained evidence. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 350, 78 
S. Ct. 311, 2 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1958). Again, excluding the evidence, even if 
it means dismissing an indictment, would have only marginal deterrent 
value. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351–52, 94 S. Ct. 613. 
Illegally seized evidence may be considered in determining whether 
there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed the crime 
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charged. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 488, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 
2 L. Ed. 2d 1503 (1958) (holding that it would not be sound judicial 
administration to remand to district court for a special hearing regarding 
probable cause because illegally seized evidence was introduced at trial). 
For example, recordings made by federal agents in a matter inconsistent 
with state law (therefore, inadmissible at trial), nevertheless, may be used 
to furnish probable cause for a court-sanctioned search. State v. O’Neill, 
103 Wn.2d 853, 867–72, 700 P.2d 711 (1985). 
The Washington Supreme Court has not yet decided whether 
illegally obtained evidence must be suppressed at a bail hearing. Other 
jurisdictions that have considered the issue suggest that the evidence may 
not be suppressed. See State v. Tucker, 101 N.J. Super. 380, 383, 244 A.2d 
353 (1968) (no need to go into detail concerning admissibility of the 
evidence for purposes of bail application when state makes prima facie 
showing of admissibility); Steigler v. Super. Ct., 252 A.2d 300, 305 (Del. 
1969). 
7.3(b) Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Post-Trial Matters 
Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, effective July 1, 
1984, structured, but did not eliminate, discretionary decisions affecting 
sentencing. RCW 9.94A.010. Under this provision, the sentencing process 
is limited to the present conviction and the defendant’s prior convictions. 
As a result, illegally obtained evidence may not be admitted. This contrasts 
somewhat with sentencing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The 
majority of circuits have maintained that the exclusionary rule does not 
apply in sentencing hearings. See United States v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426, 
1432–36 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Montoya-Ortiz, 7 F.3d 1171, 
1181–82 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1344–45 
(6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1260–61 (2d Cir. 
1992); United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1234 (11th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321, 324–25 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Washington courts are divided on whether article I, section 7 requires 
the application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings. 
State v. Murray, 110 Wn.2d 706, 70809, 757 P.2d 487 (1988) 
(recognizing the division and uncertainty that exists around the article I, 
section 7 exclusionary rule in revocation hearings, but not resolving the 
uncertainty). Compare, e.g., State v. Kuhn, 7 Wn. App. 190, 194, 499 P.2d 
49 (1972) (excluding evidence obtained as result of an illegal search is not 
applicable to probation revocation hearings), with State v. Lampman, 45 
Wn. App. 228, 232, 724 P.2d 1092 (1986) (requiring application without 
exception to probation revocation proceedings). Notably, there must be a 
“nexus between the property search and the alleged probation violation.” 
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State v. Cornwell, 190 Wn.2d 296, 304, 412 P.3d 1265 (2018). However, 
because parolees experience a lower expectation of privacy, it is less likely 
that evidence will be illegally obtained while the parolee is on release. 
State v. Parris, 163 Wn. App. 110, 117, 259 P.3d 331 (2011). 
Under the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule does not apply 
to parole revocation hearings. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 
357, 365–66, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998). The Court has 
reasoned that applying the exclusionary rule would hinder the functions of 
the state parole systems and alter the traditionally flexible administrative 
nature of parole revocation proceedings, while providing only minimal 
deterrence benefits. Id. at 364, 118 S. Ct. 2014. 
7.4 APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN QUASI-CRIMINAL 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
While Washington courts have rarely addressed the matter, the 
exclusionary rule has been applied in quasi-criminal and administrative 
proceedings as well. First, the exclusionary rule has generally been applied 
in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In Washington, criminal court rules 
are automatically applied to juvenile proceedings. JuCR 1.4(b). Other 
jurisdictions have also taken this approach. See In re Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 
3d 990, 993, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1970); In re Marsh, 40 Ill. 2d 53, 55, 237 
N.E.2d 529 (1968). However, some jurisdictions have found that it might 
be unwise to apply the rule in dependency hearings based on the possible 
damage to the child. See, e.g., In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 
615, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978). Along the same reasoning, the rule has not 
been applied to other conservatorship proceedings because of concern for 
the individual’s well-being and society’s safety. See Conservatorship of 
Susan T., 8 Cal. 4th 1005, 1019–20, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 40, 884 P.2d 988 
(1994). 
Second, whether the exclusionary rule is applied in an administrative 
proceeding depends on the nature of the proceeding. If the proceeding is 
closer to criminal in nature, then the rule will be applied. For example, the 
exclusionary rule is applied in forfeiture proceedings, requiring the 
suppression of any illegally seized evidence used to prove the criminal 
violation justifying the forfeiture. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. 
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965); 
Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 376, 37879, 721 P.2d 519 (1986). 
Courts have also applied the exclusionary rule when the disposition 
is relatively significant and when application of the rule is likely to deter 
unlawful searches and seizures. See New Brunswick v. Speights, 157 N.J. 
Super. 9, 2021, 384 A.2d 225 (1978) (policy of deterring unlawful 
governmental conduct may be significant when subsequent disciplinary 
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hearing directed at police officer charged with criminal violations was 
foreseeable at time of search or seizure). In contrast, the exclusionary rule 
is generally not applied to administrative proceedings. I.N.S. v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984) 
(exclusionary rule not applied in civil deportation hearings held by INS); 
see also Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365, 118 S. Ct. 
2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998) (exclusionary rule incompatible with 
traditionally flexible administrative procedure). However, in the Ninth 
Circuit, “administrative tribunals are still required to exclude evidence that 
was ‘obtained by deliberate violations of the Fourth Amendment or by 
conduct a reasonable officer should know is in violation of the 
Constitution.’” Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
7.5 SEARCHES BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS 
Article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment only apply to 
government actor’s searches. As such, evidence found during a private 
actor’s search need not be excluded if the search fails to conform to 
constitutional requirements. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 
S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 (1921) (papers obtained through theft by a 
private individual and delivered to federal prosecutors admissible against 
defendant); State v. Clark, 48 Wn. App. 850, 855, 743 P.2d 822 (1987). 
But the evidence must have come from an actively conducted search; if 
the private individual merely observes incriminating evidence, article I, 
section 7 protection will apply. See State v. Eisfeldt, 163 Wn.2d 628, 635–
39, 185 P.3d 580 (2008) (rejecting the private search doctrine under article 
I, section 7); State v. Faford, 128 Wn.2d 476, 488–89, 910 P.2d 447 (1996) 
(independent basis was required for police search made pursuant to 
information obtained from a nosey neighbor who was eavesdropping on 
the defendant’s cordless telephone conversations). 
Importantly, once the private party gives the evidence to the 
government, the government search may not exceed the scope of the 
private party’s previous search. In re Teddington, 116 Wn.2d 761, 766, 
808 P.2d 156 (1991) (police properly read letter when sergeant had 
inventoried defendant’s locker and turned over incriminating letter to 
police); State v. Walter, 66 Wn. App. 862, 866, 833 P.2d 440 (1992) (no 
violation when photo lab turns pictures over to police). The intrusion is 
considered of the same scope even if officers test a substance that was 
merely looked at by the private party. State v. Bishop, 43 Wn. App. 17, 20, 
714 P.2d 1199 (1986) (no violation when police reopened packets and 
tested substance that was found by private security guard in the telephone 
mouthpiece of defendant’s hospital room). 
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7.5(a) Government Involvement 
For a search to be truly “private”—therefore, not subject to 
constitutional limitations—the actor must not be a government actor nor 
acting under the state’s authority. Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 103 
Wn.2d 594, 600, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985) (when private person acts under 
authority of state, Fourth Amendment applies; thus, school search of 
students’ luggage must conform to constitutional requirements). If the 
actor is a private individual, the defendant has the burden of proving that 
he or she conducted the search as an agent or instrumentality of the state. 
State v. Swenson, 104 Wn. App. 744, 754, 9 P.3d 933, 938 (2000); State 
v. Clark, 48 Wn. App. 850, 856, 743 P.2d 822 (1987). 
Under an agency theory, a search is not private if a government 
officer ordered or requested it. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 
47475, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 (1921). For example, an airline 
employee’s search was not private when conducted under the supervision 
of government agents’ request. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th 
Cir. 1966); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336, 105 S. Ct. 
733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985) (holding that school officials act as 
representatives of the state and as such are government actors). No agency 
relationship exists unless the state actively encourages or instigates the 
citizen’s actions. See Clark, 48 Wn. App. at 85556, 743 P.2d 822. Courts 
consider as factors the State’s knowledge of and acquiescence in the search 
and whether the citizen’s intent was to assist law enforcement efforts or to 
further his or her own end. Swenson, 104 Wn. App. at 753, 9 P.3d 933 
(father intended to assist police by obtaining defendant’s phone records 
and, although police knew of the father’s efforts, there was no evidence 
that they instigated, encouraged, counseled, or directed the father to obtain 
the phone records). 
Under a joint endeavor theory, when the police accompany a citizen 
on a search, the search becomes a government search. Corngold, 367 F.2d 
at 56 (contraband discovered by airline agents inadmissible when 
government agents actively joined in search). “It is immaterial whether the 
official originated the idea or simply joined in it while the search was in 
progress.” Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 93 L. 
Ed. 1819 (1949). But even if the police are summoned before the search 
begins and are present as it occurs, the search may still be considered 
private if a private purpose is served. United States v. Lamar, 545 F.2d 
488, 490 (5th Cir. 1977) (heroin admissible when discovered by airline 
agent who opened unclaimed bag to determine its owner, because it was a 
private search even though a police officer was present during search). 
If a public employee conducts a search in his or her private capacity, 
the search is not a state action merely because the individual is a public 
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employee. State v. Ludvik, 40 Wn. App. 257, 263, 698 P.2d 1064 (1985) 
(state game warden, residing across the street from defendant, observed 
suspected drug transactions and informed police). Searches by off-duty 
police officers are considered private if the officers acted as private 
citizens and if the search or seizure was unconnected with their duties as 
police officers. People v. Wachter, 58 Cal. App. 3d 911, 920–21, 130 Cal. 
Rptr. 279 (1976) (deputy sheriff acted as private citizen when he notified 
law enforcement officials of defendant’s marijuana plants). When a 
private party, however, acts as a police officer, has a strong interest in 
obtaining convictions, and is familiar with search and seizure law, the 
purposes of the exclusionary rule are served by suppression and the rule 
will apply. See Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 477 Pa. 93, 100, 383 A.2d 
838 (1978). 
Lastly, a majority of jurisdictions have decided that when evidence 
is seized to aid the government and the government had prior knowledge 
that the seizure would occur, the taint of the illegal action is transferred to 
the government. See United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1327–28 
(5th Cir. 1975) (copies of fraudulent claims allowed into evidence because 
defendant failed to prove that federal investigators knew nurse had 
illegally copied records for government use).  
7.6 VIOLATION OF WARRANT PROCEDURE 
“[A]bsent a showing of prejudice to the defendant, procedural 
noncompliance does not compel invalidation of an otherwise sufficient 
warrant or suppression of its fruits.” State v. Aase, 121 Wn. App. 558, 567, 
89 P.3d 721 (2004) (emphasis omitted). For example, when the police 
failed to give a defendant a copy of the warrant before commencing an 
otherwise lawful search, the evidence was still admissible because the 
defendant was not prejudiced by receiving the warrant several minutes 
after the search began, and the search would not have been less intrusive 
had the defendant been able to immediately see the warrant. State v. Kern, 
81 Wn. App. 308, 311, 914 P.2d 114 (1996). 
7.7 DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE AS “FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE”: 
GENERAL RULE 
Whether evidence obtained illegally will be suppressed depends on 
the extent to which the evidence derives from exploitation of the illegality. 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 
441 (1963) (The question is “whether, granting establishment of the 
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has 
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”) (internal 
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quotations omitted); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 
385, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1920); State v. Byers, 88 Wn.2d 1, 
10, 559 P.2d 1334 (1977) (defendants’ confessions inadmissible when 
obtained as a result of defendants being in custody after an unlawful arrest 
and being confronted with illegally obtained evidence); State v. 
Magneson, 107 Wn. App. 221, 226–27, 26 P.3d 986 (2001) (evidence was 
not admissible under the plain view doctrine when officers entered home 
with what was later determined to be an invalid search warrant and seized 
drugs from a third person in the home at the time of the search); State v. 
McReynolds, 104 Wn. App. 560, 571, 17 P.3d 608 (2000) (court remanded 
for lack of findings regarding whether subsequently obtained evidence 
from valid warrants was tainted by an illegal search). The following 
sections discuss three exceptions that have been used to determine whether 
a given piece of evidence constitutes derivative “fruit of the poisonous 
tree” and should therefore be suppressed. See generally 6 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4 (5th ed. 2004). 
7.7(a) Attenuation Test 
The attenuation test suggests that where there are intervening, 
independent factors along the chain of causation, the taint of illegally 
obtained evidence becomes so dissipated as to preclude suppression of 
derivative evidence as “fruit” of the illegal police action. State v. Warner, 
125 Wn.2d 876, 888, 889 P.2d 479 (1995) (remanded for determination of 
whether both sources of information were compelled; if only one was 
compelled, the other would constitute independent source and any “fruits” 
need not be excluded); see 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4 
(5th ed. 2012). Put another way, the detrimental consequences of 
excluding the evidence become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of 
the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590, 60809, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., 
concurring); State v. Spotted Elk, 109 Wn. App. 253, 262, 34 P.3d 906 
(2001) (finding that the defendant’s and parole officer’s testimony was 
insufficiently attenuated from a law enforcement officer’s Miranda 
violation because the defendant’s improperly admitted incriminatory 
statements regarding heroin compelled her to explain and later testify 
about why she was carrying the substance); State v. Reid, 38 Wn. App. 
203, 213, 687 P.2d 861 (1984). 
For example, in Reid, the police arrested the defendant shortly after 
he emerged from his apartment building and got into a car. Reid, 38 Wn. 
App. at 205, 687 P.2d 861. When the defendant refused to identify which 
apartment unit he had exited, police seized the defendant’s keys from the 
car, entered the building, and used the keys to unlock the door to one of 
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the apartments. Id. at 20506, 687 P.2d 861. The police then entered the 
apartment, observed evidence in plain view, and later returned and seized 
the evidence pursuant to a warrant. Id. at 206, 687 P.2d 861. The court 
reasoned that even if the initial seizure of the keys was unlawful, the 
evidence taken from the apartment would be admissible because the 
seizure of the evidence “was so attenuated that the taint of the seizure of 
the keys had dissipated.” Id. at 208–09, 687 P.2d 861. “[B]ystanders had 
identified the door through which the defendant had often entered and 
exited. [Thus,] [t]he keys were not utilized in the manner of a divining rod 
to locate [the defendant’s] apartment but rather to facilitate access to [the] 
residence and to confirm from which door the defendant had exited.” Id. 
at 209, 687 P.2d 861. 
As of the end of 2018, Washington courts have not explicitly adopted 
the attenuation doctrine, but they have applied it. See State v. Eserjose, 
171 Wn.2d 907, 919, 259 P.3d 172 (2011) (evaluating the challenged 
evidence to see if it was “fruit of the poisonous tree” or so “attenuated as 
to dissipate the taint”); cf State v. Samalia, 186 Wn.2d 262, 279, 375 P.3d 
1082 (2016) (limiting the application of attenuation when not asserted or 
supported in response to suppressing evidence at the trial level). But see 
State v. Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871, 434 P.3d 58 (2019) (explicitly adopting 
a narrow application of the attenuation doctrine compatible with article I, 
section 7).  The court in Eserjose held that the defendant’s confession 
obtained at the sheriff’s office following an illegal arrest at the defendant’s 
home was an act of free will sufficient to purge the primary taint of the 
illegal arrest. Id. at 929, 259 P.3d 172. 
7.7(b) Independent Source Test 
Under the independent source exception, illegally obtained evidence 
is not suppressed under the exclusionary rule when the evidence was 
ultimately obtained pursuant to a valid warrant or other lawful means, 
independent of the unlawful government action. State v. Gaines, 154 
Wn.2d 711, 718, 116 P.3d 993 (2005). Thus, “where an unlawful [action] 
has given investigators knowledge of facts x and y, but fact z has been 
learned by other means, fact z can be said to be admissible because [it is] 
derived from an ‘independent source.’” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 
533, 538, 108 S. Ct. 2533, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988). When police lawfully 
obtain evidence, the fact that police also came by the evidence unlawfully 
does not make the evidence suppressible. State v. O’Bremski, 70 Wn.2d 
425, 42930, 423 P.2d 530 (1967) (a missing child’s testimony was 
admissible because she was not discovered solely as a result of unlawful 
search). The underlying policy is that, although the government should not 
benefit from illegal activity, it should not end up in a worse position than 
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it otherwise would have been if it had not performed the illegal activity. 
Murray, 487 U.S. at 542, 108 S. Ct. 2533. 
The independent source exception has been held to comply with 
article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. Gaines, 154 
Wn.2d at 722, 116 P.3d 993 (probable cause existed to search trunk 
independent of initial, illegal search and police would have sought a 
warrant for the trunk even absent the initial, illegal search). Under the 
exception, unlawful police activity does not invalidate a later search if (1) 
the search warrant was based on independently obtained information, and 
(2) the police were not motivated by the prior unlawful activity in seeking 
the search warrant. State v. Miles, 159 Wn. App. 282, 284, 244 P.3d 1030 
(2011); see also State v. Smith, 165 Wn. App. 296, 266 P.3d 250 (2011), 
aff’d on other grounds, 177 Wn.2d 533, 303 P.3d 1047 (2012) (police 
entry into motel room was based on independent information because 
victim sought police assistance as community caretakers and the 
emergency need was an intervening factor that allowed emergency aid 
exception to the warrant requirement). 
7.7(c) Inevitable Discovery Doctrine 
The last exception to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable discovery 
doctrine. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 
2d 377 (1984). Unlike federal courts, Washington courts do not recognize 
the inevitable discovery doctrine. State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 620, 220 
P.3d 1226 (2009). This is attributed to the express protection of individual 
privacy in article I, section 7 and the Washington State Supreme Court’s 
dislike of the doctrine’s speculative analysis. See id. at 635, 220 P.3d 
1226; State v. Hilton, 164 Wn. App. 81, 91−92, 261 P.3d 683 (2011) 
(“Washington courts will not entertain the speculative question about 
whether the police ultimately would have obtained the same information 
by other, lawful means.”). 
Under the federal exception, the inevitable discovery doctrine is an 
extrapolation of the independent source doctrine: if evidence is admissible 
because it was discovered through an independent source, then it should 
be admissible if it would have inevitably been discovered through an 
independent source. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539, 108 S. 
Ct. 2535, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S. 
Ct. 2501 (location of murdered child’s body derived from coerced 
statement was not suppressed when searchers would have located child 
anyway). Under the doctrine, originally tainted evidence is admissible if 
the police, while following routine procedure, would inevitably have 
uncovered the evidence. United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 721 (9th 
Cir. 2009). This reasoning requires a “speculative analysis” of police 
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behavior. State v. Smith, 165 Wn. App. 296, 310, 266 P.3d 250 (2011). 
Specifically, the doctrine examines the police’s actions and their 
motivations to take such actions. Hilton, 164 Wn. App. at 92, 261 P.3d 
683. However, the doctrine does not excuse police failure to obtain a 
search warrant where the police had probable cause, but simply did not 
seek to obtain a warrant. Young, 573 F.3d at 723 (inevitable discovery 
doctrine did not apply when police failed to secure a warrant to search 
defendant’s hotel room after defendant was arrested, but before defendant 
had checked out). 
7.8 EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AS A RESULT OF ILLEGAL ARREST  
OR DETENTION 
7.8(a) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Arrest 
Generally, when a defendant voluntarily confesses, a court may 
admit the defendant’s confession into evidence consistent with the Fifth 
Amendment. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 379, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. 
Ed. 2d 908 (1964). However, when a confession is the fruit of an illegal 
seizure, the court must ensure that the confession is admissible despite the 
constitutional violation. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 60003, 95 S. Ct. 
2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975); see State v. Dane, 89 Wn. App. 226, 
23334, 948 P.2d 1326 (1997). In many cases, the temporal location of 
the illegal arrest in relation to the confession will be a deciding factor. For 
example, a confession made immediately upon an illegal entry and arrest 
is excludable, but when a suspect is released after an illegal arrest and later 
returns to the police station to make a confession, the confession is 
admissible because its taint has dissipated. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 491, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). 
There are three other factors to determine whether the taint of a 
confession has dissipated. Brown, 422 U.S. at 60305, 95 S. Ct. 2254. 
First, the giving of Miranda warnings may indicate sufficient attenuation. 
Id. However, the fact that a defendant received and understood Miranda 
warnings is not sufficient by itself to purge the taint of an illegal seizure. 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 21617, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 
2d 824 (1979). When a person is unlawfully detained because probable 
cause is lacking, but is not formally arrested, the confession is inadmissible 
even if the person was first given Miranda warnings so long as his or her 
confession is causally connected to the detention. Id. at 117–18, 99 S. Ct. 
2248. 
Second, the presence of any intervening circumstances may provide 
sufficient attenuation. The court in State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 907, 
91929, 259 P.3d 172 (2011), held that the defendant’s confession 
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obtained at the sheriff’s office following an illegal arrest at the defendant’s 
home was an act of free will sufficient to purge the primary taint of the 
illegal arrest. Id. The arrest was illegal because of lack of consent, and the 
defendant only confessed later at the police station upon hearing that his 
co-conspirator had implicated him. Id. Because the co-conspirator’s 
confession elicited the defendant’s confession, and not the illegal arrest, 
the intervening circumstance was sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal 
arrest. Id. 
Lastly, the officer’s purpose and the level of the constitutional 
violation are also instructive in determining whether the confession should 
be suppressed. Brown, 422 U.S. at 60305, 95 S. Ct. 2254; see also State 
v. Johnston, 38 Wn. App. 793, 80001, 690 P.2d 591 (1984). 
7.8(b) Search as Fruit of Illegal Arrest or Detention 
When a search is incidental to an illegal arrest, courts may suppress 
the fruits of the search unless intervening factors, such as a valid arrest, 
occur between the illegal arrest and the search. United States v. Walker, 
535 F.2d 896, 89899 (5th Cir. 1976). The search may also be purged of 
the taint by voluntary consent to the search; the voluntariness of the 
consent may be determined by reference to the Brown factors, as outlined 
in section 7.8(a) above. See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 11.4(b) (5th ed. 2012); see also State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 
207, 212, 533 P.2d 123 (1975). 
The defendant’s voluntarily statement does not prove the 
voluntariness of consent. State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9, 15–16, 991 
P.2d 720 (2000), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Winterstein, 167 
Wn.2d 620, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009); 4 LaFave, supra § 8.1(a)(c). 
Washington courts have considered the totality of the circumstances to 
determine whether consent to a search incident to arrest was voluntary. 
State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 58889, 62 P.3d 489 (2003) (stating that 
repeated requests for consent is one factor to consider); State v. Tagas, 121 
Wn. App. 872, 876, 90 P.3d 1088 (2004) (agreeing that totality of 
circumstances is normally the appropriate test); cf. supra §§ 5.9−5.10 
(Ferrier warnings). 
7.8(c) Identification of the Suspect as Fruit of Illegal Arrest 
Whether illegally obtained evidence may be used to identify the 
defendant varies based on the means of identification. Washington courts 
have rarely considered the issue, but courts in other jurisdictions have 
excluded evidence of post-arrest identifications, at-trial identification, 
photo identification, and fingerprinting. First, in Washington, a court has 
found that a post-arrest identification by one officer immediately after a 
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warrantless arrest was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest 
and therefore had to be suppressed. State v. Le, 103 Wn. App. 354, 36265, 
12 P.3d 653 (2000) (admitting the identification would “conveniently 
assum[e] that the police would eventually effect a lawful arrest of the 
defendant . . . . [S]uch a result would eviscerate the exclusionary rule by 
readily excusing police failure to obtain a warrant.”). Under the Fourth 
Amendment, the evidence may be admitted if, under the Brown factors, 
the link between the illegal action and the identification is broken. See 
supra § 7.8(a); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365, 92 S. Ct. 1620, 
32 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1972) (defendant may consent to lineup and hence purge 
taint of illegal action). See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 11.4(a)(j) (5th ed. 2012). Of course, if police make flagrantly 
illegal arrests for the purpose of securing identifications that otherwise 
could not have been obtained, the identifications are inadmissible. United 
States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1970). 
The second issue arises when a witness identified the defendant in 
court but had also previously identified the defendant at a line-up 
following the illegal arrest. Because the arrest was illegal, the initial line-
up identification was illegal. If both the police officer’s knowledge of the 
accused’s identity and the victim’s independent recollection of the accused 
predate the unlawful arrest, the victim’s in-court identification of the 
accused is untainted by either the arrest or the pretrial identification arising 
therefrom. State v. Mathe, 102 Wn.2d 537, 54647, 688 P.2d 859 (1984). 
A basic attenuation test is applied, but with additional factors specific to 
in-court identification. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S. 
Ct. 1244, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980). The court should also consider (1) the 
witness’s prior opportunity to observe the criminal act; (2) any 
discrepancy between the defendant’s pre-lineup description and the 
defendant’s actual description; (3) the identification of someone else prior 
to the lineup; (4) identification of the defendant’s picture before the lineup; 
(5) failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; and (6) the time 
between the criminal act and the lineup identification. United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967). 
Courts have excluded other types of evidence identifying the 
defendant if the evidence was associated with an unlawful arrest. A photo 
identification produced by an unlawful arrest is not admissible. Crews, 445 
U.S. at 474, 100 S. Ct. 1244. And fingerprints must be suppressed when 
police unlawfully arrest a suspect for the purpose of obtaining the 
suspect’s fingerprints so as to prosecute the suspect for the crime of arrest. 
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676 
(1969). 
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7.9 TYPES OF EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AS A RESULT OF  
AN ILLEGAL SEARCH 
7.9(a) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Search 
Attenuation, including the Brown factors, is not applicable to a 
confession following an unlawful search. See supra § 7.8(a). Unlike an 
unlawful arrest, a suspect is more likely to confess as a result of an 
unlawful search. People v. Robbins, 54 Ill. App. 3d 298, 30405, 369 
N.E.2d 577, 12 Ill. Dec. 80 (1977); see also State v. Eserjose, 171 Wn.2d 
907, 917, 259 P.3d 172 (2011) (defendant’s confession following illegal 
arrest not suppressed “since ‘[a]n illegal arrest, without more, has never 
been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid 
conviction.’”) (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S. 
Ct. 1244, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537 (1980)). Thus, a confession is suppressible if it 
would not have been made but for the illegal search. See State v. White, 97 
Wn.2d 92, 10204, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). 
7.9(b) Search or Arrest as Fruit of Illegal Search 
An illegal search that took place prior to securing a valid warrant will 
not invalidate the execution of that warrant, assuming it is based on 
untainted evidence; evidence seized during the execution of the valid 
warrant will be admissible. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814, 
104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984) (second search of home is not 
tainted by prior illegal entry). But if the search warrant for the second 
search is supported by both tainted and untainted evidence, and the 
untainted evidence alone does not establish probable cause, evidence 
seized pursuant to the warrant must be excluded. State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 
304, 31415, 4 P.3d 130 (2000); see also United States v. Marchand, 564 
F.2d 983, 100102 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503, 
515 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Nelson, 459 F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir. 
1972). 
7.9(c) Testimony of Witness as Fruit of Illegal Search 
Testimony and physical evidence are treated differently under the 
exclusionary rule. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 27779, 98 S. 
Ct. 1054, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1978). Verbal testimony carries with it an 
exercise of free will, and the cost of excluding the evidence is great. 
Consequently, suppression of derivative witness testimony depends on 
several factors. First, suppression depends on whether the search and 
testimony were close in time. See id. at 27778, 98 S. Ct. 1054 (witness 
testimony not excluded where “substantial periods of time” had elapsed 
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between the illegal search and the government’s first contact with the 
witness). 
Second, suppression depends on whether the witness testified freely. 
See United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, 35 (2d Cir. 1976) (testimony 
by illegal aliens obtained as result of illegal search inadmissible because 
testimony was prompted by government statements concerning future 
prosecution). Suppression may also depend on whether the fruits of the 
illegal search were used in questioning the witness. See State v. Rogers, 
27 Ohio Op. 2d 105, 198 N.E.2d 796, 806 (1963) (testimony about gun 
suppressed because witness would not have been questioned about gun but 
for unlawful search). Testimony concerning an object seized during an 
illegal search is inadmissible when the identification of the object is 
established by use of the illegally seized object. State v. Swaite, 33 Wn. 
App. 477, 484 n.4, 656 P.2d 520 (1982). 
Third, suppression may depend on the officer’s intent and prior 
knowledge of the existence of the witnesses. If the intent of an illegal 
search was to find witnesses, the evidence should be excluded. See People 
v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 201, 46 N.E.2d 997 (1942) (testimony of witnesses 
suppressed when witnesses’ names were obtained from papers found 
during illegal search). See generally Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S. Ct. 
1054. Admission of the testimony is also more likely if the officers knew 
of the witness’s existence before the search. See State v. O’Bremski, 70 
Wn.2d 425, 42930, 423 P.2d 530 (1967) (although girl was found during 
illegal search, her testimony was admissible because her whereabouts 
were discovered through independent information). 
7.10 CRIME COMMITTED DURING ILLEGAL ARREST OR SEARCH 
Generally, evidence that the defendant attempted to bribe or attack 
an officer is admissible even if the arrest was illegal. State v. Mierz, 127 
Wn.2d 460, 473475, 901 P.2d 286 (1995). In addition, evidence of a 
suspect speeding away from an unlawful traffic stop has been found 
admissible at trial because it is considered sufficiently distinguishable 
from the unlawful intrusion. State v. Owens, 39 Wn. App. 130, 135, 692 
P.2d 850 (1984). 
The rationale for admission of this evidence is that acts of free will 
purge the taint of the illegal police activity; thus, the application of the 
exclusionary rule would only marginally deter illegal police behavior. In 
addition, exclusion would allow persons unlawfully arrested to assault 
officers with minimal risk of criminal liability. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d at 474, 
901 P.2d 286. The evidence would be inadmissible, however, if it were the 
product of questionable police action. See id. at 475, 901 P.2d 286. 
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7.11 WAIVER OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTION 
A defendant may waive or forfeit his or her constitutional objection 
and render the objectionable evidence admissible in three ways: (1) by 
failing to make a timely objection, (2) by testifying at trial about the 
evidence, and (3) by entering a guilty plea. See 6 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 11.1(a), (c)(d) (5th ed. 2012). 
7.11(a) Failure to Make a Timely Objection 
Jurisdictions have different rules for what constitutes a timely 
objection. Washington court rules provide that a defendant’s failure to 
object at the omnibus hearing may constitute a waiver of the objection if 
the party had knowledge of the illegality of the search or seizure prior to 
the hearing. See Wash. CrR 4.5(d); see also State v. Lee, 162 Wn. App. 
852, 857, 259 P.3d 294 (2011), review denied, 173 Wn.2d 1017, 272 P.3d 
247 (2012) (“Under RAP 2.5(a), a party may raise manifest error affecting 
a constitutional right for the first time on appeal. ‘A failure to move to 
suppress evidence, however, constitutes a waiver of the right to have it 
excluded.’” (footnote omitted)) (quoting State v. Mierz, 72 Wn. App. 783, 
789, 866 P.2d 65 (1994)). Thus, a defendant’s failure to move to suppress 
evidence at trial that he or she later contends was illegally gathered 
constitutes a waiver of any error associated with the admission of the 
evidence. Mierz, 127 Wn.2d at 468, 901 P.2d 286. 
Importantly, a defendant may only appeal suppression issues on the 
bases raised during the trial. State v. Garbaccio, 151 Wn. App. 716, 731, 
214 P.3d 168 (2009), review denied, 168 Wn.2d 1027, 230 P.3d 1060 
(2010) (reasoning that because the defendant’s “present contention was 
not raised in his suppression motion, and because he did not seek a ruling 
on this issue from the trial court, [the court] will not consider it for the first 
time on appeal.”). 
7.11(b) Testimony by Defendant Concerning Suppressed Evidence 
Unless a timely objection was made, on appeal a defendant may not 
raise a Fourth Amendment claim challenging the admission of evidence if 
the defendant gave testimony at trial admitting to the possession of that 
evidence. See State v. Peele, 10 Wn. App. 58, 67, 516 P.2d 788 (1973). 
However, a Fourth Amendment claim may be raised on appeal if the 
defendant’s testimony was induced by the erroneous admission of the 
evidence. Id. at 67–68, 516 P.2d 788; see also Harrison v. United States, 
392 U.S. 219, 22425, 88 S. Ct. 2008, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1047 (1968). The 
rationale for the general rule is that the testimony may make the admission 
of the illegal evidence harmless error. See Peele, 10 Wn. App. at 66, 516 
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P.2d 788. See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.1(c) 
(5th ed. 2004). 
7.11(c) Guilty Plea 
A defendant who has knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea 
may not thereafter obtain post-conviction relief on Fourth Amendment 
grounds even though he or she made a timely motion to suppress the 
evidence in advance of the plea. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 
267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973). Courts recognize this 
limitation because “[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in 
open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, 
he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation 
of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” 
State v. Butler, 17 Wn. App. 666, 676, 564 P.2d 828 (1977) (citing Tollett, 
411 U.S. at 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602). But if the plea itself can be characterized 
as the fruit of illegally obtained evidence and should have been suppressed 
upon the defendant’s timely motion, then the plea was not entered 
voluntarily or knowingly. See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602 
(defendant may attack the voluntariness of the plea under the factors set 
forth in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 
2d 763 (1970)); see also State v. Wilson, 162 Wn. App. 409, 414–15, 417, 
253 P.3d 1143 (2011) (“[A] ‘guilty plea waives or renders irrelevant all 
constitutional violations that occurred before the guilty plea, except those 
related to the circumstances of the plea or to the government’s legal power 
to prosecute regardless of factual guilt.’”) (quoting State v. Brandenburg, 
153 Wn. App. 944, 948, 223 P.3d 1259 (2009)). 
7.12 HARMLESS ERROR 
Even when illegally seized evidence has been improperly admitted 
at trial, a conviction will not be reversed if the defendant would have been 
convicted without its admission. See State v. Smith, 93 Wn.2d 329, 
35253, 610 P.2d 869 (1980); State v. Flicks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 396, 588 
P.2d 1328 (1979). Where an error infringes on a constitutional right, the 
error is presumed prejudicial, and the State bears the burden of proving the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Thompson, 151 
Wn.2d 793, 808, 92 P.3d 228 (2004); State v. McReynolds, 117 Wn. App. 
309, 326, 71 P.3d 663 (2003); State v. Spotted Elk, 109 Wn. App. 253, 
261, 34 P.3d 906 (2001). A constitutional error is harmless if the appellate 
court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that, in light of the 
overwhelming untainted evidence, a jury would have reached the same 
result in the absence of the error. State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 425, 705 
P.2d 1182 (1985). 
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CONCLUSION 
Particulars of search and seizure law may change based upon the 
circumstances of each case, but the types of issues raised and considered 
are likely to remain similar. This survey attempts to expand upon basic 
search and seizure issues by referencing recent Washington search and 
seizure cases. While this survey is not comprehensive and will require 
continual updating, we hope it will continue to be a useful tool for 
practitioners and judges who must assess the scope of protection that the 
Washington State Constitution and the U.S. Constitution afford persons 
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